Case law

'Abdullah v. Secretary of Public Safety

42 Mass. App. Ct. 387 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 28, 1997

The defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Unlike pretrial detainees who may not be punished at all, Richardson v. … Upon remand, the defendants may press their entitlement to qualified immunity. As the conditions of ‘Abdullah’s confinement may bear on this question, we do not comment on this issue. See DiMarco v.

Plummer v. Boston Elevated Railway Co.

198 Mass. 499 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 20, 1908

On the contrary, the last clause of *515 the section very clearly contemplates that the duly of the court may not be fully discharged by a mere statement of the law. … The answer of the witness was: “ I do not think I am qualified to answer that question, and if allowed I will explain the reason.

Bearce v. Morton Hospital A Steward Family Hospital, Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 20, 2022

The statute provides immunity to “[p]hysicians, qualified advanced practice registered nurses, qualified psychologists, qualified psychiatric nurse mental health clinical specialists, police officers and licensed … Any immunity under the statute, however, is qualified immunity as it only applies if the party “act[ed] in accordance with this chapter.” Mass. Gen. L. c. 123, § 22; see Hopper v.

DeNadai v. Preferred Capital Markets, Inc.

272 B.R. 21 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 13, 2001

Under the Plan, the Company could issue the following awards: stock awards, stock options (either incentive stock options (“ISOs”) qualifying for special tax treatment under I.R.C. § 422, or non-qualified stock options), … Both cases, applying Massachusetts law, considered to what extent the doctrine established in Fortune v.

Commonwealth v. Vitello

376 Mass. 426 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 26, 1978

Following a voir dire hearing, the judge found that the examiner was qualified as an expert on polygraphy and could testify. … This concern was clearly articulated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.

Clauson v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America

195 F. Supp. 72 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 16, 1961

Hence it is required that the matter of es-toppel, i.e., the facts out of which it arises, be clearly established in evidence; and then the facts so established must present these two requisites, viz.: 1. … Defendant relies heavily on Paragraph 4(b) (ii) as qualifying the language used in Paragraph 4(a).

National Shawmut Bank v. City of Waterville

285 Mass. 252 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 14, 1934

The cause of action described in the case at bar clearly is one on which the defendant is liable to suit provided jurisdiction has been secured over it or its property. … It follows that there can be no immunity from an action against the defendant on the ground that it partakes of the attributes of sovereignty whereby a State is protected from being an involuntary party to litigation.

Falmouth Hospital v. Lopes

376 Mass. 580 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 9, 1978

It is not shown how much, if any, of the $68,000 of unreimbursed services rendered by the hospital in 1973 would have qualified as "uncompensated services” under the Federal regulations. … Dyer, 7 Cush. 337 , 340 (1851), the court had enforced "the principle of law, long recognized and clearly established in this commonwealth, that when one person, for a valuable consideration, engages with another, by simple

MacNeill Engineering Co., Inc. v. Trisport, Ltd.

59 F. Supp. 2d 199 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 28, 1999

Trisport argues that this Court should deny MacNeill’s motion for leave to amend its claim of contributory infringement as futile because such scanty pleading “fails to allege facts which, if proven, would establish that … Additionally, the Court would have to consider whether Trisport's alleged disclosure, apparently made solely in the context of litigation, is immunized from section 99Q liability under some .form of litigation privilege.

Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook

491 F. Supp. 547 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 17, 1980

The municipal officials, of course, are entitled to a qualified immunity which is not enjoyed by the municipality itself. Owen v. City of Independence, -U.S.-, 100 S.Ct. 1398 , 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980). … Barber to the deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and Laws of the United States.

West Broadway Task Force v. Boston Housing Authority

414 Mass. 394 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 24, 1993

This ruling is clearly erroneous. … It is well established in the Commonwealth that loches does not operate to bar a claim simply because the events which established rights in the plaintiff occurred long ago. See, e.g., Elm Farm Foods Co. v.

Commonwealth v. Fay

467 Mass. 574 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 21, 2014

L. c. 123A outlines proper procedures and evidentiary standards, 13 and we have determined that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant suffered from a mental abnormality. … While the defendant’s argument that he would not qualify for commitment under the Kansas statute is technically accurate, it is misplaced.

United States v. Barton

282 F. Supp. 785 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 23, 1967

This seizure was too remote from the immediate presence of the arrested defendant to qualify as incident to an arrest. … It has been clearly established that automobiles are protected from unreasonable searches. Weller v. Russell, 1963, 3 Cir., 321 F.2d 848, 854 . 2 .

NAACP v. Harris

567 F. Supp. 637 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 27, 1983

The NAACP clearly qualifies under (b), see NAACP v. Button, supra, and where *640 only declaratory and injunctive relief are sought, it qualifies under (c). Mr. … While specific standards are lacking, clearly Title VIII requires effective fair housing enforcement.

Metivier v. Town of Grafton

148 F. Supp. 2d 98 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 20, 2001

Furthermore, the last sentence of Section 7-8 of the Town Charter clearly indicates that a person who has been appointed to a fixed term does not have a right to a hearing when that person is not reappointed. 1 The two statutory … From the commencement of her holdover “term”, all parties understood that her employment would end as soon as her successor was qualified.

Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Board of Appeals of Westwood

23 Mass. App. Ct. 278 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Dec 29, 1986

Such a review proceeds in accordance with the well-established principles governing judicial review under G. … Such review “confines the function of the court to its usual and proper function of applying established law to established facts.” Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 331 Mass. 555, 559 (1954).

Garneau v. Raytheon Company

323 F. Supp. 391 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 1, 1971

Plaintiffs allege that they are duly qualified for these promotions and that because of their sex they have been denied same as a result of discrimination on the part of Raytheon, with respect to compensation, terms, conditions … A reading of the January 19, 1970 letter from the Regional Director establishes that that letter did not contain element (c) of the definition of “notice” spelled out in 29 C.F.R. 1601.25.

Wasserman v. Town of Bellingham

7 Mass. L. Rptr. 40 · Massachusetts Superior Court · May 27, 1997

Blackstone’s Motion for Summary Judgment In support of its motion for summary judgment as to Counts III and V of the complaint, Blackstone argues that, to the extent the plaintiffs’ allege negligence, it is immune from liability … Blackstone contends that DeSimone, the Grove Hall Contracting, Inc. representative, is not qualified to render an expert opinion on causation because he lacks the education and experience to make such a determination.

Society of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory

754 F. Supp. 2d 219 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 3, 2010

Copying To establish copyright infringement, the Monastery must also show “copying of constituent elements of the work [by the defendant] that are original.” See Lotus Dev. … Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Safe Harbor Defense In his opposition to the Monastery’s motion for summary judgment, the Archbishop raises a matinal affirmative defense: he argues that he is immune from liability

McDonald v. Commonwealth Gas Co.

534 F. Supp. 232 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 26, 1982

A complainant has the burden of establishing a prima facie case. … In order to satisfy this burden he must show that (1) he belongs to a racial minority; (2) he applied and was qualified for a job the employer was trying to fill; (3) though qualified, he was rejected; and, (4) the employer