Case law
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1994 Mass. App. Div. 74 · Massachusetts District Court, Appellate Division · Apr 25, 1994
Pursuant to Section 3, eligibility for G.L.c. 258A compensation is expressly limited to victims of violent crimes and their qualifying dependents. See generally, Smith v. Commonwealth, 1984 Mass. App. Div. 10, 11 . … Such finding would be reviewed on a G.L.c. 258A appeal under the customary “clearly erroneous” standard. Dist./Mun. Cts. R. Civ. E, Rule 52(a). See generally, Kendall v. Selvaggio, 413 Mass. 619, 620 (1992); Powers v.
Cited 0 timesPublishedSawyer v. Inhabitants of Northfield
61 Mass. 490 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 15, 1851
In such a case, it would be very clearly the intention of the legislature wholly to annul and abrogate the existing law; and then the new and qualified right and remedy given by the succeeding act would be a new creation, … This creates a qualified, and not a general liability.
Cited 0 timesPublishedManego v. Orleans Board of Trade
598 F. Supp. 231 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 27, 1984
Therefore, absent evidence that the Board of Trade conspired with the Bank as to this allegedly “sham” suit, it is irrelevant to the issue of the Board’s immunity under Noerr-Pennington. … It is clearly established that conduct genuinely intended to influence governmental action is immune from the sweep of antitrust law and that whether the effort is genuine or a sham is an issue of fact. Id. at 1253.
Cited 5 timesPublished430 Mass. 758 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 14, 2000
As “one of the ancient immunities and privileges of English liberty,” Jones v. … Although clearly improper, the defendant did not object to this statement. See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 424 Mass. 207, 212 (1997).
Cited 40 timesPublishedConsumers Credit Union v. Widett (In Re Health Gourmet, Inc.)
29 B.R. 673 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · May 5, 1983
For the plaintiff to prevail on its motion for summary judgment and establish its secured position as a matter of law, it must establish beyond any factual controversy that the transaction was not a fraudulent transfer. … Transfers made to benefit third parties are clearly not made for value. L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy, Section 548.09 at 548-103 (15th Ed. Supp.1982). In Bullard v.
Cited 14 timesPublishedDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 8, 2019
Application Defendants argue that, because they are the functional equivalent of public officials, they are entitled to qualified immunity and thus … While the Court agrees that the doctrine of qualified immunity applies to defendants, see Husband v. Fair, Civ. A. No. 86-2865-Z, 1993 WL 343669, at *6 (D. Mass.
Cited 0 timesUnknownBaetge-Hall v. American Overseas Marine Corp.
624 F. Supp. 2d 148 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 11, 2009
Nevertheless, Báetge-Hall avers that Captain Pigott certified that she was “fully qualified.” Id. at ¶ 5 . … There is a clearly defined public policy protecting whistle-blowing and Baetge-Hall alleges that she was terminated for engaging in this protected activity.
Cited 1 timesPublished18 Mass. 535 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 15, 1823
And it is there stated by the court, “ that if the revocation is by will, it must be such a will so qualified as is provided by the section of the statute in relation to wills, to wit, signed and subscribed by the witnesses … We think it clearly settled by the cases which have been commented upon, that an instrument intended for a will, but inoperative as such on account of some defect in the instrument or in its execution, although it contain
Cited 4 timesPublished577 B.R. 436 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 3, 2017
The MDOR further argued that, under extant case-law, neither emotional nor punitive damages could be assessed' against it as a governmental unit, as its sovereign immunity was not waived with regard to those particular types … Section 2412(d)(2)(A), in turn, limits the hourly rate for attorney fees to “$125 per hour unless the court deter *441 mines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified
Cited 0 timesPublished456 Mass. 94 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 17, 2010
Calling Kelly ten times qualifies as intimidation. Kelly testified that she did not feel comfortable, and reported this to her manager. … Such an instruction would effectively immunize police officers from conviction. The judge did not err in declining to give it.
Cited 107 timesPublished404 Mass. 347 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 14, 1989
Judge Ford clearly violated this canon in several respects, as shown below. … for benefits under the qualified pension plan which NEAVS created for the benefit of Judge Ford, Ms.
Cited 2 timesPublishedMaine Drilling & Blasting, Inc. v. Lorusso Corp.
1986 Mass. App. Div. 20 · Massachusetts District Court, Appellate Division · Feb 28, 1986
The moving party, must therefore, demonstrate that relief is not within Rule 60 (b) (1) - (5) in order to qualify under Rule 60 (b) (6). … This clearly oppugns both the letter and the spirit of Rule 64.
Cited 5 timesPublishedMayor of Revere v. Civil Service Commission
31 Mass. App. Ct. 315 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Aug 30, 1991
In short, the commission must consider and deal with the issue of Ryan’s conduct in light of the public interest in a qualified chief of police for Revere, and it must do so consistently with “basic merit principles,” as … established by law” which is the prerequisite to the application of the fifth paragraph of § 2(6).
Cited 24 timesPublishedConservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. Town of Barnstable, Massachusetts
District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 31, 2025
Mangino, 873 F.3d 75, 84 (1st Cir. 2017) (refusing to review fact-based challenge to multi-factor qualified immunity ruling on interlocutory appeal).4 Because “[t]he party seeking the interlocutory … appeal must establish all three elements,” PR Recovery & Dev.
Cited 0 timesUnknownAronson v. Servus Rubber Division of Chromalloy American Corp. Employees' Profit-Sharing Plan
566 F. Supp. 1545 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 19, 1983
Further, defendants argue that the plaintiffs’ evidence fails to establish discrimination against plaintiffs. … The facts in this ruling involved an employer who had “established a qualified defined benefit plan that covered employees in the two divisions of its business.
Cited 7 timesPublished72 Mass. 1 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 1856
The burden of proof remains continually upon the government, to establish the accu *4 sation which it makes. … They use the word “ sale ” in its ordinary sense, as the provision as to sales in a dwelling-house clearly shows.
Cited 5 timesPublished474 Mass. 638 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 1, 2016
On or before August 5, 2015, sixteen qualified voters (petitioners) submitted Initiative Petition 15-12 to the Attorney General. … The two subjects in this petition are clearly not "mutually dependent." In fact, the opposite seems true.
Cited 6 timesPublishedMassachusetts Appeals Court · Jun 18, 2025
Braintree did not establish that it qualified for the 1.5 percent safe harbor, nor do we perceive error in the HAC's rejection of the board's denials based upon open space and fire safety concerns. Background. … The HAC accordingly rejected the board's position, essentially as a matter of law, ruling that the board had failed to establish a valid local concern.
Cited 0 timesPublishedMayor & Aldermen of Worcester v. Board of Railroad Commissioners
113 Mass. 161 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 15, 1873
The power thus granted clearly includes the authority to fix and establish the height and grade, as well as the mode of construction in other respects, of these tracks and bridges; for the grade of the viaduct, in order to … The St. of 1869, c. 408, establishing the board of railroad commissioners, containing no provision (such as is made by the Gen.
Cited 12 timesPublished422 Mass. 539 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 25, 1996
Prior to trial in a separate proceeding Waterman and the city agreed to a settlement of the Clickners’ claim and to litigate the issue of the city’s liability and Waterman’s immunity. … Waterman argues that he falls within the exception to the “going and coming” rule established by Wormstead v. Town Manager of Saugus, 366 Mass. 659, 667 (1975).
Cited 62 timesPublished
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