Case law

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  • Vermont Mutual Insurance v. Petit

    613 F. Supp. 2d 154 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 11, 2009

    In addition, the Petits’ history of late or otherwise imperfect rent collection spans a period of only two full years, failing to establish a predictive pattern. … The language of the Policy clearly applies to expenses that “do not continue,” 36 not “new” expenses. The preFire auto and travel expenses, therefore, qualify as discontinuing expenses. 2.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Nunez v. Carrabba's Italian Grill, Inc.

    448 Mass. 170 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 9, 2007

    In each instance, the person is under the legal drinking age, as clearly and plainly established by the Legislature. The statutory provision regulating the serving of liquor, G. … L. c. 231, § 85K, abrogated common-law doctrine of charitable immunity and imposed statutory cap on tort liability of charitable corporations); Kerins v. Lima, 425 Mass. 108, 111 (1997) (enactment of G.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Reynolds v. Dukakis

    441 F. Supp. 646 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 9, 1977

    On September 26, 1973, despite qualifying for federal benefits, Mr. Reynolds received a letter from Robert E. … The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.' . . .

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Aronson v. Commonwealth

    401 Mass. 244 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 14, 1987

    Unlike in Andover, the doubling of the tax rate solely because of the location of the taxpayer’s deposits, challenged in this case, clearly has a protectionist effect in favor of local financial institutions. … They lack the specificity necessary to establish as a matter of law that there is a reasonable relationship between the costs to which they refer and a two to one tax differential.

    Cited 24 timesPublished
  • Buxton v. Inhabitants of Uxbridge

    51 Mass. 87 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 15, 1845

    The words “ heirs and assigns ” are qualified and restrained by the words “ heirs of the body,” which last show clearly the intention of the testator to create an estate tail; and whether the restraining words succeed or … precede the more general words, they operate, in either case, to limit the gift or grant, if the intention is clearly expressed by such restraining words; as in Soulle v.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Shervin v. Partners Healthcare System, Inc.

    2 F. Supp. 3d 50 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 7, 2014

    Partners also argues that it qualifies for charitable immunity for the interference claim pursuant to Mass. Gen. L. c. 231, § 85K. D. 150 at 19. … The Court finds, however, that Partners qualifies for charitable immunity under Mass. Gen. L. c. 231, § 85K as to this claim. D. 150 at 19.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • United States v. Kelly

    519 F. Supp. 1029 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 9, 1981

    Whatever or whoever may have motivated Wilson’s column, the F.B.I. report demonstrates clearly that his assertions are contrary to fact. … Billy Masiello was the immunized key witness against Kelly in the current proceeding.

    Cited 25 timesPublished
  • St. Arnaud v. Chapdelaine Truck Center, Inc.

    836 F. Supp. 41 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 8, 1993

    Secondly, employers may be held liable where the method of termination violates a clearly established public policy. Id. Plaintiff, Armand St. … Furthermore, and in the alternative, even if the Employee succeeded in qualifying for one of the exceptions to the at-will termination rule, his wrongful termination claim is preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Castricone v. Mical

    74 Mass. App. Ct. 591 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jul 2, 2009

    the diminution of the established reputation by similar or inferior goods or services (“dilution” of its reputation); and the deception of the consumer. … For the following reasons, that finding is supportable and not “clearly erroneous” within the meaning of Mass.R.Civ.P. 52(a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1402 (1996).

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Opinion of the Justices to the Senate

    413 Mass. 1201 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 7, 1992

    The language of art. 9 itself does not clearly answer the question. Since “[w]e recognize that each Legislature elected for a two year term is a unique body,” Lamson v. … At the same time, art. 9 clearly envisions some limitations on the right to be elected to office through the establishment of qualifications for elected offices.

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Oakes v. Munroe

    62 Mass. 282 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 15, 1851

    It would clearly have been a notice which the lessors had no right to give, and which the tenant was not bound to take.. … Among the indispensable requisites at common law of a notice to quit, it is clearly established, that it must indicate to the tenant, with sufficient certainty, that he is to quit the premises at a certain fixed period, and

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Hallgring v. Callahan

    975 F. Supp. 84 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 14, 1997

    Nor does the record establish the basis on which Dr. … The acronym "CFIDS" stands for chronic fatigue and immune dysfunction syndrome.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Wesson v. Town of Salisbury

    13 F. Supp. 3d 171 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 18, 2014

    The statute established a new category of firearm, the “large capacity weapon,” comprised of all semiautomatic weapons equipped with (or readily adapted to) a “large capacity feeding device” (or magazine), all weapons with … who is over eighteen years of age (or a qualified minor between ages fifteen and eighteen who has the written permission of his or her parent or guardian).

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • The Norfolk & Dedham Group v. Town of Falmouth.

    Massachusetts Appeals Court · Oct 4, 2024

    The plaintiff argues that the town is not entitled to immunity under G. … Ct. at 92 n.9 (immunity under § 10 [j] does not apply to negligent maintenance by town).

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Salcedo v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance

    38 F. Supp. 2d 37 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 20, 1998

    Defendant reads this provision as establishing a three-year limitations period, which would be lengthened in suits filed by residents of states that forbid contractually establishing a period this short. … Accordingly, an applicable Qualifying Disability Period must be at least six months long. Since Ms.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • General Marine Construction Corp. v. United States

    738 F. Supp. 586 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 31, 1990

    The Corps had entered into a contract with Phillips Cartner, a Virginia corporation, on December 8, 1986, to furnish qualified inspectors to witness the disposal of dredge materials at sea and provide daily reports of disposal … That is not the procedure the drafters of Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(c) viewed as “clearly desirable." See 1966 Advisory Committee’s Note to Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(c). 6 .

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • JONATHAN MAIN, personal representative v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY & another.

    100 Mass. App. Ct. 827 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 8, 2022

    See id. at 435 ("We decline to place addictive chemicals outside the reach of product liability and give them special protection akin to immunity based solely on the strength of their addictive qualities"). … Christiani's testimony to establish the 1966 date. [Note 8] The plaintiff presented two expert witnesses on the issue of cigarette design (Dr. Kenneth Michael Cummings and Dr.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Williams v. HealthAlliance Hospitals, Inc.

    135 F. Supp. 2d 106 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 27, 2001

    The Split Dollar Plan also qualifies as a welfare benefit plan under the test set forth therefor by the First Circuit Court of Appeals. … Williams’ claim for breach of contract is clearly preempted because he would have to prove the existence of an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA (i.e. the Split Dollar Plan) to support his claim that benefits owed to

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Cowley v. Pulsifer

    137 Mass. 392 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 27, 1884

    Bell, ubi supra, clearly implies that the privilege claimed by the defendants does not protect them. *396 He says that a fair statement of the proceedings, “ when they have been acted upon and decided, made with an honest … We have placed only a qualified reliance on the cases cited, because some of them were decided too early to be conclusive, and those on the question of contempt have been placed on grounds not perhaps convincing with regard

    Cited 143 timesPublished
  • Commonwealth v. Silva

    10 Mass. App. Ct. 784 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Dec 9, 1980

    29,1979, when he was advised by a family member to contact the Essex district attorney’s office. 5 Insofar as relevant to our later discussion, the only exculpatory evidence provided by the Commonwealth related to a grant of immunity … Of course, it would have been better practice for the District Court judge to have clearly identified the basis for his action and to have stated whether the dismissal was with prejudice.

    Cited 12 timesPublished

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