Case law

Henry v. Moberly

6 Ind. App. 490 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 12, 1893

Where the occasion is one of qualified privilege. … In this case the words set out in the complaint, if false, as therein alleged, are clearly libelous, unless justified, under the circumstances stated, by the privileges of the occasion. Pat chell v. Jaqua, 6 Ind.

Impink v. City of Indianapolis, Board of Public Works

612 N.E.2d 1125 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 6, 1993

Notwithstanding their waiver of this issue, 1.C. 34-4-17.5-1 clearly requires: Sec. 1. … Hamilton Bank of Johnson City (1985), 473 U.S. 172 , 105 S.Ct. 3108 , 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (establishing a two-prong test to determine whether a taking claim is ripe for adjudication).

Environmental Properties v. City of Fort Wayne

178 Ind. App. 645 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 27, 1978

The mode in which a municipality can seek modification of its territorial boundaries is exclusively established by the State Legislature. 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corp., § 50. … If appellants had not qualified as remonstrators, an action for declaratory judgment may have been an available avenue for relief.

In re Haughee

795 N.E.2d 450 · Indiana Supreme Court · Sep 8, 2003

find that this alone does not clearly and convincingly establish a violation of Admis.Dise.R. 23(26)(b). … We find that the testimony and other evidence submitted clearly and convineingly establish that by entering into the agreement to represent the woman, the respondent "undertook a new legal matter" after he had received notice

Real Estate Support Services, Inc. v. Nauman

644 N.E.2d 907 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 27, 1994

Thus, it appears that the [borrowers] would not qualify as third party beneficiaries to the FHA appraisal. Id. at 184 . … The surrounding cireumstances in Emmons included the determination that Congress had not intended to establish a duty of care for the benefit of borrowers from the FHA.

State v. Springer

585 N.E.2d 27 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 21, 1992

He argues that no relationship supporting liability under I.C. 35-46-1-4 was established between himself and Flory, as Flory was not a “dependent” as defined in I.C. 35-46-1-1. … Moreover, the term “dependent” is clearly defined in I.C. 35-46-1-1, and may refer to an adult as well as a child.

In Re Paternity of MPMW

908 N.E.2d 1205 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 9, 2009

Because Father and M.P.M.W. had not had a relationship prior to the filing of the paternity petition, a gradual schedule of unsupervised visitations was established. … The child's immunizations were not kept up to date by the Mother. Appellant's App. at 38-39.

Wagner v. State

474 N.E.2d 476 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 14, 1985

It clearly appears that the photographs were of such a nature here and the trial court properly permitted them to be admitted into evidence. … Whether a witness is qualified to give an opinion is within the trial court's discretion. Rowan, supra.

BIDDLE v. PERTORIUS

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Mar 11, 2024

CODE § 34– 13–3–5(a).4 To sue a government employee personally, the plaintiff "must allege that an act or omission of the employee that causes a loss is: (1) criminal; (2) clearly 1 "Mr. … Johnson's allegation that Officer Brown's conduct was willful and wanton." 2 "These disputed facts precluded summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, and the same analysis holds true here

Montagana v. City of Elkhart

149 Ind. App. 283 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 27, 1971

As a public right the plaintiff together with the rest of the taxpayers *290 which he represents would clearly have a right, but not an unqualified right. … Attackable “wastage” in the sense hereinabove used would also occur where the annexation was clearly or patently illegal.

Yeary v. United States

921 F. Supp. 549 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Mar 21, 1996

In addition, the federal government’s funding and regulatory oversight were not enough to establish federal “control” over the premises. See United States v. … That provision gives personal immunity to federal employees for torts committed while acting within the scope of their (presumably federal) employment.

State v. Eubanks

729 N.E.2d 201 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 26, 2000

The prosecutor did not offer either witness immunity pursuant to Ind.Code § 35-37-3-1, 7 and the questioning of the witnesses occurred in the presence of the jury. … First, Eubanks’ counsel was clearly ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s actions in calling Beverly and Worl to *211 testify.

COLEMAN v. ALICEA

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 8, 2025

The defendants argue that they should be entitled to qualified immunity on these claims against Investigator Alicea and Officer Fawver related to their refusal to provide a decontamination shower, as it is not clearly … Coleman to a prolonged period exposed to a chemical agent and were deliberately indifferent, and these claims cannot be foreclosed under qualified immunity grounds.

Fowler v. State

809 N.E.2d 960 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 14, 2004

From these generalities, the Court extrapolated that statements made during a police "interrogation" would qualify as "testimonial" statements. Id. … We conclude this choice of words clearly indicates that police "interrogation" is not the same as, and is much narrower than, police "questioning."

Brown v. State

271 Ind. 129 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 18, 1979

He contends that the document was introduced merely as an attempt to establish that appellant’s earlier cooperation was voluntary. This theory is not supported by the record. … Any alleged lack of reliability can be brought out on cross-examination, and, as long as the expert is otherwise qualified, should go to weight of the evidence and not its competency.

Dickerson v. State

257 Ind. 562 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 5, 1972

Since the State is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under which the interrogation takes place and has the only means of making available corroborated evidence of warnings given during incommunicado … A signature obtained with the instructions given by Officer Brunkhart is' clearly not sufficient to- indicate a knowing and intelligent waiver.

Ray v. St. John's Health Care Corp.

582 N.E.2d 464 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 12, 1991

Moreover, [the immunity provisions of] I.C. § 34-4-12.6-3 support[ ] our determination. … The immunity provision protects ‘evaluation of patient care,’ not contractual arrangements by a hospital’s board of directors.” 580 N.E.2d at 357 .

Alsman v. Matthews

125 Ind. App. 132 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 1, 1954

The proceedings and determination of the board are immune from collateral attack in this action. … The evidence, and permissible inferences deductible therefrom, clearly shows that appellees’ use of the way from May, 1930 to June 25, 1951, was continuous, uninterrupted, with claim of right, and with the knowledge and acquiescence

Dickens v. State

754 N.E.2d 1 · Indiana Supreme Court · Aug 28, 2001

The prosecutor disagreed that he needed to state racially-neutral reasons for the strike before Dickens established a prima facie case. … “We will uphold the trial court’s decision on the matter of discriminatory intent unless the decision is clearly erroneous.” Williams, 700 N.E.2d at 786 (citing Kent v.

Laketon Asphalt & Refining, Inc. v. United States Department of the Interior

476 F. Supp. 668 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Jul 17, 1979

Justice Stewart defined its parameters in Roth, supra : To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. … The Geological Survey was established by statute in the Department of the Interior in 1879.