Case law

Caldaro v. Ferber

39 N.J. 314 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 18, 1963

This provision is clearly not applicable to the present case. The term “transferred” in B. S. 11:21-4 is not qualified in any manner. … requirements that would qualify the holder of such a position to carry out his duties in a competent and responsible manner.”

Kasper v. TEACHERS'PEN. & ANN. FUND

164 N.J. 564 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 18, 2000

Those amended statutes included the TPAF Law. 2 The amendments provided that, in order to receive accidental disability benefits, an employee must establish that he or she was “permanently and totally disabled as a direct … Thus, a teacher who is required to come early or stay late for parent conferences or sports practices clearly qualifies for an accidental disability pension if she receives a disabling traumatic injury while performing those

Way v. Ohio Casualty Insurance

346 F. Supp. 2d 711 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Dec 2, 2004

was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries ... … The Pay Plan clearly indicates an intent to “pay benefits, depending on the type of termination, to employees whose employment is terminated by the Company.” (Separation Pay Plan, Answer, Ex. A, p. 1.)

Kiczales v. Strelecki

103 N.J. Super. 257 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Oct 11, 1968

Clearly, had the accident in question occurred in New York, it would not have come within the protection of the MVAIC law. … Substantial similarity requires more than similarity of purpose, although this is essential to establish general reciprocity. There must also be substantial similarity of relief.

Garrison v. Township of Middletown

154 N.J. 282 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 7, 1998

Apparently recognizing the incongruity of an analysis that makes the dangerousness of property depend not on its general condition but rather on a specific plaintiffs use, the Court qualifies its holding by observing that … The Court has found that the legislative policy expressed in the Act was “to establish immunity as the general rule.” Id. at 373 , 593 A.2d 335 ; see also Manna v.

Lakeland Parks, Inc. v. Washington Township

147 N.J. Super. 528 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 25, 1977

The township’s finding as to this criterion is clearly arbitrary and capricious. … Yet, the trial judge, without evidential support, offered the opinion that “it has not been conclusively established as an existing street.”

In re Department of Institutions & Agencies

123 N.J. Super. 39 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 6, 1973

Any payment by the Title XIX (Medicaid) agency for this type of work function would not only be a violation of HEW Regulations but would clearly be outside the purview of Chapter 413. … It is suggested that for the most part these applications are prompted by the desire of the client to qualify for Medicaid.

C. v. C.

54 N.J. 223 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 27, 1969

In the past, although admittedly in another context (common law immunity), we have not hesitated to initiate change in a well established doctrine in an attempt to bring the law into focus with modern society. … We qualify this holding only because it is not possible to foresee all situations which might arise.

SLIPPI-MENSAH v. MILLS

District Court, D. New Jersey · Jun 25, 2020

Thus, regardless of For Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants acting in their personal capacity, the qualified immunity doctrine governs the analysis.10 “Qualified immunity shields government … It is the defendant’s burden to establish entitlement to qualified immunity. Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 2004).

State ex rel. of K.O.

424 N.J. Super. 555 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 1, 2012

We will not go beyond the language of the statute if it “leads to a clearly understood result.” State v. Hudson, supra, 209 N.J. at 529 , 39 A.3d 150 (citing Shelley, supra, 205 N.J. at 323 , 15 A.3d 818 ). … Appellate review of a juvenile disposition is guided by *565 well-established sentencing standards.

Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler

307 N.J. Super. 333 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 20, 1998

Unlike the ADEA, there is no minimum age limit established in the LAD. … A rational employer can be expected to promote the more qualified applicant over the less qualified, because it is in the employer’s best interest to do so.

J.O. v. Township of Bedminster

433 N.J. Super. 199 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Oct 31, 2013

Hale, 206 N.J. 209 (2011), the court heard re-argument and issued a written decision finding that plaintiff did not qualify as a newsperson under the Act. … Const., art. 30 A-1838-11T3 I, ¶¶ 6, 7, and that they are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary

27 N.J. 29 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 28, 1958

The immunity policy has had legislative notice; but there has been no adverse action. … Thus, the Legislature considered the immunity policy and refused to modify the existing law.

State v. Janiec

9 N.J. Super. 29 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 17, 1950

notice of the record of prior convictions; that the burden of proving the prior conviction or convictions and the identity of the defendant as being the same person previously convicted rests with the State and must be established … * "What has been said, and the authorities which have been cited, sufficiently show that there is no basis for the contention that the plaintiff in error has been put in double jeopardy, or that any of his privileges or immunities

Prud. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Monmouth County Mun.

141 N.J. 235 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 25, 1995

The Legislature enacted the Tort Claims Act to establish qualified governmental immunity for the negligent acts of governmental entities and their employees. See N.J.S.A. 59:1-2. … "declared [it] to be the public policy of this State that public entities shall only be liable for their negligence within the limitations of [the Tort Claims Act] and in accordance with the fair and uniform principles established

Deo v. Morello

388 N.J. Super. 226 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 27, 2006

The Profits Sharing Plan also clearly provides that spousal consent is the written consent of a participant’s spouse. … In addition, ERISA clearly provides that an election of a waiver of the qualified joint and survivor annuity form of benefit or the qualified pre-retirement survivor annuity form of benefit or both under an ERISA governed

James R. Jarrell v. Richard A. Kaul, M.D. (072363)

223 N.J. 294 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Sep 29, 2015

For example, N.J.S.A 45:9-19.11 immunizes members of the BME from liability for actions taken in the course of their administrative obligations, and N.J.S.A. 45:9-22.3(b) immunizes a physician from liability for failing to … The Court stated: State regulations now clearly require practicing physicians maintaining a professional office ... to obtain a minimum amount of medical malpractice insurance as a condition for licensure.

Payton v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority

148 N.J. 524 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 26, 1997

Those exceptions, though important, are qualified in two ways. … The section clearly excludes defendant’s operation of a highway.

Dexter v. Board of Commissioners of Pilotage

70 N.J.L. 429 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 23, 1904

The powers of the commissioners of pilotage are derived from “An act to establish and regulate pilots for the ports of Jersey City, Newark and Perth Amboy by way of Sandy Hook,” approved April 17th, 1846, and certain supplements … By reference to section 1 of the act of 1846 (above quoted) it clearly appears that the commissioners are clothed with a large discretion about admitting applicants to the pilotage service.

Barrett v. Borough of Frenchtown

6 N.J. Tax 558 · New Jersey Tax Court · Sep 14, 1984

The raising of bees and production of honey are clearly considered an agricultural use because the Legislature provided specifically that “[ljand shall be deemed to be in agricultural use when devoted to the production for … Applying well-established principles as set forth in the above cases, I am constrained to find from the evidence in this case that as of 1978 Lot 84 was not “actively devoted to agricultural use” within the intendment of