Case law

State v. Burris

370 Or. 339 · Oregon Supreme Court · Oct 20, 2022

That question arises in this case because, unlike the other cross-referenced provisions, ORS 166.270 does not clearly conflict with the prohibitions in ORS 166.250(1). … Establishing that the inclusion of ORS 166.270 in the prefatory clause originally had no legal effect has important implications.

State v. Wiltse

373 Or. 1 · Oregon Supreme Court · Nov 7, 2024

The Court of Appeals then considered whether the instruction “qualified for plain-error review.” Id. … It is the jury’s role to determine whether the state has carried that burden; the jury must find the facts that establish the elements of the crime. Boots, 315 Or at 592.

Springfield Utility Board v. Emerald People's Utility District

339 Or. 631 · Oregon Supreme Court · Dec 30, 2005

The parties agree, as do we, that there is no question that the board qualifies as a “municipality” within the meaning of ORS 758.400(2) and, consequently, also qualifies as a “person” within the meaning of ORS 758.450(2) … qualifies as a “municipality’ that is excluded from the statutory term “public utility’ in that context.

McInnis v. Lind

198 Or. App. 139 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Mar 2, 2005

Plaintiff asserts that the compromise letter “clearly sets out that the [original option] remains in effect.” We disagree. … Even if we were to agree that this conduct was unequivocally referable to the alleged oral agreement, none of the alleged facts establish equitable grounds for enforcement.

Baker v. Keisling

312 Or. 385 · Oregon Supreme Court · Dec 12, 1991

Those requirements are clearly stated in the measure in section (3), albeit in general terms. The certified summary makes no reference to the requirement that the listed behaviors “are to be discouraged.” … Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution provides: “No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens

Marshall v. Brown

District Court, D. Oregon · Aug 8, 2023

immunity, id. at 8-9. … However, plaintiff does not clearly state the claims or grounds on which he seeks summary judgment or regarding which defendants. See id. at ¶¶ 99-114.

SAIF Corp. v. Traner

270 Or. App. 67 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Mar 25, 2015

The board observed that, under ORS 656.267(1), claimant was required to “clearly request formal written acceptance of a new [or] omitted medical condition ***.” … Those precedents establish that a claimant initiates a claim for a new or omitted medical condition under ORS 656.267(1) when clearly requesting formal written acceptance of that condition, even if the requested condition

Roach v. Hockey

53 Or. App. 710 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Aug 31, 1981

He argues that the failure to give this additional qualifying instruction amounted to telling the jury that a physician is not liable for an inappropriate judgment if he acts in good faith. … The trial court clearly instructed the jury to disregard the release and its terms if it found that it did not apply to the present defendants.

State v. Wiltse

373 Or. 1 · Oregon Supreme Court · Nov 7, 2024

The Court of Appeals then considered whether the instruction “qualified for plain-error review.” Id. … It is the jury’s role to determine whether the state has carried that burden; the jury must find the facts that establish the elements of the crime. Boots, 315 Or at 592.

Pio v. Ross B. Hammond Co.

281 Or. 517 · Oregon Supreme Court · Mar 7, 1978

It is not clear, for instance, that the subcontracting clause is immune from attack merely because this union is the collective bargaining agent for the general contractor’s employees. … Deprived of the construction industry exemption, the agreement clearly violated section 8(e).

Marquam Farms Corp. v. Multnomah County

147 Or. App. 368 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Apr 16, 1997

had somehow established a nonconforming use to operate and expand a 50-dog kennel. … To the extent that the county has interpreted the section in the manner that petitioners assert, the interpretation cannot survive even under the less than stringent “clearly wrong” test that inheres in Clark.

Raymond v. Flavel

27 Or. 219 · Oregon Supreme Court · Apr 29, 1895

It is doubtless true that, as a general proposition, express or continuing trusts, clearly established, do not come within the statute of limitations, for the reason, as *235 stated by Lord Redesdale (Hovendon v. … Loomis .of all trust relations, and a claim of absolute title and *240 ownership by her, of which Raymond clearly had knowledge.

LandWatch Lane County v. Lane County

346 Or. App. 290 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Dec 31, 2025

The planning director therefore concluded that, even though the properties were initially lawfully created in 1983, they were unlawfully adjusted and therefore were not lawfully estab- lished, meaning they did not qualify … As explained, however, the hearings official did not find that that the 1999 property line adjustment was a land use deci- sion or otherwise immune from collateral attack—instead she found that by following the

Roost v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In Re Boyer)

212 B.R. 975 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Oregon · Sep 18, 1997

BAP 1994) the court held that a security interest which was perfected outside the 10 day grace period 4 (in that case the 12th day) did not qualify for the enabling loan defense provided under § 547(c)(3). … In some instances, the period of time could be as short as 17 days, clearly abridging rights provided by Congress in enacting § 547(e)(3).

State v. Anthony

179 Or. 282 · Oregon Supreme Court · Feb 26, 1946

Cas. 68, (prohibiting operation of crowded street cars) Notwithstanding the established rule that indefinite statutes are subject to condemnation under the 14th Amendment, it cannot be said that every statute containing broad … But enough has been said to indicate, first, that federal statutes as indefinite in their terms as the state statute now before us have been held immune to the condemnation of the due process clause; and, second, that if

State v. Guzman/Heckler

366 Or. 18 · Oregon Supreme Court · Dec 27, 2019

principle that “[w]hen a statute has been construed by the court of last resort of the state and is later re- enacted, it is deemed that the Legislature has adopted the court’s construction unless the contrary purpose is clearly … Cite as 366 Or 18 (2019) 47 significant to prevent it from qualifying as a statutory coun- terpart.

Fred Messerle & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Revenue

8 Or. Tax 413 · Oregon Tax Court · Aug 29, 1980

majority of the bottom land soils on these ranches are classified type III or higher; IAG-10 may best suit the plaintiff’s "needs of our intended use and management *[419] for this land,” (see Def Ex A, 5th sheet), but it is clearly … Since we are incorporated, we do not qualify for reduced inheritance taxes.”

In Re Portland Electric Power Co.

97 F. Supp. 903 · District Court, D. Oregon · Sep 16, 1947

This attorney has had long experience in corporate reorganization and is a member of a firm of high national standing, but those factors do not render him immune from process of the court. … but the new Board establish the dividend rate.

In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of Fadeley

342 Or. 403 · Oregon Supreme Court · Feb 23, 2007

An active emeritus attorney qualifies as an “attorney” under BR 1.1(c). … In determining the appropriate sanction, we follow our well-established methodology.

Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Klein Campaigns, Inc.

168 Or. App. 259 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jun 7, 2000

With respect to the Lloyd Center, the court clearly concluded that there had been an invitation to the public to use its common areas as public property. … This court held that the defendant had established that the premises were of the sort subject to the right established in Whiffen , and the Supreme Court affirmed.