Case law

Gary Teachers Union, Local No. 4 v. School City of Gary

165 Ind. App. 314 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 12, 1975

To the extent that Article X embodies the procedural protections extended by the Tenure Act, it promotes the retention of qualified teaching personnel. … Since the legislative policy underlying the Tenure Act is not offended by Article X of the collective bargaining agreement, the General School Powers Act clearly authorizes the School City to contractually establish minimum

Kennedy v. State

934 N.E.2d 779 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 6, 2010

Here, Kennedy conceded that Keeling possesses the requisite skill, training, and experience to qualify as an expert in the field of DNA forensic analysis. … Chakraborty also agreed that trained and qualified DNA analysts ean have reasonable disagreements regarding proper test results.

Ridenour v. Furness

504 N.E.2d 336 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 26, 1987

Such findings may not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.” College Life, at 742. … Since the commercial fishermen and restaurant had no legally recognizable harm and since they did not establish a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits by demonstrating a prima facie case, the trial court clearly

Glenn v. State

163 Ind. App. 119 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 30, 1975

to establish with certainty whether a convicted defendant is eligible and a drug abuser. … After examining the medical report, the trial court can then determine whether the convicted defendant medically qualifies as a drug abuser under the Act.

Gary Pennington and Sherry Pennington v. U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for Master Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-WF1 (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 25, 2015

Bank cannot carry its burden to establish a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment. … organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit; (C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity; (D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified

Melo v. State

744 N.E.2d 1035 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 21, 2001

Shepherd, 733 N.E.2d 987, 989-990 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied, this court held: When interpreting the meaning of a statute, this court is guided by well-established rules of statutory construction. … It clearly states two requirements that must be met before the State may charge a person with interference with custody.

Harris v. Raymond

715 N.E.2d 388 · Indiana Supreme Court · Sep 2, 1999

Although defendant points out that there is currently no statute or common law establishing this duty, he did not move to dismiss the claim and rather assumes that he had at least some duty to act. … Any countervailing interest in guarding against imposing potentially burdensome requirements for finding patients who may have relocated can be addressed by qualifying the duty so that the physician or oral surgeon need only

DOE v. TRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Oct 26, 2020

State "officers are entitled to qualified immun- ity under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was 'clearly established at the time.'" … The Court will reserve ruling on whether Defendants have qualified immunity until a later stage in litigation.

Halbe v. Weinberg

717 N.E.2d 876 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 7, 2000

The record does not clearly disclose whether or not Dr. Weinberg disputes the existence of these calls. … Weinberg's un-contradicted affidavit establishes that he did, in fact, use saline implants.” (Br. Ct.App. at 29.)

Indiana Bell Telephone Co. v. Friedland

175 Ind. App. 622 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 9, 1978

As an administrative agency, it is presumed to be qualified by knowledge and experience to perform this function. … (Emphasis supplied) 290 A.2d at 701-702 . * * * “The Public Utility Code clearly prohibits discrimination in rates and services for whatever reason' and just as clearly empowers the PUC to hear and decide such complaints.

Willie D. Williams v. State of Indiana

42 N.E.3d 107 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 7, 2015

But even assuming that Williams was ineligible for the habitual- substance-offender enhancement, because Williams benefited from his plea agreement and the specific facts do not establish an objective reasonable … Accordingly, we accept the post-conviction court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we do not defer to the post-conviction court’s conclusions of law. Wilson v.

Reynolds v. State, ex rel. Titus

61 Ind. 392 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 15, 1878

In this position counsel are so clearly right, in our opinion, that we deem it unnecessary to cite their authorities in its support. … That this is so is abundantly and clearly shown, we think, by the statute of this State on the subject of elections.

State Board of Accounts v. Indiana University Foundation

647 N.E.2d 342 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 24, 1995

The principle established by our supreme court in Sendak once again decides this question. … If the relationship "is, in fact, a fee-for-services (or goods) agreement then, clearly, an entity is not maintained or supported by public funds." Id. at 212-18.

Douglass v. State ex rel. Wright

31 Ind. 429 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 15, 1869

The same principle is clearly recognized in Lightly v. Clouston, 1 Taunt. 112, and in Allen v. McKean, 1 Sumner, 276. And so, in Boyter v. … Under these admitted facts, we are not able to perceive any good conscience there would be in permitting the defendant to retain anything over a bare compensation, nor, in view of the well established class of decisions in

Grooms v. Caldwell

806 F. Supp. 807 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Dec 16, 1991

established constitutional rights of this plaintiff. … Wade, 850 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 968 , 109 S.Ct. 497 , 102 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988), the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. See also Mitchell v.

Hobson v. State

795 N.E.2d 1118 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 18, 2003

Only 'one characteristic is necessary to qualify an individual as an expert. Id. As such, a witness may qualify as an expert on the basis of practical experience alone. Id. … It is within the trial court's sound discretion to decide whether a person qualifies as an expert witness. Id.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. White

168 Ind. App. 118 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 17, 1976

It is widely recognized that the public represents an anonymous third party to the insurance contract, having a clearly definable interest in its interpretation.” 262 F.Supp. 1, 5 . … Since the purported qualifying phrase relies upon “permission” for its meaning, and since permission may be implied, the inquiry for the trier of fact remains the same. The judgment is affirmed.

Zisis v. St. Joseph Tp. of Allen County

979 F. Supp. 806 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Aug 25, 1997

This is clearly an insufficient basis for a false arrest claim against Uhrick and the Township. *813 4. … Zisis fails to address this immunity issue in his response.

Austill v. State

745 N.E.2d 859 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 20, 2001

It is the State's contention that the trial court properly denied Austill's Motion to Dismiss because he failed to establish, as a matter of law, that the two electric blasting caps, wire, and a battery operated detonation … When construing statutes, we give words and phrases their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning unless some contrary purpose is clearly shown. Smithhart v. State, 591 N.E.2d 149, 151 (Ind.Ct.App.1992).

Washington v. State

271 Ind. 97 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 14, 1979

We have held that where oral remarks made by the court during voir dire are clearly qualified as not being instructions and where correct instructions are subsequently given, there is no abuse of discretion in giving the … Since the admissibility of lay witness opinion testimony on ultimate fact issues is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and the police officer’s experience was clearly established, there was no error in