Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
5,059 results
1.17s
Scott Co. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop
83 Or. 97 · Oregon Supreme Court · Feb 20, 1917
The validity of the restrictions on which appellants rely is established by Seeck v. Jakel, 71 Or. 35 ( 141 Pac. 211 , L. R. A. 1915A, 679). … The relative rights of appellants and Laurelhurst Company under the facts alleged in the complaint are clearly set out in De Gray v. Monmouth Beach Co., 50 N. J.
Cited 22 timesPublishedHayden Island Condos v. Multnomah Cty., Tc-Md 060822d (or.tax 8-18-2008)
Oregon Tax Court · Aug 18, 2008
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff "cannot establish equitable estoppel on the facts of this case, * * * and the Assessor's denial of Plaintiff's Application as untimely filed was proper." … Similarly in Hoyt and Sidhu , taxpayers received documents (notices of adjustment) that clearly stated that their appeals must be filed within 90 days from the date of the notice.
Cited 0 timesPublishedState Ex Rel. State Office for Services to Children & Families v. Hammons
169 Or. App. 589 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Sep 6, 2000
taken within the 90-day time frame established by ORS 419A.200(4)(c). … Clearly, appellate counsel’s inadequate performance did not affect the outcome of the trial, it affected the appellate court’s ability to review de novo the order of the trial court. ORS 419A.200(5).
Declined to follow by Miller v. Baldwin, 176 Or. App. 500 (2001)Cited 14 timesPublishedAt&T Communications of Pacific Northwest, Inc. v. City of Eugene
177 Or. App. 379 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Oct 31, 2001
But it is generally required that the legislature’s preemptive intentions be clearly stated. … In that case, the county imposed a business income tax on pari-mutuel racing establishments.
Cited 29 timesPublishedWiederhold v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
888 F. Supp. 2d 1065 · District Court, D. Oregon · Aug 23, 2012
In the present case, without such a discussion, the court cannot identify clearly which factual assertions Wiederhold deems relevant and material, and which she deems immaterial. … Thus, Sears asserts Wiederhold must be able to establish “constructive discharge” in order to prevail on this claim.
Cited 2 timesPublishedPortland Police Ass'n v. City of Portland
275 Or. App. 700 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Dec 30, 2015
Specifically, the city’s thesis is that the legislature has established, in ORS 181.789(2), a clearly defined public policy that deference be given to a police chiefs plausible interpretation and application of a police department … We disagree with the city that ORS 181.789(2) establishes a clearly defined public policy requiring deference to the police chiefs decision on whether an officer’s conduct comports with the bureau’s use-of-force policies.
Cited 0 timesPublishedHolbrook v. Precision Helicopters, Inc.
162 Or. App. 538 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Sep 15, 1999
Defendant misunderstands the requirements for establishing a business record. … if kept in the course of a *544 regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the * * * report, * * * all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified
Cited 11 timesPublishedIn Re Complaint as to the Conduct of Albrecht
333 Or. 520 · Oregon Supreme Court · Mar 14, 2002
Rule 6(e)(2) establishes the general rule of federal grand jury secrecy. … Farber had obtained immunity from prosecution under an agreement with the federal government. Farber later obtained immunity from state prosecution under an agreement with the state government.
Cited 8 timesPublishedLincoln Interagency Narcotics Team v. Kitzhaber
188 Or. App. 526 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jul 9, 2003
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to impair judicial immunity if otherwise applicable. “(11) Reporting requirement. … The dissent disagrees, because it believes that section 7 does not confer a qualifying constitutional right on persons in need of drug treatment.
Reversed by Lincoln Interagency Narcotics Team v. Kitzhaber, 341 Or. 496 (2006)Cited 8 timesPublished9 Or. App. 299 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Apr 21, 1972
The qualifying phrase ‘in any significant Avay’ is used at one point in the opinion, although it is omitted in later statements of the test. … However, it clearly does not suggest that when he consented to the search the defendant was a “focal suspect,” which in State v.
Cited 3 timesPublishedApplication of Portland General Elec. Co.
277 Or. 447 · Oregon Supreme Court · Mar 3, 1977
established by the Council." … This clearly is not the law.
Cited 100 timesPublished343 Or. 379 · Oregon Supreme Court · Nov 8, 2007
Instead, petitioners Keisling and Campbell assert, the proposed measure “establishes a new, parallel system, the open primary system.” … (Only the references to “all candidates” and “top two” in the caption can even arguably be said to address the petitioners’ concerns, but we think that those phrases, as used, so clearly refer back to the reference in the
Cited 1 timesPublished865 F. Supp. 1454 · District Court, D. Oregon · Oct 6, 1994
Both Branch and Genter clearly require that a plaintiff prove that he or she did or did not take action resulting in forfeiture of the very benefit sought. … Her action all occurred after her accident and after she was informed that she may not qualify for coverage.
Cited 7 timesPublishedPremier Technology v. OR. STATE LOTTERY
136 Or. App. 124 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Aug 23, 1995
Plaintiffs right to sue defendant is found in ORS 30.320. 1 That statute provides a waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity and a statutory remedy for breaches of contracts by state agencies made within the scope of their … In paragraph 3.1, the agreement clearly establishes a condition precedent regarding the requirement of a performance bond.
Cited 12 timesPublishedStewart v. Salem School District 24J
65 Or. App. 188 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Oct 12, 1983
“Fasold: Under our laws, it is permissible for a school district to establish that kindergarten which would include 5-year olds. … If the legislature intended that the district provide educational services to handicapped children under regular school age, it should have said so clearly. 6 Petitioner asserts that, in any event, 20 USC § 1400 et seq and
Cited 1 timesPublishedState Ex Rel. Engweiler v. Powers
232 Or. App. 214 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Nov 25, 2009
The defendant had argued to the trial court that his skateboard did not qualify because vehicles are something that one drives, and one does not drive a skateboard. … The parties clearly put before the trial court the meaning of ORS 144.120(1)(a) (1989).
Reversed on other grounds by State Ex Rel. Engweiler v. Felton, 350 Or. 592 (2011)Cited 6 timesPublished301 Or. App. 373 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Dec 18, 2019
It is well established that confessions are presumed to be involuntary. Id. (citing Powell, 352 Or at 225-26; State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 137, 806 P2d 92 (1991)). … Those statements also did not suggest that, if defendant confessed, he might receive immunity or leniency.
Cited 11 timesPublishedDistrict Court, D. Oregon · Apr 9, 2025
Likely because the Supreme Court has already established that Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity with respect to Title II of the ADA “as it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right … To establish an ADA or RA violation, a plaintiff must (1) be a qualified individual with a disability, (2) who was denied a reasonable accommodation that is needed for her “to enjoy meaningful access to the benefits of
Cited 0 timesUnknown322 Or. App. 202 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Oct 5, 2022
“In truth the distinction must be clearly explained to the jury because we have held that contributory negligence is a defense in an action for gross negligence but is not a defense in an action for wanton misconduct.” … It fol- lows, under well-established case law, that the defense of comparative fault is unavailable to defendant. E.
Cited 4 timesPublished255 Or. App. 340 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Feb 21, 2013
Because a lawyer cannot commit a crime on behalf of a client or to further the lawyer’s own *352 self-interest, that conduct, too, would fall outside the scope of the attorney-client relationship for purposes of immunity. … See Reynolds, 341 Or at 351 (“[T]he rule [concerning qualified privilege] protects lawyers only for actions of the kind that permissibly may be taken by lawyers in the course of representing their clients.”
Cited 12 timesPublished
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