Case law

Adoption of Hugo

428 Mass. 219 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 14, 1998

When a judge complies with these mandates, we do not disturb his findings unless they are clearly erroneous. … “There is no requirement that testimony on a question of discrete knowledge come from an expert qualified in [a] subspecialty rather than from an expert more generally qualified.” Commonwealth v.

Parker v. Hurley

474 F. Supp. 2d 261 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 23, 2007

of qualified immunity the court must ascertain whether the plaintiffs have asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all.” … Amendments, as parents and guardians to direct the moral upbringing of their children and the clearly established rights of the minor children to such upbringing.”

Saab v. Massachusetts CVS Pharmacy, LLC

452 Mass. 564 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 13, 2008

We begin with a brief review of the act’s well-established purpose, focusing on its exclusivity provisions. … Cumberland Farms, Inc., 406 Mass. 615, 621 (1990) (workers’ com *568 pensation law provides fixed compensation for employees; employers are granted immunity in return).

Pronghorn, Inc. v. Licensing Board

13 Mass. App. Ct. 70 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jan 25, 1982

No charges were made of violations by the licensees, although it was suggested at the July 30 hearing (see note 4, supra) that there was overcrowding in certain licensed establishments during the early morning hours. … The plaintiffs make an additional argument, not developed particularly clearly, that the discretion given local licensing authorities by G.

VLT Corp. v. Unitrode Corp.

194 F.R.D. 8 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 31, 2000

The letter is clearly limited to Japanese legal issues. After Mr. … Although the stipulated protective order does not place the burden of establishing that the documents were inadvertently produced squarely on Plaintiffs, it does state that it is up to “the producing party” to "establish[

Cardoza v. Cardoza

2006 Mass. App. Div. 137 · Massachusetts District Court, Appellate Division · Aug 30, 2006

However, not every written expression by a trial justice in an order disposing of a civil case qualifies as a statement of voluntary findings of fact for purposes of Mass. R. Civ. R, Rule 52 (c). … She established a bank account for the tenant to deposit his monthly rent check. The fact that the parties were related (they are cousins) doesn’t preclude a finding that the parties were in commerce.

Royce v. Commissioner of Correction

390 Mass. 425 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 10, 1983

However, the limits of such discretion are established by the rules and regulations promulgated by the Department of Correction. … The plaintiff contends that he has had no review to date and has been “warehoused” in the D.S.U. for over two years without any review. 9 Clearly, if these alleged facts are established by evidence, the plaintiff would be

Commonwealth v. Mcfarlane

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 23, 2024

immunity. … And where the claim nonetheless survives a defense of qualified immunity, it often must overcome a motion for summary judgment. Mass. R. Civ. P. 56, 365 Mass. 826 (1974). Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

Merchants Discount Co. v. Esther Abelson, Inc.

297 Mass. 517 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 28, 1937

In paragraph 2 the plaintiff alleges that the defendant Esther Abelson owned and conducted the business of merchandise of embroideries and linens in her business establishment located on Boylston Street, in Boston. … Ed.) c. 109A, where intent is presumed in law, like transfers without fair consideration, insolvency or pending insolvency is the qualifying factor.

Commonwealth v. Simon

456 Mass. 280 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 12, 2010

Colleton, 387 Mass. at 795-796 , we concluded that art. 12 demanded that any immunity from prosecution granted by the government to secure a witness's self-incriminating testimony be full transactional immunity, not the more … narrow use or derivative use immunity deemed sufficient under the Fifth Amendment.

Charing Cross Corp. v. Comfed Mortgage Co.

25 Mass. App. Ct. 924 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Dec 21, 1987

First, the plaintiff argues that the agreement fails to specify clearly the extent to which the defendant was obligated to furnish 90% financing to all qualified purchasers. … There is nothing to establish that Allardice (who is described simply *928 as an employee of the defendant) had authority to bind the defendant.

Mathews v. Mathews

141 Mass. 511 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 7, 1886

Section 15 established a rule •of inheritance, and created an estate very different from dower. … This was clearly, unless qualified in some way, filing in the probate office her election to claim dower.

Marhefka v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Sutton

79 Mass. App. Ct. 515 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 13, 2011

Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Newburyport, 421 Mass. 719, 720, 722 (1996) (appellate court *518 will not set aside judge’s findings, after contested evidentiary hearing, about standing unless “clearly erroneous”). … These sketches were compiled from exhibits in the summary judgment record, and we took judicial notice of the online database of the assessors for the town, which established the living area for *517 the defendants’ home.

Kirkwood v. Board of Appeals of Rockport

17 Mass. App. Ct. 423 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jan 24, 1984

Wrightson claims, however, that his site qualifies under the by-law for the possible construction of two single family houses 8 but that he is precluded from subdividing the property, and hence gaining maximum benefit from … Nor will the deprivation of a potential economic advantage to a landowner qualify as substantial hardship. Shacka v. Board of Appeals of Chelmsford , 341 Mass, at 594-595. Bruzzese v.

Samuels v. Bureau of Prisons

498 F. Supp. 2d 415 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 27, 2007

to include alt law enforcement officers acting within the scope *421 of their duties no matter the context, or whether the phrase includes only law enforcement officers performing customs or excise functions, I turn to established … See also Ortloff, 335 F.3d at 659 (“reading the exception so broadly that it includes all other law enforcement officers would render superfluous the ‘any officer of customs or excise’ language, since such officers would clearly

Canney v. City of Chelsea

925 F. Supp. 58 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 7, 1996

Finally, the Receivership Act also granted the receiver immunity from civil liability arising from the exercise of his duties. Id. at § 3(8). … Fore River Ry., 861 F.2d 322, 326-27 (1st Cir.1988) (“[T]he decision to appoint a receiver clearly lies within the discretion of the court....

Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Comvest Trading Corp.

481 F. Supp. 438 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 6, 1979

The CFTC, as an agency of government, may assert an immunity from legal responsibility for providing for costs of receivership. See, e. g., Securities and Exchange Commission v. … A governmental agency’s immunity from legal responsibility for costs of receivership, however, does not cause those costs to be less real.

Somers v. Converged Access, Inc.

23 Mass. L. Rptr. 511 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 23, 2008

“The term ‘age’ unless a different meaning clearly appears from the context, includes any duration of time since an individual’s birth of greater than forty years.” … Even giving Somers the benefit of the doubt and assuming he was qualified for the position, thereby meeting prong three, Somers fails to establish a prima facie case on the fifth prong.

K.O. v. United States

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 9, 2023

This plainly overlaps with qualified immunity, which bars suits on the basis of constitutional violations where the right in question is not “clearly established.” Penate v. … As such, it declines to import qualified immunity into the FTCA context. c.

Lemieux v. City of Holyoke

259 F.R.D. 13 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 14, 2009

The First Circuit found that the section 7(k) exemption did not apply because the Town of Agawam had not shown that it had in fact established a “qualifying work period.” Id. at 291. … In any event, as Plaintiffs argue, the FLSA and the regulations interpreting it clearly state that a section 7(k) work period is based on days, not hours. See 29 U.S.C. § 207 (k)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 553.224 .