Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
10,000+ results
2.89s
151 Md. 154 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jun 11, 1926
Certain general principles seem, however, to have been clearly settled by the current and weight of judicial authority. … actually taken, for consequential damages to his premises, even though in grading and leveling the street a portion of the adjoining lot in consequence of removal of its natural support falls into the highway, and the same immunity
Cited 12 timesPublishedDistrict Court, D. Maryland · May 27, 2020
But clearly Title VII does not allow suit on this basis. See Jaffer v. Nat’l Caucus & Ctr. on Black Aged, Inc., 296 F. … Holmes argues that dismissal is warranted because the Complaint does not aver that she played any role in Freeman’s non-selection, and alternatively that she enjoys qualified immunity. ECF No. 25-1 at 4–5.
Cited 0 timesUnknownBonomo v. National Duckpin Bowling Congress, Inc.
469 F. Supp. 467 · District Court, D. Maryland · Mar 23, 1979
No bowling establishment may conduct a sanctioned event unless a tournament director or executive of the NDBC is actively in charge of the event. … As the court stated in Greenfield, 4 EPD at p. 5932, the statutory definition clearly describes the activities of an employment agency in the traditional and generally accepted sense of that term, that is, any agency in the
Cited 10 timesPublished327 Md. 628 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Sep 17, 1992
This man is not qualified as a torn edge expert. He is certainly not qualified as an expert on rubber and he is his own—he is self-qualified, if qualified at all. The jury can look as well as I can look. … So the objection to the witness being qualified is overruled. I would tell the witness that he is qualified and his testimony is for their determination as to its weight.
Cited 110 timesPublished237 Md. App. 179 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Apr 30, 2018
Establishing lien. … A lien for unpaid wages is established: (1) after a circuit court issues an order to establish a lien for unpaid wages; or (2) if no complaint disputing the lien for unpaid wages is filed, within 30
Cited 1 timesPublishedMaryland Minority Contractor's Ass'n v. Maryland Stadium Authority
70 F. Supp. 2d 580 · District Court, D. Maryland · Sep 30, 1998
for summary judgment on the issues of qualified immunity and discriminatory motive. 2 Before filing their opposition, the plaintiffs moved for continuance under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f), alleging they could not respond to the … Clearly then, the injury-in-fact prong of the standing inquiry has not been met.
Cited 13 timesPublished51 Md. App. 586 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · May 7, 1982
In this appeal, appellant raises three issues: (1) is appellant immune from liability to appellees because Joyner had a right to use deadly force in attempting to capture the fleeing felon, (2) was the damage award based … These inferences are clearly ones of negligence.
Cited 11 timesPublishedPack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County
377 Md. 55 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Sep 10, 2003
In that case, the ordinance clearly would not leave open sufficient alternative avenues. See Alexander v. … Howard County does not in this Court argue that the trial judge’s findings were clearly erroneous. .
Cited 15 timesPublished4 Md. 532 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Dec 15, 1853
Tuck, J., delivered his opinion as follows: In the interpretation of wills, the intention of the is to be gathered from the entire instrument, and less it violates some established principle of law there is a general intention … Floyd,” most clearly show that he designed- for them only what might remain of the' original property at the arrival at age of her youngest child', because if he had intended the increase to go over with the corpus he would
Cited 7 timesPublishedCaples v. Sinai Hospital of Baltimore, Inc.
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · May 1, 2026
Vol.), section 5-609 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”), provided them with immunity from suit. … Sinai clearly had knowledge as to where Caples was headed and, minimally, at least two people with whom he would interact.
Cited 0 timesPublished400 Md. 167 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jul 27, 2007
Konits argues that the Director did not have the discretion to grant Carroll an extension of time because it was not filed within the 180-day period and good cause was not established. … This language, requiring a specific statement of causal connection, was clearly intended to be another way (the first being the Certificate itself) to substantiate the merit of the claim being filed.
Cited 32 timesPublishedMassey Ex Rel. Smith v. Weinberger
397 F. Supp. 817 · District Court, D. Maryland · Apr 7, 1975
That illegitimates may take as between themselves is clear, but the statute does not purport to be a legitimation statute, as Sec. 6 of the same Article clearly is. … That’s—the reconsideration determination clearly states open and notorious 2 . This citation refers to the 1957 edition of the Annotated Code of Maryland, as amended.
Cited 8 timesPublishedSmith v. Walton ex rel. Walton
8 Gill 77 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jun 15, 1849
A witness who has seen a party write, or who has corresponded with him, is qualified to speak with respect to the genuineness of his signature. … The court were clearly right in rejecting the prayer offered by the defendant in the second exception, and that exception has been properly abandoned.
Cited 5 timesPublishedBrownlee v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co.
456 Md. 579 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Dec 18, 2017
from liability on charitable immunity grounds, unless and until Liberty Mutual indemnified it as responsible for Appellants’ injuries and damages. … The Supreme Court of Georgia held that lead present in paint “unambiguously qualifies as a pollutant and that the plain language of the policy’s pollution exclusion clause” removed plaintiffs claims against her landlord from
Cited 9 timesPublishedAtlantic Richfield Co. v. Sybert
51 Md. App. 74 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Mar 2, 1982
, Atlantic Richfield Company (hereinafter Arco), a Pennsylvania corporation duly qualified to do business in the State of Maryland. … of proof in establishing that the appellees were the procuring cause of the sale of the Belvoir property.
Cited 7 timesPublished240 F. Supp. 583 · District Court, D. Maryland · Apr 2, 1965
The language of the decedent’s will does not clearly and unambiguously establish that decedent’s intention was to give a bequest to his wife conditioned upon her continued life as the Government argues. … The language of the will clearly and unambiguously establishes that the interest was limited only by the time of final accounting and settlement.
Cited 1 timesPublishedEdgewater Realty Co. v. Tenn. Coal, Iron & Railroad Co.
49 F. Supp. 807 · District Court, D. Maryland · Mar 31, 1943
Summarized, we find that the weight of the credible evidence establishes the following facts: The Tennessee Company and the Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation are subsidiaries of the United States Steel Corporation. … State, there remains to be considered the point whether, even assuming our conclusion is correct that what these representatives and employees did amounted to “doing business” within the State, the Tennessee Company was not immune
Cited 14 timesPublished73 Md. App. 391 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jan 6, 1988
In other words, the defendant has the right to establish a foundation for a negative evidence closing argument. He is not, however, required, to offer any particular evidence to establish such foundation. … In the case sub judice, appellant contends that the State failed to prove a qualifying conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
Cited 11 timesPublished6 Md. App. 440 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Mar 26, 1969
On the evidence before the court, its finding that there was probable cause for the arrest was clearly erroneous. … As the existence of probable cause for the warrantless arrest was not established, we must hold that the arrest was invalid.
Cited 19 timesPublishedRhoads v. Federal Deposit Insurance
956 F. Supp. 1239 · District Court, D. Maryland · Feb 22, 1997
At the time of Rhoads’s termination, SFSA’s personnel policies clearly stated that employees terminated for cause were not due cash representing accrued vacation pay. … Additionally, the record in this case clearly indicates that Rhoads was considered a valuable employee.
Reversed on other grounds by Rhoads v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 257 F.3d 373 (2001)Cited 38 timesPublished
Ask Donna