Case law

State v. Dolbow

117 N.J.L. 560 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 2, 1937

It took legislation to qualify them to serve on juries, and this was done by the legislature of 1921, chapter 28, page 50. … By this act and this act alone was the door opened to the members of that sex to participate as qualified jurors.

Countiss v. Trenton State College

77 N.J. 590 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Oct 12, 1978

Moreover, it was established that the men’s season was only two weeks longer than the women’s and that Countiss was required to coach both the women’s junior varsity and the varsity basketball teams in her second year and … foundation for the College’s requirement of significant progress toward a doctorate for tenure seekers and Countiss’s lack thereof, strongly spell out a clearly mistaken exercise of judgment by the Division in awarding Countiss

Oravsky v. Encompass Insurance

804 F. Supp. 2d 228 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Apr 28, 2011

Reply Brf. at 2; see also Moving Brf. at 8 (arguing that Metlife establishes that “antique automobile policies, like plaintiffs, fall outside the provisions of New Jersey’s automobile insurance laws ...). … A “special” policy is one that is available only to certain individuals who qualify as “eligible low income individuals.” 39:6A-3.3.

Howard Savings Inst. of Newark v. Peep

34 N.J. 494 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 10, 1961

We first consider the next-of-kin’s contention that the doctrines of cy pres and deviation are inapplicable to the trust established by Mr. … Clearly, scholarship loan aid is one of those privileges.

State v. Travis

125 N.J. Super. 1 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 4, 1973

Indeed, the legislative history clearly indicates that "the issue of delegation by that officer would be a question of State law." U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, supra, at 2187. … In such instances it will be the burden of the State to establish that the exercise of the power by a surrogate was necessary and warranted when tested against the aims and purposes of the legislation permitting wiretap intrusions

Smith v. Continental Ins. Corp.

747 F. Supp. 275 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Sep 25, 1990

The burden is upon a plaintiff alleging discrimination pursuant to § 1981 to establish by the preponderance of the evidence that (1) he or she applied for an available position; (2) he or she was qualified for the available … Even if there were positions available for which she was qualified — and, I reiterate, she has failed to so establish — plaintiff has neither refuted the existence of or her awareness of the eminently reasonable company policy

In Re the Department of Insurance's Order Nos. A89-119 & A90-125

129 N.J. 365 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 29, 1992

If the Commissioner makes such a determination, the legislative statement and the statute itself both clearly indicate that the Commissioner may modify the statewide average rate change calculated pursuant to the formula. … Neither the statute nor the legislative history contains any qualifying language that would tend to limit the Commissioner’s discretion to modify the statewide average rate by changing only one element of the statutory formula

Girls Friendly Society v. Cape May City

26 N.J. Tax 549 · New Jersey Tax Court · Oct 26, 2012

The Municipality acknowledges that GFSPA itself qualifies as a nonprofit organization subject to exempt status pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:4-36. … Direct proof of an individual’s mental or moral improvement is not necessary for an entity to qualify for an exemption. International Sch. Services, Inc. v.

Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd.

916 F. Supp. 404 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Dec 29, 1995

Defendants conclude that the Protective Order immunizes all unintentional disclosures against any waiver argument. … Establishing that a disclosure was unintentional, therefore, does not go far in establishing the absence of waiver.

Krich v. Zemel

96 N.J. Eq. 208 · New Jersey Court of Chancery · May 9, 1924

Justice Minturn's opinion, which clearly sets forth the facts: "One Meyer had title to the lot with the building thereon [now property of complainant]. … be superior to the lien of an existing mortgage, whose lien or title has not been released or qualified in any way by the agreements referred to.

75 SPRUCE v. State Board

382 N.J. Super. 567 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Sep 21, 2005

The State Board is entitled to the immunity conferred by § 3 of the New Jersey Contractual Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 59:13-3, and both cases are hereby dismissed. … The legislative intent in adopting the Charter School Program Act is clearly expressed in § 2: The Legislature finds and declares that the establishment of charter schools as part of this State's program of public education

Read v. Board of Excise Commissioners

77 N.J.L. 33 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 17, 1908

act of the legislature that created these local boards conferred upon them unlimited and exclusive powers of legislation touching the granting of licenses to sell intoxicating liquors or only a particular function and a qualified … On the contrary, its clearly expressed purpose is the administration of excise laws and not their abrogation or repeal.

DCPP VS. V.F., IN THE MATTER OF T.Q., A.Q., S.F., AND VI.F. (FN-15-0061-17, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

457 N.J. Super. 525 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 22, 2019

"Only when the trial court's conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark' should an appellate court intervene and make its own findings to ensure that there is not a denial of justice." Ibid. … Moreover, we agree with defendant that the trial judge should not have considered the HGN test because Officer Falzarano was not qualified as an expert.

State v. Triestman

416 N.J. Super. 195 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Sep 10, 2010

An "indictment should not be dismissed unless the prosecutor's error was clearly capable of producing an unjust result. … Defendant points out that N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3b does not have any such subsections; the State asserts that the "(1)" is clearly a reference to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2c(1).

Long v. Township of Union & The Clinton Hill Cemetery Ass'n

79 N.J.L. 70 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Oct 23, 1909

township of Union, county of Union, on March 18th, 1909, entitled “An ordinance granting the .consent and approval of the township committee of the township of Union *71 to the Clinton Hill Cemetery Association, to locate and establish … The testimony clearly shows that the trolley was to offer facilities for transportation to the inhabitants of this section of the township, irrespective of cemetery uses.

Paydon v. Hawk

960 F. Supp. 867 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Apr 9, 1997

of custody for an inmate who completes a qualifying drug abuse treatment program. … Obviously, such a decision is clearly rationally related to the legitimate interests of the BOP.

Kirschling v. Atlantic City Board of Education

10 F. Supp. 3d 587 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Mar 31, 2014

To “demonstrate ‘background circumstances’ sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination[,]” under this standard Plaintiff can either establish that: (1) he “was better qualified for the position than the minority candidate … This is demonstrated clearly from the chart below.

Johnny Medina v. Ceasar G. Pitta, M.D.

442 N.J. Super. 1 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Aug 11, 2015

Pitta's answer complied with the requirement established by the Supreme Court in Buck v. … Morse was qualified to testify as an expert witness.

Margaret A. Kelly v. Back of Bay Condominium Association, Inc.

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 19, 2026

Finally, plaintiff argues "[m]inisterial acts of the public entity defendants are not shielded by qualified immunity; only discretionary acts can be." … immunity.

State ex rel. S. Z.

177 N.J. Super. 32 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 5, 1981

These are clearly the kinds of motions covered by R. 3:10-3 which should not be considered during trial. … Thus since R. 3:10-3 controls, the motions should clearly not have been considered during trial.