Case law

Suffolk Construction Co. v. Royal & Sunalliance Insurance

14 Mass. L. Rptr. 295 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 29, 2002

The court held that the phrase, “arising out of your work” triggers the insurance company’s duty to defend and indemnify the additional insured unless the policy is drafted “with qualifying language that expressly implements … Although Royal was free to redraft the policy so that it clearly demonstrated an intention to limit coverage, it did not.

Greece v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board

3 Mass. L. Rptr. 89 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 25, 1994

I conclude that the case law interpreting that statutory standard clearly supports the plaintiffs argument that, on the facts at bar, she is entitled to receive accidental disability retirement. In Adams v. … The test borrowed from Zerofski’s Case and applied in Adams to accidental disability retirement benefits did not establish a conjunctive standard.

LaFrenier v. Kinirey

478 F. Supp. 2d 126 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 20, 2007

For the reasons stated above, defendants clearly had probable cause to arrest plaintiff. … Defendants Kinirey and Morrison contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity even assuming that plaintiff could make out a violation of § 1983.

Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, Ltd., of London

281 Mass. 303 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 3, 1933

Nevertheless, it follows from the established scope and effect of the statute (said c. 231, § 5) already set forth, that the plaintiff has no immunity from the defence in the nature of abatement interposed by the defendant … Immunity granted to a class, however limited, having the effect to deprive another class, however limited, of a personal or property right, is just as clearly a denial of equal protection of the laws to the latter class as

In Re CRS Steam, Inc.

217 B.R. 365 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 11, 1998

Nor has he sought to establish that the policy contains a choice-of-law clause designating the law of a state which is not in accord with the weight of authority. He has therefore failed to qualify the policy as exempt. … And there is no long list of phrases making the later qualifier quite remote from early phrases.

Murphy v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority

462 Mass. 701 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 12, 2012

If nondiscriminatory, it is invalid only if it imposes a burden on interstate commerce that “is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Id. at 338-339 , quoting Pike v. … L. c. 81A (see note 7, supra), the act that established the authority, established the Department of Transportation (department) in its place, and transferred the authority’s responsibilities and employees to the department

Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n

914 F. Supp. 688 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 18, 1996

However, those designations are not controlling in determining whether the case is one involving the denial of accreditation within the meaning of § 1099b(f), and even a cursory examination of the complaint clearly establishes … or may qualify as an eligible institution.”

Commonwealth v. Flaherty

61 Mass. App. Ct. 776 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Sep 7, 2004

“The portion of the statement sought to be introduced must ‘qualify or explain the segment’ previously introduced.” Commonwealth v. Richardson, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 94, 99 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. … Here, clearly the statements the prosecutor sought to introduce did not clarify, qualify, or explain what defense counsel had earlier elicited.

Graham v. McGrail

370 Mass. 133 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 9, 1976

L. c. 268A, § 19, but that there was a valid quorum and that the chairman’s votes were valid and effective to establish the budget. … L. c. 268A, § 19, might “participate in any way in establishing the entire Budget.”

May v. Breed

61 Mass. 15 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 1851

As to the law regulating remedies, it is as clearly settled, and upon most satisfactory grounds, that every case must be governed by the law of the place where the remedy is sought. … nature and character, the force and obligation of the contract, deciding to what extent it binds the parties in all the various contingencies which mav occur, what shall be deemed actual *36 and specific performance, or qualified

Green v. Cosby

160 F. Supp. 3d 431 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 11, 2016

Laws ch. 233, § 20 , Second (emphasis added); see In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 849 N.E.2d at 800-01 (holding that the term “trial” qualifies the phrase “other criminal proceeding” and thus the privilege does not apply to grand … June 15, 2007) (“[Witnesses who appear before a court or for some other judicial proceeding — such as a deposition — are immune from service of process _”) (quoting James Wm.

Craft Beer Stellar, LLC v. Glassdoor, Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 17, 2018

Because Congress has clearly dictated that the DTSA should not be construed to be a law “pertaining to intellectual property” for the purposes of any other Act of Congress, the DTSA is clearly not such a law for the purposes … Ch. 93, §§ 2 & 11); that Glassdoor aided and abetted John Does 1-20; and that Glassdoor civilly conspired with John Does 1-20—are clearly not claims “pertaining to intellectual property” and thus are subject to § 230 immunity

Commonwealth v. McAlister

365 Mass. 454 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 12, 1974

We have examined these studies and are unprepared to say that they so clearly demonstrate a conviction-prone bias in “death-qualified” juries as to make trials before such juries constitutionally defective. … He further charges error in that the prosecutor did not establish that the defendant was the same James McAlister named in the conviction record. Ayers v. Rat-shesky, 213 Mass. 589, 594-595 (1913).

Booten v. United States

95 F. Supp. 2d 37 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 3, 2000

The plaintiff has clearly satisfied the jurisdictional notice requirements of Section 2675. … These documents, by themselves, were sufficient to establish the plaintiffs authority to pursue her claims.

Wellington &c.

33 Mass. 87 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 15, 1834

expound the laws, to declare what has and what has not the force of law, and to apply them to the investigation and adjustment'of the rights, duties, and obligations of citizens, in the actual administration of justice, it is clearly … Respect for the legislature, therefore, concurs with well established principles of law, in the conclusion, that such act is not void, but voidable only ; and it follows as a necessary legal inference from this position,

United States v. Gorski

36 F. Supp. 3d 256 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 1, 2014

The government has filed a motion for reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s decision, contending that it was clearly erroneous and contrary to law. … Instead, a defendant has a burden of production to establish a prima facie defense of advice of counsel. See United States v.

Brown v. Hearst Corp.

862 F. Supp. 622 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 21, 1994

The first requirement is met here because the divorce trial clearly qualifies as an official proceeding. … Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 , 84 S.Ct. 710, 720 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) ("libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations”). 8 .

Shea v. Caritas Carney Hospital, Inc.

79 Mass. App. Ct. 530 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 13, 2011

L. c. 123, § 36B, clearly abrogated any common-law duty owed by a mental health professional to a patient. … A statute cannot “be interpreted as effecting a material change in or a repeal of *541 the common law unless the intent to do so is clearly expressed.” Riley v. Davison Constr.

Massachusetts Electric Co. v. Department of Public Utilities

383 Mass. 675 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 3, 1981

While the company concedes that “ [i] t is a recognized tenet of administrative law that an agency can adopt policy decisions in the context of adjudicatory proceedings,” it qualifies this by urging that “[a]n automatic application … This alone is sufficiently *680 impractical to outweigh the adverse impact of retroactive application, at least where, as here, the department is working within a detailed, organized system of precedent which clearly established

Hullum v. Mici

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 30, 2024

Of course, “a motion to dismiss may be granted on the ground of failure to exhaust only where the facts establishing the defense are clear on the face of the plaintiff's pleadings … The remaining undecided issues in the motion to dismiss (i.e. qualified immunity and merits claims) are held in abeyance pending the resolution of the exhaustion issue.