Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Long v. State

    422 N.E.2d 284 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 26, 1981

    It is clear that a confession is inadmissible if obtained by a promise of immunity or mitigation of punishment. Ashby v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 316 , 354 N.E.2d 192 . … Defendant’s refused instruction dealt with the burden of proof the state must meet in establishing that a confession was voluntary.

    Cited 31 timesPublished
  • Overstreet v. State

    783 N.E.2d 1140 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 24, 2003

    do not think Defendant has established reversible error. … As explained in section II, Misner was qualified to present this testimony.

    Cited 111 timesPublished
  • In Re: The Marriage of: Regina A. Niccum v. Matthew B. Niccum (mem. dec.)

    Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 8, 2015

    At the conclusion of the hearing, Regina’s counsel challenged whether Gottschalk was qualified to be a GAL. … Thus, Regina has not established that this finding is clearly erroneous.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Think Tank Software Development Corp. v. Chester, Inc.

    988 N.E.2d 1169 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 7, 2013

    To invoke this doctrine, the matters decided in the earlier appeal must clearly appear to be the only possible construction of an opinion. Id. … WILNER’S QUALIFICATIONS Chester argues that Wilner is not qualified to render an opinion on causation.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Huber v. Protestant Deaconess Hospital, Etc.

    127 Ind. App. 565 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 1, 1956

    The foregoing rule only applies where it clearly appears that the evidence fails to establish one or more of the facts essential to a recovery, and where the facts and the reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom … There is no claim made that such anesthetist was not a duly qualified and experienced specialist in the field of anesthesiology.

    Cited 22 timesPublished
  • Hometowne Associates, L.P. v. Maley

    839 N.E.2d 269 · Indiana Tax Court · Dec 16, 2005

    may only reverse a final determination of the Indiana Board if it is: (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity … To Qualify for LIHTCs, a project must reserve a portion of its rental units for use by low-income households only, with rents on those units limited to a percentage of qualifying income.

    Cited 17 timesPublished
  • Abe's Free Flow, Inc. v. City of Mishawaka, Ind.

    55 F. Supp. 2d 908 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Mar 11, 1999

    The City maintains that enactment of the Ordinance was clearly within reason and was not arbitrary. … “Liberty [of contract] implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community.” West Coast Hotel Co. v.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Cauldwell v. Curry

    93 Ind. 363 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 30, 1884

    There is a right of appeal in proceedings for the establishment and construction of ditches. Bryan v. Moore, 81 Ind. 9 ; Corey v. Swagger, 74 Ind. 211 ; Meehan v. Wiles, ante, p. 52. … The propositions we have stated, and the cases to which we have referred, very clearly sustain the ruling of the trial court adjudging the complaint bad. Judgment affirmed.

    Cited 33 timesPublished
  • Kentron, Inc. v. State Board of Tax Commissioners

    572 N.E.2d 1366 · Indiana Tax Court · Jun 11, 1991

    Clearly, Stanadyne is directly on point in the matter before the State Board. The Taxpayers are seeking exemptions that were not claimed on their returns for the years at issue. … The evidence clearly shows Kentron did not claim an exemption.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Woodruff v. Wilson

    484 F. Supp. 2d 876 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Apr 27, 2007

    , and that certain Defendants, namely, Coleman, Hornstein, McGee, Powers, Stark, Ellis and Connell, are not entitled to qualified immunity. … ABSOLUTE & QUALIFIED IMMUNITY Defendants Mason and Davis contend that as legal representatives at all times relevant to Legacy’s claims, they are entitled to absolute immunity.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Ransburg v. Richards

    770 N.E.2d 393 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 20, 2002

    We think it clear that public policy does not condemn the immunity clause voluntarily agreed upon by the parties. Id. at 951. … We also point out that an exculpatory clause of this type contravenes the long established common law rules of tort liability.

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Lembach v. State of Indiana

    987 F. Supp. 1095 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Nov 14, 1997

    In addition to 11th Amendment immunity, the court noted that a state and state agencies (the IDOC is an arm of the State of Indiana, since it is established as part of the executive branch of state government) are not “persons … While states can waive that immunity, Indiana has expressly not waived its 11th Amendment immunity. I.C. § 34-4-16.7-3.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Angelique Lockett and Lanetra Lockett v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana, Inc., and Cathy McGee

    Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 17, 2015

    We construe all facts and all reasonable inferences established by the designated evidence in favor of the non-moving party. Asklar, 9 N.E.3d at 167. … [21] Here, there is no question that Planned Parenthood qualifies as a “health care provider” under the MMA.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Knaus v. York

    586 N.E.2d 909 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 19, 1992

    Under IND.CODE 31-6-6.1-8, blood testing in paternity actions must be conducted by qualified experts. … Before the test results may be introduced into evidence, this court has held that a proper foundation must be established to prove that the doe-tor who conducted the tests was a qualified expert.

    Cited 27 timesPublished
  • Sturgeon v. State

    719 N.E.2d 1173 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 18, 1999

    Sturgeon clearly challenged Anderson’s credibility with inconsistencies between Anderson’s prior statement and his trial testimony. … The trial judge’s decision to deny Sturgeon’s motion for change of judge was not clearly erroneous. III.

    Cited 42 timesPublished
  • Robin Eugene Montgomery v. State of Indiana

    22 N.E.3d 768 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 11, 2014

    An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or it misinterprets the law. Id. … Accordingly, the main purpose of the NPLEx records is not to establish or prove some fact at trial.

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Myers v. Reynolds

    47 Ind. App. 233 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 9, 1911

    In this contention appellants are clearly in error. Other elements would have to be present in order to bind appellee. … It was clearly to the interest of appellants that the county surveyor, whose survey they had in this proceeding defeated, should not be appointed by the court.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Paternity of G.G.B.W. v. S.W.

    80 N.E.3d 264 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 26, 2017

    The school required that its students be vaccinated but, pursuant to Indiana Code section 20-34-3-2, the school allowed an unvaccinated student to attend if a parent executed a form claiming a religious objection'to immunization … Following the establishment of paternity, a trial court may modify a child-custody order only upon a showing that modification is in the child’s best interests and that there has been a substantial change in one or more of

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Wissman v. State

    540 N.E.2d 1209 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 12, 1989

    We find the totality of independent evidence presented by the State established the corpus delicti of murder. … Clearly, Dr. Swanson's testimony taken as a whole was beyond the common knowledge and experience of the average lay person. There was no error in allowing him to testify about the angle of the wound.

    Cited 29 timesPublished
  • Bell v. Clark

    653 N.E.2d 483 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 11, 1995

    Whether Bell established the defenses of qualified privilege or truth to Clark’s counterclaim of libel. Bell argues that his communications to the other limited partners were protected by a qualified privilege. … Clark argues persuasively that Bell failed to establish and has waived this defense.

    Cited 16 timesPublished

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