Case law

Worthington v. WestNET

182 Wash. 2d 500 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 22, 2015

Contrast the cases cited by the dissent, in which the enabling statute at issue is not qualified and instead conclusively provides for defendant’s immunity. See dissent at 517-18 (citing Roth v. … That possibility is qualified by subsection .030(5), which prohibits the contributing agencies from using these agreements to avoid other obligations.

Ace Fireworks Co. v. City of Tacoma

76 Wash. 2d 207 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 5, 1969

To be void for unreasonableness, an ordinance must be clearly and plainly unreasonable. Seattle v. Hurst, 50 Wash. 424 , 97 P. 454 (1908). … It is with this thought in mind that we hold as reasonable the distinction between proven, experienced, qualified retail fireworks licensees on the one hand and other applicants who may also be qualified, but as yet without

Kees v. Wallenstein

973 F. Supp. 1191 · District Court, W.D. Washington · May 14, 1997

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity when “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. … it is not clearly established today.

Bruce L. Davidson, M.d. v. Robb W. Glenny, M.d., Et Ano.

14 Wash. App. 2d 370 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Aug 24, 2020

is like a qualified privilege.58 By 53Magney v. … A speaker abuses a qualified privilege or immunity when he knows his statements are false.68 Davidson alleges Glenny and Skerrett “intentionally omitted key information” and “each knew” they were spreading false impressions

Harper v. State

110 Wash. 2d 873 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 7, 1988

Ill The State's final argument is that Harper's suit must be dismissed because he has proved no violation of a "clearly established" constitutional right so as to overcome the State's qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § … Official conduct is per se unreasonable if contrary to clearly established constitutional rights. Hocker , at 825; Wood , at 322.

Deschamps v. Mason County Sheriff's Office

96 P.3d 413 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Aug 17, 2004

RCW 9.41.0975 RCW 9.41.0975 provides qualified immunity for employees who prepare and issue or deny firearm licenses in good faith. … App. 614, 622-23 , 943 P.2d 298 (1997) ("It is particularly important that good faith (or its absence) in this qualified immunity situation be determined promptly ... a prompt determination is vital because qualified immunity

United States v. Brigman

874 F. Supp. 1125 · District Court, E.D. Washington · Sep 19, 1994

That right is clearly-established. See, Department of Taxation & Finance of New York v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 2028 , 129 L.Ed.2d 52 (1994). … WAC 458-20-192 clearly provides that Indians may purchase unstamped cigarettes for resale to “qualified purchasers.”

Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle

274 F. Supp. 3d 1155 · District Court, W.D. Washington · Aug 1, 2017

state' immunity. … Trade Comm’n, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1101, 1111 , 191 L.Ed,2d 36 (2015), Under the Ordinance, the City’s Director of Finance and Administrative Services establishes criteria for the identification of qualifying drivers whose

Grenning v. Stout

144 F. Supp. 3d 1241 · District Court, E.D. Washington · Nov 3, 2015

As the Magistrate Judge correctly held, prison officials carrying out their duties are immune from suit unless their behavior contravenes “clearly established federal law.” Torres v. … claims was clearly established at the time Defendants’ relevant actions occurred.

Moore v. Smith

89 Wash. 2d 932 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 20, 1978

Once the existence of an occasion of qualified privilege is established, the burden of proof to demonstrate abuse of privilege shifts to the plaintiff. … Our decisions have clearly restricted the application of absolute privilege while we have frequently discussed the applicability of qualified privilege. Engelmohr v. Bache, 66 Wn.2d 103 , 401 P.2d 346 (1965); Owens v.

In Re Washington Public Power Supply System Securities Litigation

623 F. Supp. 1466 · District Court, W.D. Washington · Dec 5, 1985

Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 , 96 S.Ct. 1375 , 47 L.Ed.2d 668 (1976) it was clearly established that scienter must be alleged for a claim under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. … The issue in the case was whether local governments were entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983.

Horan v. King County, Washington, Division of Emergency Medical Services

740 F. Supp. 1471 · District Court, W.D. Washington · Mar 20, 1990

KING COUNTY’S IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY. 1. Absolute Immunity. … For King County to qualify for complete immunity under section 259, the County must show that its actions (1) were taken in reliance on regulations or a written ruling of the Wage and Hour Administrator; (2) were in conformity

Segaline v. Department of Labor & Industries

144 Wash. App. 312 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Apr 29, 2008

Clearly, claims challenging the communications themselves, here to 911 and police, are “based upon” the communication. ¶33 In Dang, Division One held that immunity under RCW 4.24.510 is not limited solely to communications … Because of this holding, we do not need to decide whether Croft had qualified immunity.

Aventis Pharmaceutical Inc, V Wa State Department Of Revenue

428 P.3d 389 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 16, 2018

The statute at issue required that for Stroh to qualify for the exemption, neither Stroh’s representative “‘[n]or any other person’” sell Stroh’s products in a permanent retail establishment. Stroh Brewery, 104 Wn. … 13 50641-6-II sold in any retail establishment.

Maynard v. Ferno-Washington, Inc.

22 F. Supp. 2d 1171 · District Court, E.D. Washington · Oct 2, 1998

There is clearly an issue of fact over whether Marta Maynard witnessed a similar accident shortly before her own accident. … The court finds that Ferno-Wash-ington has not established that Mr. Fries is not qualified as an expert. Mr.

Leah Campanelli, V. Peacehealth Southwest Medical Center

Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 24, 2025

Under ER 702, an expert’s opinion can be qualified by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Whether an expert is qualified to render an opinion is a preliminary finding by the court under ER 104(a). … Establishing cause in fact involves a determination of what actually occurred and is generally left to the jury to decide. Id.

McKinney v. Northwest Tractor & Equipment Corp.

41 Wash. 2d 372 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 30, 1952

The defendant .corporation appeared specially and moved to quash the service upon it on three grounds, two of which merit consideration here: (1) that it is a foreign corporation and is not qualified to do business in the … Brown is not sufficiently explicit to establish that fact. The basic question of whether the defendant corporation is transacting business in this state is not one that should be *374 decided on conflicting affidavits.

Carl W. Schwartz v. King County

Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 27, 2020

Thus, “[t]o qualify for immunity under RCW 4.24.210, the landowner must establish that the land at issue was (1) open to members of the public (2) for recreational purposes and that (3) no fee was charged.” … This case is factually different from Jewels because, unlike in Jewels, expert testimony in this case clearly establishes there is a material dispute of facts as to latency.

Latimer v. Western MacHinery Exchange

42 Wash. 2d 756 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 25, 1953

In other words, we now hold that the so-called immunity provision of the workmen’s compensation act, the provision in RCW 51.24.010 just referred to, does not bar an action by a self-employed individual for negligence causing … , that, inasmuch as “any individual employer or any member or officer of any corporate employer” engaged in extrahazardous employment may elect to take under the workmen’s compensation act, such persons are bound by the immunity

Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.

632 F. Supp. 2d 1029 · District Court, E.D. Washington · Jun 19, 2009

Congress can waive a tribe’s immunity from suit, but that waiver must be clearly expressed. Congress has plenary power over tribal sovereignty, but must make clear its intent to limit that sovereignty. … However, such a conclusion is of dubious validity inasmuch as a tribe’s disposal activities would clearly be subject to regulation under RCRA as well as SDWA and the CWA.