Case law

Miller v. Pioneer Cooperative of Franklin County, Inc.

2004 Mass. App. Div. 84 · Massachusetts District Court, Appellate Division · May 24, 2004

After qualifying, a member would be required to pay $500 for his or her share and then he or she would have the right to occupy one of the units. … The judge’s findings may not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. G.E B. v. S.R.W., 422 Mass. 158 (1996).

Revere Water Co. v. Inhabitants of Winthrop

192 Mass. 455 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 21, 1906

But even if their final action, when those in office sat as a board of selectmen, in not publishing to the community or stating in the warrant their *459 vote to buy the plant before the qualified inhabitants were called … the St. of 1882, c. 142, by which it was incorporated, enjoyed no vested rights which gave it immunity from this contingency, or rendered such legislative action unconstitutional.

Cable Mills v. Coakley Pierpan Dolan & Collins Insurance Agency

82 Mass. App. Ct. 415 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Sep 11, 2012

The proposal letter clearly sets out the scope of Barry’s responsibilities for the project and also lists the services that will be performed by others, such as geotechnical and soil testing. … We have concluded, supra, that subcontractors qualify as independent contractors for the purposes of this policy.

Santana v. Deluxe Corp.

12 F. Supp. 2d 162 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 4, 1998

To his credit, Santana readily admits that he is “clearly not an ‘employee’ for purposes of establishing ‘current employment status.’ ” See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment at 20. … But there is more here, establishing why the negative pregnant argument should be treated as an interpretive trump card.

Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp. (In Re Cambridge Biotech Corp.)

186 B.R. 9 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 1, 1995

Yet it has failed to do so, clearly breaching its best efforts obligation. That DP should perhaps pay consideration for the transfer is immaterial. … Here again its argument is the same—that the described method does not establish the presence of AIDS. As discussed, however, the claims are useful in establishing a person does not have AIDS. 3.

Labonte v. Hutchins & Wheeler

424 Mass. 813 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 5, 1997

To establish the prima facie case of unlawful employment discrimination on the basis of handicap pursuant to G. … Therefore, there is no clearly defined list of essential functions that the plaintiff must prove that he can perform. Compare Cox v. New England Tel. & Tel.

Commonwealth v. Sperrazza

3 Mass. Supp. 416 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Mar 29, 1982

Simpson, 370 Mass. 119 , 121 n.1 (1976) (“Recently, we noted the existence of this unresolved question [i.e., whether G.L.c. 233, sec. 20F, establishes the exclusive procedure by which a Superior Court Judge may grant immunity … Accordingly, even if the plea bargain agreement were to be interpreted as broadly as Sperrazza requests,, he could form no reasonable reliance thereon in light of the clearly controlling law, a matter which this Court infers

Patriarca v. Center for Living & Working, Inc.

10 Mass. L. Rptr. 486 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Sep 8, 1999

[liability may be imposed on an employer ... if an at-will employee is terminated for a *488 reason that violates a clearly established public policy.” Upton v. JWP Businessland, 425 Mass. 756, 757 (1997). … Director . . . provided however that the immunity conferred by this section shall not apply to any acts or omissions intentionally designed to harm or to any grossly negligent acts or omissions that result in harm to the

Bryant v. Caritas Norwood Hospital

345 F. Supp. 2d 155 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 24, 2004

In order to recover under the ADA, then, claimants need to establish that they have a .qualifying impairment and they “also need to demonstrate that the impairment limits a major life activity.” Id. … The “exemption from heavy lifting” proposed accommodation clearly fails the first prong of the Reed test.

Herrick v. ESSEX REGIONAL RETIREMENT BOARD

77 Mass. App. Ct. 645 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Sep 10, 2010

“A fundamental and well-established principle of statutory interpretation ‘is that a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained *650 from all its words construed by the ordinary and … Thus, since the antecedent phrases of the statute are separated from the qualifier by commas, the qualifier applies only to the immediate antecedent within the same phrase that was not separated from “without moral turpitude

Harding v. Studley

294 Mass. 193 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 1, 1936

Studley qualified as executrix. The surviving husband of the testatrix, Edward M. Harding, waived the provisions of the will. Edward M. Harding brought this petition in equity in the Probate Court against Florence A. … Clearly, apart from the direct testimony of Mrs.

Bennett v. Murphy

166 F. Supp. 3d 128 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 26, 2016

“Qualifying for disability retirement, however, is no small task” because “military regulations establish a complex web of procedures for obtaining disability benefits after leaving active service.” Fulbright v. … It does not, in itself, establish physical unfitness for Army purposes. The [VA] rating decision provided by the applicant does not establish entitlement to medical retirement or disability separation from the Army.

Wood v. Town of Oxford

290 Mass. 388 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 4, 1935

Facts in the case at bar bring it clearly within the prin *391 ciple enunciated in Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489 . … She gave to the defendant a notice sufficient to comply with the condition precedent to the establishment of her right of action under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 84, § 21. Baird v. Baptist Society, 208 Mass. 29 .

Commonwealth v. Lamb

372 Mass. 17 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 17, 1977

The threshold requirement of a psychiatric report which “clearly indicates” that the defendant is an SDP must be distinguished from the burden of proof at the commitment hearing. … The psychiatric report in this case contained an unequivocal statement that the defendant was an SDP, and a more qualified statement that the defendant appeared to be an SDP, but that a definitive opinion could not be given

Sebago v. Boston Cab Dispatch, Inc.

471 Mass. 321 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 21, 2015

In contrast, the plaintiffs clearly do not provide services to taxicab garages. USA Taxi owns neither a taxicab nor a medallion. … Engagement in an independently established business.

School Committee v. United Educators

438 Mass. 753 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 28, 2003

The department determined that Woolis was qualified for the position at Herberg. … No. 5750 at 2 (letter from Governor introducing bill) (“Principals will be clearly established as part of the management team of the school district, with strict accountability for educational performance”).

Greene v. Corey

210 Mass. 536 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 3, 1912

FitzGerald was qualified to testify to the law of New York. The witness testified that he.had made a special study of the subject. We cannot say that the action of the judge was clearly wrong. Teele v. … purchased on a margin a hundred shares of a particular stock for each one of a hundred different customers, and who was bound to deliver upon demand and full payment that number of shares to each customer, would conclusively establish

Priester v. Town of Auburn

21 Mass. L. Rptr. 149 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jun 1, 2006

As a municipal employee, Hammond was immune from suit for negligence in the course of his employment under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G.L.c. 258, §2 (“Tort Claims Act”). … However, that immunity does not insulate the Town from suit for negligence for the acts of Hammond.

City of New Bedford v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination

440 Mass. 450 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 2, 2003

As the arbitrator found, the lengthy, accusatory message showed “very clearly” Turgeon’s “feelings” toward the department’s senior officials. … L. c. 151B, § 6, judicial review proceeds under the well-established standards mandated by G.

Commonwealth v. Rosenberg

410 Mass. 347 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 6, 1991

Maurer, a psychiatrist who qualifies as a psychotherapist under G. … L. c. 120, § 19. 15 The statute clearly permits at least two extensions.