Case law

In Re Lennon

294 N.J. Super. 303 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 23, 1996

The sole issue for Medicaid eligibility purposes is who established the trust. … Clearly, a third party trust fits this definition. However, an individual's own proceeds from a judgment/settlement that are transferred into a trust do not.

Garden St. Comm. Hsp. v. State Bd. of Med. Exam

147 N.J. Super. 592 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 14, 1977

(c) A duly qualified surgeon, duly qualified assistant physician, and duly qualified resident shall be determined by the hospital credentials committee in conjunction with the chairman or chief of the appropriate department … Clearly, the quoted provision does not authorize or sanction any of the designated persons to act as a first assistant surgeon in the performance of major surgery.

MATTIACCIO v. SCHARFENBERG

District Court, D. New Jersey · Jul 8, 2025

Seventh, the NJTCA’s qualified immunity provisions shield Defendants from liability. The Court will address each argument in turn. A. … OCPO’s designation as a “constitutionally established office” satisfies the second Fitchik factor.

Feder v. Bankers Nat. Life Ins. Co.

100 N.J. Super. 458 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 25, 1968

That result clearly contravenes the Reinstatement clause requirement that all overdue premiums shall have been paid upon reinstatement (with interest). … It could not reasonably be found on this state of facts that there was an intentional surrender by the company of a known immunity on the policy.

State v. McCrary

97 N.J. 132 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 26, 1984

If, under these latter circumstances, the guilty verdict had been returned by a non-death-qualified jury, then the sentencing phase would have to go forward with a newly-impanelled, death-qualified jury. … We are clearly of the opinion, that in this state, at least, it does not.

Kraivanger v. Radburn Ass'n

335 N.J. Super. 169 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 21, 2000

The respondent, Radburn Association, is a non-profit corporation established in 1929 to administer certain restrictive covenants running with property located within the community. … The one-day’s pay for participation in the training program was clearly some consideration, and was regarded as such by respondent when it required petitioner to file employment documents, including a W-4 form.

KIDWAI

District Court, D. New Jersey · Mar 31, 2026

Thus, while we tend to discuss prosecutorial immunity based on alleged acts, our ultimate analysis is whether a defendant has established absolute prosecutorial immunity from a given claim … “Meaning to earn the protections of absolute immunity, a defendant must show that the conduct triggering absolute immunity ‘clearly appear[s] on the face of the complaint.’” Fogle, 957 F.3d at 161 (quoting Wilson v.

Dungee v. Northeast Foods, Inc.

940 F. Supp. 682 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Oct 3, 1996

To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he belongs to a protected category; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his … Plaintiff, a woman over forty, clearly falls within the class of persons protected by the statutes. 2 Plaintiff applied for and was minimally qualified for the job. Despite her qualifications, she was not hired.

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Township of Saddle River

96 N.J.L. 40 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 1, 1921

Chief Justice Chase in the Thomson case: “We perceive no limits to the principle of exemption which the complainants seek to establish.” … To us it is inconceivable that congress ever intended any such drastic and all-pervading immunity from taxation.

Ballinger v. Delaware River Port Authority

172 N.J. 586 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 25, 2002

Therefore, beyond being simply a compensatory measure affecting only government action, “CEPA establishes a statutory exception to the general rule that an employer may terminate an at-will employee with or without cause. … Both creator states in this case clearly regard the fundamental duty of a police officer to be enforcement of the laws.

HINES v. BOROUGH OF BELMAR

District Court, D. New Jersey · Jul 30, 2025

Qualified immunity shields police officers from liability unless they violated clearly established rights. … light of clearly established law and the information the [arresting] officers possessed.”

FERNANDO A. PORTES VS. EILEEN MARKENSTEIN (L-1335-18, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 22, 2020

Legg argued that as a municipal prosecutor, he was entitled to qualified immunity for his actions in prosecuting plaintiff for contempt of the no-contact order. … The mere allegation of racial discrimination by [p]laintiff is not supported by evidence, and so it cannot be said [Legg] violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional

Gibilterra v. Rosemawr Homes, Inc.

19 N.J. 166 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 20, 1955

liability might rest upon a jury finding of a failure by United and Bayley, assuming the trench was dug by Bayley in the continuance of the general hire, to employ standard methods in digging it, provided expert opinion establishes … R. 4:16-2 expressly immunizes from production or inspection “the conclusions of an expert” (except the report of a physician as limited by R.

Rosa v. Dunkin' Donuts of Passaic

122 N.J. 66 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 15, 1991

The fireman's rule still allows recovery in situations of willful or intentional misconduct traditionally outside of the cloak of the rule's immunity. As we stated clearly in Mahoney v. … Freda that the rule does not apply when a defendant's clearly "subsequent act of negligence" injures the police officer or firefighter. 93 N.J. at 91 , 459 A. 2d 663 .

Ward v. Zelikovsky

136 N.J. 516 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 20, 1994

At the core of those tests, however, are certain fairly well-established principles. True statements are absolutely protected under the First Amendment. 2 Fowler V. … Meanings of this sort fit comfortably within the immunity for name-calling. [/d at 402.]

Shreve v. Shreve

17 N.J. Eq. 487 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 15, 1864

If this is the correct theory, the disposition which has been made of the interest in question is clearly erroneous. As simple personalty, it cannot rank with the specific gifts to legatees and devisees. … The specialty creditor can look to the land as well as the personal assets, and there seems to be no reason why, in regard to this class of debts, the one kind of property should have an immunity which the other does not

Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. UNITED SERV. AUTO. ASS'N

218 N.J. Super. 492 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 1, 1987

Kiev established several Club Nautilus centers. The investors set up individual corporations for each operation, and Dr. Kiev was made president of each. … Clearly, emotional trauma can be as disabling to the body as a visible physical wound.

D.G. v. Somerset Hills School District

559 F. Supp. 2d 484 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Apr 18, 2008

Dep’t of Educ., 301 F.3d 952, 957 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that state officials were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the plaintiffs’ IDEA claims because the plaintiffs could not recover compensatory or punitive … To make out a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff usually must establish that he or she (1) has a disability, (2) is a qualified individual, and (3) has suffered an adverse action because

Crespo v. Stapf

128 N.J. 351 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 25, 1992

Requiring a person to establish residency, which subjects him or her to the general jurisdiction of state courts, Jack H. … may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.

State v. Lee

188 N.J. Super. 432 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 16, 1982

Michael O’Donovan was qualified as an expert on weapons and gave his opinion that the taped scissors were useless for their traditional purpose and in the taped condition became a “stiletto.” … Thus, the judge clearly charged the jury as to the required statutory elements making up an offense under N.J. S.A. 2C:39-5(d).