Case law

Attorney General v. INDUS. NATIONAL BANK OF RI

380 Mass. 533 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 2, 1980

Clearly, a suit to enforce a C.I.D. is not a local action. Venue is not restricted under G. L. c. 93A to the county where specific property is located. G. L. c. 93A, § 7. … Otherwise, the Congressional enactment, which was intended generally to afford national banks immunity from suit in foreign States, would be meaningless because the exception would engulf the rule.

Adoption of Georgia

433 Mass. 62 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 14, 2000

We do not disturb these findings absent a showing that they are clearly erroneous. Petition of the Dep’t of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 397 Mass. 659, 670 (1986). … A CASA is not qualified to testify and report simply by being a CASA, and when an objection is made to qualifications, the judge must first determine that the CASA is qualified before accepting testimony or a report from

Massachusetts Electric Co. v. Department of Public Utilities

383 Mass. 675 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 3, 1981

While the company concedes that “ [i] t is a recognized tenet of administrative law that an agency can adopt policy decisions in the context of adjudicatory proceedings,” it qualifies this by urging that “[a]n automatic application … This alone is sufficiently *680 impractical to outweigh the adverse impact of retroactive application, at least where, as here, the department is working within a detailed, organized system of precedent which clearly established

Wellington &c.

33 Mass. 87 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 15, 1834

expound the laws, to declare what has and what has not the force of law, and to apply them to the investigation and adjustment'of the rights, duties, and obligations of citizens, in the actual administration of justice, it is clearly … Respect for the legislature, therefore, concurs with well established principles of law, in the conclusion, that such act is not void, but voidable only ; and it follows as a necessary legal inference from this position,

Munroe v. Boston Medical Center

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 16, 2024

She created humans with, amongst other things, innate senses, minds to think, and immune systems to protect. … I had Covid very recently and the immune system that Mother Nature provided me with got me through it. According to many studies I have better immunity than that which is provided by the vaccine.

MacRae v. Mattos

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 25, 2023

Qualified immunity shields “government officials performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional … Santini, 652 F.3d 45, 54 (1st Cir. 2011) (recognizing that liability under the “fact-intensive balancing test” required by Pickering “can rarely be considered ‘clearly established’ for qualified immunity”) (internal citation

Doris v. Police Commissioner of Boston

374 Mass. 443 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 21, 1978

This is clearly not a case in which a statute has focused on the “local matters” of a “particular city or town.” See Opinions of the Justices, 356 Mass. 775, 787-788 (1969). … The 1971 amendment to § 99A deleted the qualifying phrase: “In any city or town which accepts this section.” St. 1971, c. 956, § 1.

Hood v. City of Boston

891 F. Supp. 51 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 28, 1995

Thus, the municipality’s immunity applies as well to suits against each of the defendant officers in his official capacity. B. … immunity, discretionary function, and exclusivity of remedy provisions of state law.

Brown v. Hearst Corp.

862 F. Supp. 622 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 21, 1994

The first requirement is met here because the divorce trial clearly qualifies as an official proceeding. … Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 , 84 S.Ct. 710, 720 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) ("libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations”). 8 .

Commonwealth v. Lykus

367 Mass. 191 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 27, 1975

The witnesses were particularly definite in identifying certain words which were said, not in a whisper, but clearly. Only one of the eight witnesses, called as to this issue, could make no voice identification. … Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert *204 witness should be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion.”

Motta v. Reading Municipal Light Department

5 Mass. L. Rptr. 687 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Aug 12, 1996

Motta also alleges that RMLD was negligent in awarding the masonry subcontract to Major because Major was not qualified to do masonry work. At no time did Motta send a letter of presentment to the defendant. … G.L.c. 258 was enacted as an exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine, which precludes suits against the state, municipalities or their agencies without their consent.

Commonwealth v. Coolidge

128 Mass. 55 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 27, 1880

It may be that the same act may involve more than one of them; but it is necessary to allege only one intent, if that intent is proved, and all the other facts necessary to constitute the crime are established. … This distinction is clearly pointed out and illustrated in Regina v. Tiddeman, 4 Cox C. C. 387, cited at the bar by the counsel on both sides.

Ex parte Pettine

259 F. 733 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 3, 1919

taken that, by treaty between the government of the United States and Italy, Italians stand on a level with native-born citizens, who, it is said, under the right of freedom of speech, may teach anarchistic theories with immunity … Congress, through the act approved October 16, 1918, having clearly declared against all aliens who are anarchists, the declaration must be accepted as meaning that Congress was of opinion that the presence of alien anarchists

Adam Associates International, Inc. v. William A. Berry & Son, Inc.

22 Mass. L. Rptr. 389 · Massachusetts Superior Court · May 2, 2007

The arbitrator(s) shall be selected in accordance with the AAA procedures from a list of qualified persons maintained by the AAA. … An arbitrator cannot direct a person to act in violation of the law and thereby immunize that person from the consequences of his illegal conduct.

L.L., a juvenile v. Commonwealth

470 Mass. 169 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 5, 2014

Because § 178E (f) itself does not clearly define the appropriate level of risk warranting relief from registration under § 178E (f), we seek guidance on the issue from other sections of the act. … It follows that to qualify for exemption from registration under § 178E (f), a juvenile sex offender's risk of reoffense should be less than this "low" registration-triggering risk.

Craft Beer Stellar, LLC v. Glassdoor, Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 17, 2018

Because Congress has clearly dictated that the DTSA should not be construed to be a law “pertaining to intellectual property” for the purposes of any other Act of Congress, the DTSA is clearly not such a law for the purposes … Ch. 93, §§ 2 & 11); that Glassdoor aided and abetted John Does 1-20; and that Glassdoor civilly conspired with John Does 1-20—are clearly not claims “pertaining to intellectual property” and thus are subject to § 230 immunity

Hutchins v. Commonwealth

15 Mass. L. Rptr. 657 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 10, 2003

The commitment scheme established by the version of c. 123A in existence in 1985 allowed for a 60-day evaluation period during which examinations were to be performed either prior to sentencing for the offense upon which … If such report clearly indicates that such prisoner is a sexually dangerous person, the clerk shall thereupon notify the court and the district attorney, and the district attorney shall file a petition for commitment of the

Kinney v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board

330 Mass. 302 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 10, 1953

It does not clearly appear whether on September 16, 1952, when the repealing act was approved, the petitioner had already attained a status making him eligible then to claim retirement rights. … For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to state further qualifying details. 1 See cases collected in 54 A. L. R. 943, 945; 98 A. L. R. 505, 506; 112 A. L. R. 1009, 1010; 137 A. L. R. 249, 252.

Camara v. Attorney General

458 Mass. 756 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 25, 2011

The plaintiff, Michael Camara, is its vice-president and qualifies as a statutory employer of ABC’s employees within the meaning of the Wage Act. … Black’s Law Dictionary 373 (9th ed. 2009). 10 This interpretation of the term, as the Attorney General contends, clearly furthers the Wage Act’s overarching policy of protecting employees’ rights to wages. Cf.

Denny v. Cabot

47 Mass. 82 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 1843

explained in the present contract; the clear meaning of the terms of which is, that Cabot, Appleton & Co. were to pay Cooper one third part of the profits, after making certain specified deductions therefrom, and Cooper clearly … ; the question is, whether the circumstances, under which the participation exists, may not qualify the presumption, and satisfactorily prove, that the portion of the profits is taken, not in the character of a partner, but