Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
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Maryland Casualty Co. v. NSTAR Electric Co.
471 Mass. 416 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 14, 2015
appeal, the plaintiffs assert that the judge improperly granted partial summary judgment because: (1) there is a genuine dispute regarding the authenticity of the tariff; (2) the language at issue in the tariff does not clearly … We have no occasion to address 26 whether a broader limitation of liability tariff provision -- one that, for instance, fully immunized a public utility
Cited 7 timesPublished26 Mass. App. Dec. 144 · Massachusetts District Court, Appellate Division · Jun 6, 1963
It was established that the only persons present at the time of this .conversation were Alfred Clark, Edna Clark and Daniel Splaine. … Clearly, the conversation called for is hearsay and, under the circumstances and for the purpose it was offered, does not qualify under any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule of exclusion.
Cited 0 timesPublished1994 Mass. App. Div. 74 · Massachusetts District Court, Appellate Division · Apr 25, 1994
Pursuant to Section 3, eligibility for G.L.c. 258A compensation is expressly limited to victims of violent crimes and their qualifying dependents. See generally, Smith v. Commonwealth, 1984 Mass. App. Div. 10, 11 . … Such finding would be reviewed on a G.L.c. 258A appeal under the customary “clearly erroneous” standard. Dist./Mun. Cts. R. Civ. E, Rule 52(a). See generally, Kendall v. Selvaggio, 413 Mass. 619, 620 (1992); Powers v.
Cited 0 timesPublished682 F. Supp. 2d 60 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 29, 2010
Second, as a waiver of sovereign immunity, the FTCA should return the action, as near as statutorily warranted, to what it would have been had the immunity not been present in the first instance. … Sovereign immunity bars that lawsuit from going forward. Fine.
Cited 16 timesPublished62 Mass. App. Ct. 673 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Dec 13, 2004
Gen., 344 Mass. 188, 192 (1962) (in the usual case, “[u]se of the words ‘about,’ ‘more or less,’ and the like, to qualify a statement of quantity indicates that the quantity of land is not the essence of the contract”). … We accept this finding of the Land Court judge as it was not clearly erroneous.
Cited 6 timesPublishedThomka v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc.
22 Mass. L. Rptr. 263 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 12, 2007
At schools where there is insufficient student interest to establish separate boys’ and girls’ teams, the schools may field mixed-gender teams. … The plaintiff competed in the 2005 fall boys’ individual tournament, after qualifying by score, by reason of a preliminary injunction issued by the court. 13 Clearly, as the rule stands now,- if the plaintiff qualifies to
Cited 0 timesPublished13 Mass. L. Rptr. 4 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 24, 2001
If the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege specific facts establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. … Finally, as §10(j) is not applicable, the evidence clearly establishes a triable issue of material fact as to whether the employer knew or should have known that Rosario was unfit and posed a danger to others with whom he
Cited 1 timesPublished152 Mass. 136 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 4, 1890
Nor can exceptions to their rulings be established by parol evidence. … The commissioners were selected by the court as qualified to make a just and equal partition of the land, and were appointed for that purpose.
Cited 5 timesPublished221 B.R. 573 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 12, 1998
At the time of the filing of Shadduck’s bankruptcy petition, this property was an ERISA-qualified plan and, therefore, excluded. … Id. 17 This Court must defer to this finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. A factual finding is clearly erroneous if the record lacks substantial evidence to support it.
Cited 30 timesPublishedLydon v. Justices of Boston Municipal Court
536 F. Supp. 647 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 13, 1982
The corpus of writing on this case already includes two scholarly opinions by justices of the S.J.C. which clearly present the opposing arguments, Lydon v. … But we do not believe that that rule, coupled with the fact that a state chooses not to provide for review of a bench trial verdict, immunizes the state from federal constitutional promises.
Cited 4 timesPublishedNew York Airlines, Inc. v. Dukes County
623 F. Supp. 1435 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 4, 1985
These statutes confer authority on the Commission to perform functions necessary to the establishment and operation of the Airport. … The conduct of airport operators, as proprietors, is not immune to challenge under the supremacy clause, as defendants contend.
Cited 20 timesPublished1 Rep. Cont. El. 543 · Massachusetts House of Representatives · Jul 1, 1846
It was not then known to the selectmen, that any person had voted, who was not constitutionally qualified, and they clearly discharged their duty in withholding a certificate. … That John Jackson was not a citizen of the United States, is so clearly proved, that any comment is unnecessary.
Cited 0 timesPublishedMassachusetts Appeals Court · Jun 18, 2025
Braintree did not establish that it qualified for the 1.5 percent safe harbor, nor do we perceive error in the HAC's rejection of the board's denials based upon open space and fire safety concerns. Background. … The HAC accordingly rejected the board's position, essentially as a matter of law, ruling that the board had failed to establish a valid local concern.
Cited 0 timesPublishedConservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. Town of Barnstable, Massachusetts
District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 31, 2025
Mangino, 873 F.3d 75, 84 (1st Cir. 2017) (refusing to review fact-based challenge to multi-factor qualified immunity ruling on interlocutory appeal).4 Because “[t]he party seeking the interlocutory … appeal must establish all three elements,” PR Recovery & Dev.
Cited 0 timesUnknown73 Mass. App. Ct. 352 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Dec 18, 2008
We also conclude that the nurses cannot otherwise invoke the arbitration agreement as nonparties because they do not qualify as intended third-party beneficiaries to the contract. … If the nursing home harbored the intention to bring its employees within the purview of the arbitration provision, it had the duty to clearly inform its patients that the arbitration provision was intended to inure to the
Cited 10 timesPublished32 Mass. App. Ct. 290 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 25, 1992
In this case, the grand jury were clearly informed as to whether the evidence they heard was direct or hearsay testimony. There was no showing that the grand jury had been impaired in any way. … The trial judge qualified Dr. Richmond, an associate chief medical examiner in Massachusetts, as an expert in forensic pathology without objection from the defendant.
Cited 42 timesPublished777 F. Supp. 116 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 14, 1991
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities … The fifth amendment clearly provides for a cause of action against officials of the federal government. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 , 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).
Cited 23 timesPublishedConsumers Credit Union v. Widett (In Re Health Gourmet, Inc.)
29 B.R. 673 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · May 5, 1983
For the plaintiff to prevail on its motion for summary judgment and establish its secured position as a matter of law, it must establish beyond any factual controversy that the transaction was not a fraudulent transfer. … Transfers made to benefit third parties are clearly not made for value. L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy, Section 548.09 at 548-103 (15th Ed. Supp.1982). In Bullard v.
Cited 14 timesPublished462 Mass. 324 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 29, 2012
Collins, 386 Mass. 1, 8 (1982) (“Evidence tending to impeach the credibility of a key prosecution witness is clearly exculpatory”). … A translator need not be a “certified interpreter” or “qualified interpreter" as defined in G. L. c. 221C, § 1, to qualify as an expert.
Cited 11 timesPublished97 Mass. 246 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 15, 1867
the sequestration and distribution of the debtor’s property, or for granting him a discharge, could be instituted until the 1st of June 1867; for by the express terms of the proviso at the end of the last section, which qualifies … from the time of its passage, the use, in this section, of words in the future tense — “shall go into operation” — is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the statute goes into operation presently upon its passage, and clearly
Cited 11 timesPublished
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