Case law

Sokol v. University Hospital, Inc.

402 F. Supp. 1029 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 14, 1975

The underlying facts concerning the operation of the Hospital have been established by the pleadings, by stipulation and by affidavits. … Pape, 365 U.S. 167 , 81 S:Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) in which it was held that policemen, who were clearly agents of the state, may not escape liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , because they act in violation of state laws

Mangianfico v. Stanton

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 20, 2019

Under the well-established doctrine of judicial immunity, “a judge is immune from a suit for money damages” as long as the relevant actions were “taken in the judge’s judicial capacity” and were not “taken in the complete … When extended to other officials, the immunity is called quasi-judicial immunity, and it “provides absolute immunity for those who perform tasks that are inextricably intertwined with the judicial function,” Nystedt v.

Attorney General v. Merrimack Manufacturing Co.

80 Mass. 586 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 15, 1860

Rights of pews and sittings are often created and conveyed, by which the power of the proprietors to dispose of the church may be to some extent qualified and limited. … The consecration is, and is to be regarded as, a religious ceremony, and not as an act qualifying the estate in the land.

Taing v. Chertoff

526 F. Supp. 2d 177 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 12, 2007

The complaint contains three counts which are not very clearly presented. … I.N.A. section 204 (“Section 204”) establishes the procedure for granting immigrant status.

Commonwealth v. Corcoran

252 Mass. 465 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 22, 1925

The defendant Reese, who was called and testified as a witness, was promised immunity by the district attorney if she would testify. … It is well established that evidence which merely tends to prove that defendants have committed similar offences is not admissible.

Commonwealth v. Pentz

247 Mass. 500 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 25, 1924

His contention is that the statute establishes no standard of conduct sufficiently definite to inform a person charged with its violation of the nature and extent of his offence, and affords no ascertainable test of guilt … The operation of an automobile upon a way is a clearly defined act, susceptible of being easily understood. Its operation so as not to endanger the lives or safety of the public is the description of a fact.

Commonwealth v. Edelin

371 Mass. 497 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 17, 1976

Clearly the doctor’s duty to the viable fetus arises at the time he knows or reasonably should know that he could be dealing with such a subject. … That immunity extends to the privilege of terminating the pregnancy; it does not protect against wilful, wanton or reckless conduct which causes the death of a viable fetus.

Shipley Co., Inc. v. Clark

728 F. Supp. 818 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 16, 1990

Defendants’ visits and reports to Shipley in Massachusetts, and the mailing of the employment contracts, qualify as “transacting business” for purposes of § 3(a). … Because defendants are clearly violating the no-compete covenants, Shipley has established a likelihood of success on the merits.

Zoppo v. John Hancock Insurance

6 Mass. L. Rptr. 137 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Oct 31, 1996

At first glance, it might seem that the GIC is kin to the associations thus shielded from the operation of G.L.c. 93A and ought also to be immune from its proscriptions. … Poznik, 417 Mass. at 51 . 6 The regulations promulgated by the GIC clearly describe the GIC’s power to determine participant eligibility and the amount and extent of coverage provided under the plan. 805 C.M.R. §§3:05(2)

Reade v. Secretary of the Commonwealth

472 Mass. 573 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 3, 2015

Empowering the clerk to grant relief clearly was intended to expedite the waiver process in cases involving routine costs and expenses. … Because Reade did not receive such benefits, he would not have qualified as indigent under the 1980 version of the statute.

Finigan v. Burwell

189 F. Supp. 3d 201 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 19, 2016

To treat her diabetes, Finigan’s physician “established a blood glucose testing regimen requiring the use of a [CGMS,]” Id. at 0062 . … The sole issue with regard to Finigan’s appeal is whether her CGMS supplies qualify as “durable medical equipment.”

Willowood of Great Barrington, Inc. v. Sebelius

638 F. Supp. 2d 98 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 28, 2009

Therefore, pursuant to Medicare policy, the test results were not used by the ordering physician in such a way as to qualify for reimbursement.... … The orders established patient-specific sliding scales. (A.R. at 38, 151.)

The First Marblehead Corporation v. Commissioner of Revenue

470 Mass. 497 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 28, 2015

We view the language of § 2A (e) (vi) (B)18 to be unambiguous in establishing the rebuttable default presumption described by the board. See Commissioner of Revenue v. … Such a reading would leave open the possibility that loans qualifying as property of the taxpayer could exist without being assigned anywhere. This is clearly an unintended and ultimately absurd result.

Gray v. Patriot Bank (In re Newbury Cafe, Inc.)

80 B.R. 259 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 21, 1987

United States, 789 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir.1986). 1 The Fourth Circuit found that the language of section 506(b) established a distinction between interest and the other claims that could be made by an oversecured creditor: The … Though Congress could have more clearly separated the interest clause from the agreement clause, we think that the natural meaning of its chosen words is to permit postpetition interest on noncon-sensual oversecured claims

Alexander v. Brigham & Women's Physicians Organization, Inc.

467 F. Supp. 2d 136 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 26, 2006

Rather, it clearly states that to merit top hat status a plan must: (1) be unfunded; (2) be maintained primarily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation; and (3) such deferred compensation must be for “a select … plan contributions), offset for qualified plan and employer 403(b) contributions from any source.

Town of Wrentham v. Housing Appeals Committee

69 Mass. App. Ct. 449 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jun 27, 2007

HAC clearly has jurisdiction to determine in the first instance whether a denial of a comprehensive permit application comports with the statute when that denial is predicated on asserted compliance with the town’s minimum … Newton, 397 Mass. 329, 333-335 (1986) (styling claim as one for declaratory judgment does not establish basis for judicial review that does not otherwise exist).

Daviau v. Daviau (In Re Daviau)

16 B.R. 421 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 13, 1982

On the basis of this qualifying language, the defendant argues that if the award was not for Mrs. Daviau’s support, it must have been part of an overall property settlement between the parties. … Having thus found that the plaintiff has established a prima facie ease for non-dis-chargeability, the burden then falls upon the debtor to establish his continuing right to a discharge of the obligation.

Commonwealth v. Sheppard

313 Mass. 590 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 26, 1943

Holt, who qualified as a psychiatrist and who had examined Sheppard on three occasions subsequently to January 1, 1942. … There was no error in the admission of this testimony by a duly qualified psychiatrist who had examined Sheppard.

Cardillo, Jr. v. Town of Stockbridge

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 9, 2021

Qualified immunity shields government officials whose conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. … Qualified immunity “protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Solis-Alarcón v.

Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Backleaf, LLC

60 Mass. App. Ct. 502 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Feb 24, 2004

“Although whether a particular set of acts, in their factual setting, is unfair or deceptive is a question of fact. . . the boundaries of what may qualify for consideration as a G. … It is Diamond’s burden on appeal to establish that the judge’s finding was clearly erroneous by demonstrating that it was not supported by “any reasonable view of the evidence, including all rational inferences of which it