Case law

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  • Harper v. Auto-Owners Insurance

    138 F.R.D. 655 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Aug 13, 1991

    Clearly, such a finding would be unwarranted and the Court doesn’t understand Auto-Owners to be making such an argument at this time. … Asserts work product immunity.]

    Cited 95 timesPublished
  • Starks v. Moore

    51 F. Supp. 3d 782 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 2, 2014

    Qualified Immunity Notwithstanding the foregoing, Detective Moore argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity in relation to the foregoing claims. … “Qualified immunity shields a government official from liability for civil damages unless his or her conduct violates a clearly established principle or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known at

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • John Lane-El v. Michael Spears, in his official capacity of Chief of Police, and the Indianapolis Police Department

    13 N.E.3d 859 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 9, 2014

    In the APRA, the Legislature established the procedure for disputing a denial of access to public records. … The trial court concluded that Chief Spears was immune from suit under the ITCA, which is codified at INDIANA CODE §§ 34-13-3-0.1–34-13-3-25 (2006) and immunizes public employees against certain tort claims.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Owens v. Schoenberger

    681 N.E.2d 760 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 25, 1997

    is clearly a question of fact.” … Therefore, we do not find it to be an erroneous decision by the trial court that as a matter of law the letter was not protected by qualified privilege and Angus could not assert the defense of qualified immunity.

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Willson v. Buss

    370 F. Supp. 2d 782 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Mar 31, 2005

    Qualified immunity protects government officials from “liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” … Even if the rule in this case were unconstitutional, Buss would be protected by qualified immunity because the right at issue here is not clearly established. IV.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Paige v. Hudson

    234 F. Supp. 2d 893 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Dec 5, 2002

    “Qualified immunity shields the officers from suit ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Sledd v. … In light of the qualified immunity analysis, this court need not make address this issue. 14 .

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • ESPN, Inc. and Paula Lavigne v. University of Notre Dame Security Police Dept., a Dept. of the University of Notre Dame du Lac

    50 N.E.3d 385 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 15, 2016

    Accordingly, judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and when the facts shown by the pleadings clearly establish that the non-moving party cannot in any way succeed … [35] Correspondingly, we note that whereas the Police Department qualifies as a public agency under APRA because it is a law enforcement agency, the remainder of Notre Dame clearly does not qualify as

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Harrison v. Veolia Water Indianapolis, LLC

    929 N.E.2d 247 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 29, 2010

    Although the issue here is not, strictly speaking, one of sovereign immunity, we believe it is necessary to review the history of sovereign immunity in Indiana and the adoption of ITCA. 3 Sovereign immunity originated in … Despite the difficulty of defining what constituted a "proprietary function" for which a municipality could be held liable if it had been performed negligently, there were numerous cases clearly establishing that a municipality's

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Ind. State Hwy. Com'n v. Ind. Civ. Rights Com'n

    424 N.E.2d 1024 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 13, 1981

    Pape (1961), 365 U.S. 167 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 , which established the immunity of municipalities from § 1983. … The finding of a discriminatory practice was clearly based on facts that either appeared on the record or could reasonably be inferred from the record.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Boyce v. Woodruff

    979 F. Supp. 817 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Aug 26, 1997

    “Qualified immunity shields [officers] from suit for damages if ‘a reasonable officer could have believed [the arrest] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the offi *828 cers possessed.’” … Qualified Immunity Even assuming arguendo that M. Adam did not have probable cause to arrest the Plaintiff, Woodruff is surely protected by qualified immunity. M.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Carter v. US (Veterans Administration)

    768 F. Supp. 670 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Jun 24, 1991

    that the United States is not a “qualified health care provider” under Indiana law. … some protection to health care providers and ensure the availability of health care services within the state, the Indiana legislature created a patient compensation fund, to which health care providers contribute, and established

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Joseph v. LaPorte County

    651 N.E.2d 1180 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 20, 1995

    Thus, we conclude that setting speed limits does not so clearly implicate government policy that all such decisions are discretionary as a matter of law. See Peav-ler, supra, at 47. … Maintaining a warning sign is analogous to correctly posting an established speed limit; - both fuvolve a non-discretionary mandate to implement established policy. Both are clearly operational functions.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Veolia Water Indianapolis, LLC v. National Trust Insurance Co.

    3 N.E.3d 1 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 6, 2014

    The party seeking immunity bears the burden of establishing that its conduct comes within the Act. Id. at 800 . … But as it stands, the City cannot establish that it is entitled to statutory immunity for a discretionary function under Ind.Code § 34-18-3-3(7). II.

    Cited 48 timesPublished
  • Bedree v. DeGroote

    799 N.E.2d 1167 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 9, 2003

    Bedree's arguments, as presented in his appellate brief, are convoluted and confusing, and decidedly short of the standard established in the appellate rules. … Judicial immunity of the defendant is one. such ground.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Dillon v. Chicago South Shore & North Bend Railway Co.

    654 N.E.2d 1137 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 15, 1995

    Further, it is the challenger's burden to show that the alleged constitutional defects are clearly apparent. Matter of Tina T. (1991), Ind., 579 N.E.2d 48, 56-57 (citation omitted). … permit other units to eventually qualify.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Mitchell v. Randolph

    155 F. Supp. 2d 1057 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Jul 27, 2001

    QUALIFIED IMMUNITY Qualified immunity shields government officials who are performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional … The protection afforded through qualified immunity “turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of the action, Harlow, 457 U.S., at 819 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , assessed in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly established

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Chandradat v. State, Indiana Department of Transportation

    830 N.E.2d 904 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 30, 2005

    The State is not immune from negligence that results in the implementation part of a project. Greathouse, 616 N.E.2d at 866-67 . Here, the State did not qualify for discretionary function immunity under the TIPCA. IV. … Finding, as we do, that the placement of the signage does not qualify the State for discretionary function immunity, that the State owed the Chandradats a duty, that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Brademas v. St. Joseph County Commissioners

    621 N.E.2d 1133 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 30, 1993

    Finally, Brademas claims the trial court erroneously determined Zap-pia was entitled to qualified immunity. … Because we hold the trial court properly found that Brademas did not meet the requirements of the public lawsuit statute, we need not address the issue of Zappia's qualified immunity.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Burkhart Advertising, Inc. v. City of Auburn, Ind.

    786 F. Supp. 721 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Dec 19, 1991

    In the alternative, even if the Plan Commission and mayor are not cloaked with absolute immunity, they enjoy qualified immunity from personal liability by virtue of the rationale in Harlow v. … As such, de *737 fendants are clearly entitled to qualified immunity under the rationale of Harlow .

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Board of Commissioners v. Kokomo City Plan Commission

    263 Ind. 282 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 23, 1976

    Such rules are intended to insure that the courts will nullify a statute on constitutional grounds only where such result is clearly rational and necessary. … It established also that the County had enacted a master plan.

    Cited 20 timesPublished

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