Case law

Milazzo v. Sentry Insurance

691 F. Supp. 517 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 6, 1987

In light of these well established rules, Sentry’s determination that Kane’s policy did not cover Milazzo’s injury claims, because Milazzo was an excluded “guest occupant” under the circumstances of her case, was clearly … Further, I do not find the Magistrate’s Order either clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

Cameron v. Tomes

783 F. Supp. 1511 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 14, 1992

immunity. … Rather, a qualified professional must make a determination as to Cameron’s particular risk. I.

Mancini v. Spagtacular, LLC

Massachusetts Appeals Court · Aug 29, 2019

Massachusetts jurisprudence does not establish a per se rule that mowing and yard maintenance can never be adequate to establish adverse possession. See Brandao, 80 Mass. App. … Instead, the disputed areas were clearly delineated as outside the wooded and allegedly wild area.

Jane Doe 1 v. City of Holyoke

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 25, 2024

Additionally, qualified immunity protects individuals from liability unless their acts or omissions “violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” … Qualified immunity does not apply to official capacity claims.

Mahajan v. Department of Environmental Protection

464 Mass. 604 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 2013

While small greens remaining as the result of constructing public highways may be excluded, it is suggested that parks, monuments, reservations, athletic fields, concert areas and playgrounds clearly qualify. … We do not conclude that land taken pursuant to an urban renewal plan is automatically immune from art. 97. See note 19, infra.

Dao Bui v. Vazquez

1999 Mass. App. Div. 5 · Massachusetts District Court, Appellate Division · Jan 13, 1999

After a two day trial, the trial judge made express written findings clearly stating that he affirmatively disbelieved the plaintiffs’ testimony and was unpersuaded that they were either in the car at the time in question … Such qualified statements fell well short of establishing any inability to be impartial or to rule fairly. See Haddad v.

Lee v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority

4 Mass. L. Rptr. 83 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Aug 8, 1995

In the process laid out in Pushkin , the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing that he or she was an otherwise qualified person apart from his handicap, and was rejected under circumstances which gave rise to … Once the plaintiff establishes this prima facie case, the defendants *85 have the burden of proving that plaintiff was not an otherwise qualified handicapped person, able to meet all of the program’s requirements in spite

Banushi v. Dorfman

438 Mass. 242 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 13, 2002

The Appeals Court has held that a watchmen’s cottage at a commercial marina qualified as a “building” within the meaning of the statute, and implied, by referring to the broad definition of “building” in G. … Any such suggestion has clearly been discredited. See Commonwealth v. Eakin, 427 Mass. 590, 591-592 (1998); Santos v. Bettencourt, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 90, 93-94 (1996).

Commissioner of Revenue v. Mullins

428 Mass. 406 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 19, 1998

The rate of tax, established in § 8 of the statute, is $3.50 per gram of mari *408 huana. … The CST is clearly conditioned on the commission of a crime.

Commonwealth v. Gross

64 Mass. App. Ct. 829 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Oct 25, 2005

That analysis establishes that, even had the Commonwealth’s § 14(a) trial motion been timely filed, the additional sixty days allowed under § 14(a) for commencement of trial (after the trial motion filing) was, in effect, … examiner reports filed on October 4, 2002, there was virtually no question but that the Commonwealth possessed psychiatric opinions clearly and unequivocally concluding that the defendant was sexually dangerous within the

Fernandes Super Markets, Inc. v. State Tax Commission

371 Mass. 318 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 5, 1976

No. 143, Report of the Special Commission Relative to Taxation of Tangible and Intangible Property and Certain Related Matters (Commission established by Res. 1935, c. 63); P. … L. c. 58, § 2, receives an exemption for all its machinery, not just its manufacturing machinery, the requirement of substantiality is clearly appropriate. We have resisted in the past, Assessors of Boston v.

Commonwealth v. Leftwich

430 Mass. 865 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 7, 2000

The defendant argues that this evidence fell short of the Commonwealth’s offer of proof, failed to establish a credible motive, and was therefore irrelevant and inflammatory. … Germain, 381 Mass. 256, 271 (1980) (evidence that “merely suggests rather than ‘clearly shows’ a motive for the crime may still be ruled admissible”).

Biewald v. Seven Ten Storage Software, Inc.

113 N.E.3d 881 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Oct 31, 2018

Babcock Power Inc., 476 Mass. 565, 571 (2017).4 The rules of interpretation are well established. … Clearly, there were two conditions precedent, a "Sale" and "Consideration."

The Clover

5 F. Cas. 1095 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 15, 1869

The cases cited appear to establish the proposition that the states may lawfully make regulations concerning the harbors within their limits, and not repugnant to any act of congress, which will be binding on all persons … The words “so that the said jib-boom shall not annoy” other vessels, do not qualify the express command to rig in the jib-boom, but only explain its purpose, or at- most limit the law to those cases in which the jib-boom

Spaniol's Case

81 Mass. App. Ct. 437 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 16, 2012

All four conditions must be met in order to qualify for the reduction. We need look no further than the first condition in this case. … Prompt payment alone, however, without satisfying the other requirements of the statute, is not enough to qualify for the § 13A(10) reduction. Because AIM did not establish that it met all the requirements of G.

Byrne v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority

196 F. Supp. 2d 77 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 18, 2002

The plaintiffs, all of whom are MBTA police officers, clearly are engaged in safety-sensitive work, see Guiney v. … The MBTA has never asserted its “Eleventh Amendment immunity” in this Court. See Alden v.

Vita v. Berman, DeValerio & Pease, LLP

81 Mass. App. Ct. 748 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 17, 2012

Block further testi *752 fled that Hillger’s removal was a “strategic decision” and not based on lack of standing or his failure to qualify as a plaintiff. … Here, BDP claims there was insufficient evidence to establish that the parties had an agreement as to the payment of a ten percent referral fee for the PSC litigation.

Bennett v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority

8 Mass. L. Rptr. 154 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 2, 1998

In December of 1989, the MBTA established its first written drug and alcohol policy (“Policy”). In March of 1991, the MBTA implemented the random drug testing component of the Policy. … It does not follow that, because the MBTA does not enjoy sovereign immunity, Morrison-Knudsen Co. v.

Massachusetts Baptist Missionary Society v. Bowdoin Square Baptist Society

212 Mass. 198 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 27, 1912

Whoever else, therefore, may be, or claim to be, cestuis que trust, the holders of pews are clearly entitled to stand in that relation.” Attorney General v. Federal Street Meeting House, 3 Gray, 1 , 45, 47. … A decree may be entered establishing its rights in accordance with this opinion. So ordered.

Northeast Petroleum Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue

395 Mass. 207 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 13, 1985

The board concluded that the taxpayer had not carried its burden of establishing that the calculation of the excise under G. … It is well established that failure to raise a statutory or constitutional question before the board generally bars a party from raising it on appeal. See G. L. c. 58 A, § 13 Minchin v.