Case law

DIAZ v. MERCED

District Court, D. New Jersey · Jun 24, 2024

Defendants filed their Answer on October 19, 2021, summarily denying the allegations and raised the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. (D.E. 20.) … Notwithstanding, qualified immunity would attach because, based on the foregoing, there was no violation of a clearly established right. See e.g. Mirabella v.

Restivo v. Church of Saint Joseph of Palisades

306 N.J. Super. 456 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 30, 1997

For example, if a church owned an abutting property used for a restaurant or hotel, the church in that instance would clearly be a commercial landowner.'... … Defendants already enjoy the substantial immunities created by the Legislature in the Charitable Immunity Act.

State v. Parris

175 N.J. Super. 603 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Aug 11, 1980

Here defendant clearly should have been aware of the defense before trial because his two acquitted codefendants had been tried under the same indictment. … Rather, it is established that in the view of the trial judge the evidence presented was not adequate to support a conviction of either of them. R. 3:18-1.

Bellocchio v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection

16 F. Supp. 3d 367 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Apr 15, 2014

To have a protected property interest, “a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it” or “a unilateral expectation of it,” but rather must have “a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” … Ann. §§ 59:4-2 , 4-3 (establishing liability of public entity for injury caused by dangerous conditions on its property).

Garrett v. State

49 N.J.L. 94 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 15, 1886

The judge had, in a former part of the charge, clearly defined a public nuisance. … It is a mistake to ascribe to this legislation a design to grant immunity from the ordinary legal consequences of creating or continuing a public nuisance.

Van Dunk v. Reckson Associates Realty Corp.

210 N.J. 449 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 26, 2012

Nor can the context prong, which is a legal determination, be satisfied because plaintiff knew or should have known that the propellers were operating when he inserted his hand into the chute; the labels on the machine clearly … Notwithstanding that the employer’s deception did not rise to the level presented in Laid-low, it clearly affected the Court’s totality of the circumstances analysis on the conduct prong. See ibid.

C.W. v. Roselle Board of Education

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 15, 2026

Clearly, the parties and courts properly adhered to the statute enacted more than fifty years ago. … The Legislature also narrowed the scope of A-2236-23 18 substantive immunity under the TCA, so that immunity

McNeil v. McDonough

515 F. Supp. 113 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Mar 20, 1980

These well established principles and practices, however, have not been clearly applied in employment discrimination cases, whether under Title VII or § 1981, et seq., even in non-jury cases. … or, if equally qualified, had less seniority.

BYRD v. CUMBERLAND COUNTY JOHN/JANE DOE DECISION MAKERS 1-10

District Court, D. New Jersey · Jun 29, 2020

The doctrine of qualified immunity provides that “government officials performing discretionary functions . . . are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established … Next, the Court proceeds to step two of the qualified immunity analysis, wherein “the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the defendant's conduct violated some clearly established statutory or constitutional

In re the Petition to Compel Testimony of Tuso

73 N.J. 575 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 30, 1977

Yet clearly any such interaction would have violated Tuso’s privilege. … But while federal precedents indicate that a court has no discretion to determine whether a grant of immunity would be in the public interest, they also establish that courts have ample authority to check prosecutorial abuses

Zoller v. State Board of Tax Appeals

124 N.J.L. 376 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 20, 1940

Zoller qualified as the executrix therein named. A decree barring creditors, effective January 7th, 1938 (B. 8. 3:25-3), was entered. … That bare circumstance falls far short of establishing a valid transfer of the stocks as required by our “Uniform Stock Transfer law.” R. S. 14:8-27 (a) and (b).

Helduser v. Kimmelman

191 N.J. Super. 493 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Oct 14, 1983

Clearly, these provisions are' appropriate to civil *505 actions, not criminal actions. … Clearly, the focus was upon the need to defend and indemnify state employees against civil liability for damages.

In re Dykas

261 N.J. Super. 626 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 29, 1993

In a submission to the Board, the DMV asserted its wish to waive the one-year limitation, but indicated that it was uncertain whether the type of injury suffered by petitioner qualified for the benefit sought. … Without any evidence to countervail the clearly expressed opinions of Dr. Moskowitz, the Board’s finding that petitioner did not come within established criteria was without adequate basis.

Foster v. Township of Hillside

780 F. Supp. 1026 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Jan 30, 1992

Furthermore, a public official is protected by qualified immunity from a suit under § 1983, if he or she can show that the “offending conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights which a … Because the courts have not yet “clearly established” the proper response required under the constitution, to a sexual harassment claim, the individual defendants raised the defense of qualified immunity properly.

Pino v. Board of Trustees

309 N.J. Super. 112 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 6, 1998

To qualify as a traumatic event the applicant for accidental disability retirement must establish that the “source of the injury itself was a great rush of force or uncontrollable power.” … the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly

NIEMIERA BY NIEMIERA v. Schnieder

114 N.J. 550 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 13, 1989

In his view, “it needed to be spelled out more clearly, *557 then one would have to say, this could cause a real problem in the brain and nervous system, and these are things you must watch.” … Rothman, supra, 110 N.J. 204 , established that the standard of informed consent related to the patient's needs, not the physician’s judgment.

MULLIN v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

District Court, D. New Jersey · May 31, 2019

or statutory rights and (2) that the rights violated were clearly established. … As an initial matter, with regard to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, there is no dispute that the right at issue is clearly established.

Interstate Wreck. Co. v. Palisades Interstate Pk. Comm.

57 N.J. 342 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 25, 1971

In that year the Palisades Interstate Park Commission was established by the compact as the "joint corporate municipal instrumentality of the States of New Jersey and New York" with appropriate provision for the transfer … While these provisions clearly support the administrative separations between the states in the Commission's operations they hardly serve to narrow the breadth of the sue and be sued clause. Cf. 109 N.J.

Wynfield Corp. v. Killam Associates

385 N.J. Super. 20 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 24, 2006

Thus, in Neelthak, we declined to “posit a cause of action such as plaintiffs assert against staff employees or contractors independent of the immunities preserved by the Tort Claims Act,” especially where the law required … Defendant further contends that, contrary to the trial judge’s ruling, secretarial charges clearly qualified as out-of-pocket expenses for which separate billing was otherwise permitted under the statute.

Eden v. Conrail

87 N.J. 467 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Sep 28, 1981

Consistent with the notion that this railroad immunity statute, like all immunity enactments, must be strictly construed, Potter v. … Because Eden was clearly an invitee in terms of his presence in the train station and on the platform, the defendant railroad was required "to use reasonable care to make the premises safe." E.g., Handleman v.