Case law

In Re Dipalma

24 B.R. 385 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 2, 1982

A boat clearly is not a household good or furnishing within the meaning and intent of § 522(f)(2)(A). … In the instant case, the Debtors’ use of the mobile home as their residence establishes the household purpose for which this item is held.

Paddock v. Town of Brookline

347 Mass. 230 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 19, 1964

Johonnot, 7 Met. 388 , 392. *233 The Constitution confers upon the General Court full authority “to make, ordain, and establish, all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, statutes, and ordinances . . . … General Court “full power and authority to erect and con- *238 sti.tu.te municipal or city governments, in any corporate town or towns in this commonwealth, and to grant to the inhabitants thereof such powers, privileges, and immunities

Morton v. Potts

57 Mass. App. Ct. 55 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jan 9, 2003

established by her parents over which she held powers of appointment. … Had Lindsay intended such a result, she clearly could have stated so expressly in article two or elsewhere in the trust instrument. *59 That she did not do so strongly suggests that she did not intend the trust to fail in

Morales v. Minter

393 F. Supp. 88 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 22, 1975

This clearly makes them eligible for foster care under M.G.L. c. 119, §§ 23, subd. A and 23, subd. C. … He is, unlike plaintiffs Hall, Andino and Rodriguez, clearly “ineligible for any other public assistance program available within the Commonwealth.”

Marcy v. Barnes

82 Mass. 161 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 15, 1860

The whole, taken together, is a fact, which, like any other fact, may be shown and established by any competent means of proof. 1 Greenl, Ev. § 101. But the testimony of Lucian Marcy went further than this. … Proportions are so enlarged thereby to the vision, that faint lines and marks, as well as the' genuine characteristics of handwriting which perhaps could not otherwise be clearly discerned and appreciated, are thus disclosed

Latino Political Action Committee, Inc. v. City of Boston

609 F. Supp. 739 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 22, 1985

The state legislature also gave the City Council authority to establish the City’s nine new electoral districts. … Any person may run for office if he or she 1) is a registered voter of the City qualified to vote in the election for that office; 2) submits a nominating petition signed by a designated number of registered voters qualified

McNeil v. Commissioner of Correction

417 Mass. 818 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 17, 1994

The commissioner has established such programs primarily in State correctional facilities. … L. c. 127, § 129B, see St. 1961, c. 74, in a context in which it is clearly not intended to refer to pretrial detainees.

United States v. McCormack

31 F. Supp. 2d 176 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 25, 1998

The language is clear, and the reach of the statute is clearly broad. See Id. … The Court was clearly concerned with the same federal-state balance issues as described above.

Connelly v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.

96 F.R.D. 339 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 29, 1982

The last three of the requisites for the privilege clearly have been established in connection with the first questionnaire. It is undisputed that the Customers’ Representative was a lawyer. … Even if a document satisfies the work-product criteria, however, it may still be discoverable upon a showing of sufficient need for the document to overcome the qualified protection.

Sullivan v. Town of Brookline

435 Mass. 353 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 14, 2001

This language facilitated the transfer of authority to PERAC from PERA, and its terms clearly indicate an intent to continue all existing regulations. … The difference between these two standards may seem slight, but the additional words “qualified for” demonstrate an intent that there be a more stringent examination. Finally, G.

Searcy v. Paul

20 Mass. App. Ct. 134 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 31, 1985

bring actions for negligence against third parties, either individuals or corporations, even if in some degree affiliated with the insured employer corporation (at least where no joint venture with another defendant is established … L. c. 152 (after the 1971 amendments) extends any immunity to Paul, if DLP was his agent, because Vortex (insured under c. 152) had made a lump sum settlement with Searcy.

Hamdi Halal Market LLC v. United States

947 F. Supp. 2d 159 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 30, 2013

Hasbro, Inc., 314 F.3d 289, 295-96 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding a typed name at the end of an email qualifies as a signature). … Hamdi has established no actual prejudice occasioned by the agency’s use of a typed name.

Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance v. Morel

60 Mass. App. Ct. 379 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jan 29, 2004

The summary judgment record establishes the following relevant facts. … In view of the qualifying word, “immediate,” this statement is not the dispositive concession that Metropolitan makes it out to be. In any event, Morel’s testimony is not determinative of the legal question presented.

Rogers v. Attorney General

347 Mass. 126 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 4, 1964

Although a donor may clearly manifest a desire to have the trust serve as a memorial, the doctrine of cy pres may still apply. … The use of the word “request” as to the latter suggests that the trust should not fail for want of applicants who could not qualify be *134 cause they drank or smoked.

Bush v. Fantasia

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 12, 2022

the unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’” … Because the complaint fails to allege any viable constitutional claims, the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. C.

DiPietro v. Sipex Corp.

69 Mass. App. Ct. 29 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 14, 2007

In not clearly raising the defense of fraud until he responded to Sipex’s summary judgment papers, DiPietro failed to abide by both rules. … Accord Amar & Katyal, Executive Privileges and Immunities: The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 Harv. L.

Born v. Simonds International, Corp.

26 Mass. L. Rptr. 416 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 30, 2009

Further, the deponent’s testimony from which this line is taken clearly states that the subsidiary “managed its money.” … Plaintiff alleged that the fire was the result of maintenance work performed by untrained employees not qualified to undertake the repairs. The refinery was owned and operated by a subsidiary of the defendant.

Martinez v. Umass Memorial Health Care, Inc.

21 Mass. L. Rptr. 103 · Massachusetts Superior Court · May 12, 2006

on June 12, 2002. 2 Brown now moves for summary judgment (and entry of separate and final judgment), on the ground that, on October 27, 1998, he was a public employee of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and as such, is immune … Clearly, the fact that Brown was a Resident presents a factual issue that would not have been relevant had he been a physician engaged in private practice.

Rand v. Hubbard

45 Mass. 252 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 1842

This point seems to have ever since been considered as an established rule of the law merchant, and is so laid down in elementary treatises. Watkins v. Maule, 2 Jac. & Walk. 237. Chitty on Bills, (6th ed.) 122, 123. … By a provision in the constitution of the United States, art. 4, § 2, the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and *261 immunities of citizens of the several States.

Taylor v. Creeley

257 Mass. 21 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 9, 1926

Unless clearly wrong, his determination will not be disturbed. There is no evidence that any juror had read the articles. … The trial judge ruled that he was not qualified as an expert in mental diseases, yet he was allowed to express an opinion on senile dementia, a mental disease.