Case law

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  • Konan v. George

    14 Mass. L. Rptr. 509 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Mar 14, 2002

    However, subsection (c) of the statute significantly curtails the immunity afforded by G.L.c. 128, §2D. … Such signs shall be placed in a clearly visible location in the proximity of the equine activity.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Jillian's Billiard Club of America, Inc. v. Beloff Billiards, Inc.

    35 Mass. App. Ct. 372 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Sep 24, 1993

    The plaintiffs appeal, seeking broader relief; the defendants cross-appeal, claiming the judge’s finding that they misappropriated confidential financial information was clearly erroneous. We affirm the judgment. … The judge ruled that the plaintiffs’ financial information, including accounting procedures, qualified as a trade secret, but concluded that advertising, marketing, and information relating to the type of billiard tables

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • Richard v. Industrial Commercial Electrical Corp.

    337 F. Supp. 2d 279 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 20, 2004

    In the instant case, ICE has failed to establish that Richard’s .actions constituted gross misconduct under any definition of that term contemplated by Massachusetts law or federal case law. 12. … If Richard engaged in- any misconduct, which is doubtful, it clearly was not gross and did not warrant a denial of Richard’s COBRA *283 benefits.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • In re Luftig

    162 F. 322 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 13, 1905

    offense described in section 29b (4), the bankrupt was guilty of the same offense if he participated in Rosenberg’s commission of it by virtue of section 1 (19), I am still unable to regard Rosenberg’s guilt as sufficiently established … swear on May 25,1903, that he then owned stock to the amount of $5,-000, and also his testimony on January 20, 1904, in the same hearing, that the amount of stock he swore to on May 25, 1903, was $2,500, is, in my opinion, clearly

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Staples Coal Co. v. City Fuel Co.

    316 Mass. 503 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 16, 1944

    He owns all but three qualifying shares of this corporation. … The grant of a charter or certificate of incorporation carries with it no immunity for the fraudulent or deceptive use of a corporate name.

    Cited 19 timesPublished
  • Donna Bucca v. Commonwealth.

    Massachusetts Appeals Court · Feb 8, 2024

    The amended complaint does not plausibly allege, nor does Bucca argue, that her work qualified her as a mechanic, workman, or laborer or that she was employed in a penal or 2 charitable … We do not agree with Bucca's reading of the emphasized language as establishing a blanket waiver of sovereign immunity. Rather, as explained in Cook v.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Flagg v. AliMed, Inc.

    466 Mass. 23 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 19, 2013

    V 2011) (“the term ‘discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability’ includes . . . excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of … Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 434 Mass. 521 , 531 n.11 (2001) (filing administrative complaint with commission is mandatory predicate for establishing jurisdiction in Superior Court).

    Cited 49 timesPublished
  • Longever v. Revere Copper & Brass Inc.

    381 Mass. 221 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 25, 1980

    The second defense was that the complaint failed to “state a *222 claim upon which relief can be granted” and the sixth defense was that the defendant “is immune from liability in this action pursuant to the applicable provisions … Moreover, separate divisions are insufficient to establish dual capacity. See Strickland v. Textron, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 326, 327-328 (D.S.C. 1977); 2A A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation § 72.80, at 14-115 (1976).

    Cited 27 timesPublished
  • Commonwealth v. Boston Transcript Co.

    249 Mass. 477 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 12, 1924

    They have no special immunities. They do not constitute a privileged class. They are entitled to invoke • constitutional guaranties in common with others. … The legislative power as to price fixing and as to regulation, which recently was discussed and upheld with reference to theatres in Opinion of Justices, 247 Mass. 589 , clearly does not reach to the facts here disclosed.

    Cited 22 timesPublished
  • Doe v. Town of Plymouth

    825 F. Supp. 1102 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 2, 1993

    Turning to the first argument, it is well established that plaintiff has a constitutional right to privacy sufficient to establish liability under section 1983. Daury v. Smith, 842 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir.1988). … Ryan, 827 F.2d 836 (1st Cir.1987), the.court determined that the right to prevent disclosure of the contents of a court ordered psychiatric report was not “clearly established”, prior to June 1983. Id. at 844 .

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Whitcomb v. Hearst Corp.

    329 Mass. 193 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 7, 1952

    administrative officers in the performance of their duty are absolutely privileged as to such officers, reports of army officers in the performance of their duties are similarly privileged, and consequently newspapers enjoy a qualified … And it would certainly be going beyond reason to say that the Munich military post telephone book was a privileged official report, statement or communication which conferred immunity upon the American newspapers.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Rosario v. United States

    824 F. Supp. 268 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 10, 1993

    Since the complex medical issues involved here are beyond the “common knowledge” of this Court, Plaintiffs must first establish by expert testimony the average degree of care and skill exercised by qualified practitioners … practicing a specialty, by the average qualified physician practicing that specialty.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Scarpa v. Murphy

    624 F. Supp. 33 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 30, 1985

    County of Burke, 660 F.2d at 114 (“single incident ... normally insufficient to establish supervisory inaction upon which § 1983 liability may be based”) and Landrigan v. … The logical fall-out from this concept is significant. • For example, it has been held that since municipalities are not entitled to a qualified immunity defense, Owen v.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Baker v. Fales

    16 Mass. 488 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 15, 1820

    But this question, though simple in its form, necessarily led into a wide field of argument, and must be pursued in the same manner, in order that the reasons of the opinion which the Court have adopted, may be clearly and … could find no ministers or churches to aid them, they would have the right, by some public solemn act, to carry into full effect their constitutional privilege, and thus to secure to their pastor all the privileges and immunities

    Cited 38 timesPublished
  • Dickow v. United States

    740 F. Supp. 2d 231 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 18, 2010

    It does not waive sovereign immunity to permit a suit against the government; rather, a separate waiver is required. … In any event, the purported failure of receipt by the Executor does not establish a failure to send by the IRS.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Elder v. Dwight Manufacturing Co.

    70 Mass. 201 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 15, 1855

    The St. of 1852, c. 94, to establish the city of Springfield, § 22, after providing for the establishment of a police court, states its civil jurisdiction thus: “ The said police court shall have original jurisdiction and … If a person should issue process as a justice of the peace, who was never appointed, or was, for any cause, incapable of exercising any judicial function over the persons or the subject, it would be clearly void.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • NPS, LLC v. StubHub, Inc.

    25 Mass. L. Rptr. 478 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 26, 2009

    In effect, the same evidence of knowing participation in illegal “ticket scalping” that is sufficient, if proven, to establish improper means is also sufficient to place StubHub outside the immunity provided by the CDA. 3 … The element of economic loss required to establish tortious interference cannot be established by “speculative or conjectural losses.” Chemawa Country Golf, Inc. v. Wnuk, 9 Mass.App.Ct. 506, 510 (1980).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Dullea v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority

    12 Mass. App. Ct. 82 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jun 15, 1981

    [p]ension [s]ystem established by this [v]ote.” … The remaining jurisdictions considered the promise of a pension, once accepted, as creating an irrevocable contractual commitment to pay the pension which was immune from any modification by the public employer which would

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Mercurio v. Town of Sherborn

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 19, 2017

    Qualified Immunity The defendants argue that they enjoy qualified immunity for their conduct even if they used excessive force. … “The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Petersen v. US Airways

    31 Mass. L. Rptr. 666 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 19, 2013

    The contract terms—which the defendants (or some of them) established—did not need to be further described than this. … US Airways’ assertion that EasyCGI was “clearly” the party with whom the plaintiffs contracted has, with the exception of the term “clearly,” a plausible ring to it.

    Cited 0 timesPublished

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