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  • Mayor of Baltimore v. Guttman

    190 Md. App. 395 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Feb 2, 2010

    Gallagher”) because he is not entitled to legislative or qualified immunity- II. Whether the court’s denial of Ms. Mullins’ petition for attorney fees is an abuse of discretion. … Gallagher is entitled to qualified immunity because they did not raise it at the trial level. See Maryland Rule 8-131 (a). 9 .

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • De La Puente v. CTY COMM'SR OF FREDERICK COUNTY

    386 Md. 505 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · May 5, 2005

    In Muthukumarana , we outlined the doctrine of common law public official immunity: At common law, a government actor will enjoy qualified immunity from liability for his or her non-malicious acts where: (1) he is a public … Once it is established that the individual is a public official and the tort was committed while performing a duty which involves the exercise of discretion, a qualified immunity attaches; namely, in the absence of malice

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Cahill v. Montgomery County

    72 Md. App. 274 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jul 16, 1987

    Qualified immunity means that “government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional … was adopted by the court, maintain that they have demonstrated their entitlement to the qualified immunity defense.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Gray-Hopkins v. Prince George's County, Maryland

    163 F. Supp. 2d 571 · District Court, D. Maryland · Sep 24, 2001

    Under the qualified immunity doctrine, law enforcement officials are not liable under federal law for civil damages to the extent that their conduct does not contravene “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights … The officers are entitled to summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity if they can establish that “reasonable offieer[s] could have believed [that their actions were] lawful, in light of clearly established law

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Knussman v. Maryland

    65 F. Supp. 2d 353 · District Court, D. Maryland · Sep 3, 1999

    . § 1983 , *355 that qualified immunity is appropriate for all the individual defendants on the FMLA claim, that qualified immunity is not appropriate on the Equal Protection claim, and that plaintiff failed to establish … Qualified Immunity on Count I Finally, defendants renew their argument that Mullineaux should be entitled to qualified immunity on Count I. The Court finds no reason to disturb the jury’s findings in this regard.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Hodge v. College of Southern Maryland

    121 F. Supp. 3d 486 · District Court, D. Maryland · Aug 3, 2015

    The Supreme Court “has drawn on principles of sovereign immunity to construe the Amend *495 ment to establish that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal. courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens … individual Defendants violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Dyer v. Maryland State Board of Education

    187 F. Supp. 3d 599 · District Court, D. Maryland · May 20, 2016

    Plaintiffs federal claims as against them pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity. … removal of a local official for misconduct in office, via a statutory mechanism with extensive procedural protections, nevertheless violates some clearly established federal right.

    Cited 36 timesPublished
  • Hodge v. Carroll County Department of Social Services

    812 F. Supp. 593 · District Court, D. Maryland · Sep 21, 1992

    Qualified Immunity Qualified immunity acknowledges that subjecting public officials with discretionary functions to insubstantial lawsuits burdens not only the defendant officials, but society as a whole. Harlow v. … Accordingly, public officials enjoy qualified immunity from liability under § 1983 unless their actions violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

    Reversed in part, on other grounds by Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157 (1994)Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Carrero v. Farrelly

    280 F. Supp. 3d 774 · District Court, D. Maryland · Dec 1, 2017

    Further, the Court found that Officer Farrelly was not entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct, as alleged in the Complaint, violated clearly established law at the time he stopped Plaintiff. … Counsel makes the same error in addressing Officer Farrelly’s qualified immunity defense.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Corp. v. United States

    308 F. Supp. 761 · District Court, D. Maryland · Jan 22, 1970

    MSSIC also cites intergovernmental tax immunity cases to establish that MSSIC’s activity is an essential governmental function. … The exemption carried forward, however, was qualified by adding a cutoff date of September 1, 1951. Insurers not organized before that date did not qualify for the exemption.

    Reversed on other grounds by United States v. Maryland Savings-Share Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 4 (1970)Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Benisek v. Lamone

    263 F. Supp. 3d 551 · District Court, D. Maryland · Jan 31, 2017

    Applying established principles of First Amendment retaliation cases, the Court distilled the three ele *553 ments that Plaintiffs will be called upon to prove in this case: 1. … seeking damages; those circumstances qualified the breadth of Tenney’s holding, in the Gillock Court’s view.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Jones v. Frederick County Board of Education

    689 F. Supp. 535 · District Court, D. Maryland · Jun 20, 1988

    A state’s general waiver of sovereign immunity does not qualify as a waiver of its constitutional immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. … To establish a continuing violation, however, the plaintiff must establish that the unconstitutional or illegal act was a part of ‘standard operating procedure,’ a fixed and continuing practice.

    Cited 25 timesPublished
  • Murray v. Transcare Maryland, Inc.

    203 Md. App. 172 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Feb 9, 2012

    [Appellees’ counsel] points out very clearly that there was no fee charged to [appellant] in this matter, Bryson Murray, and therefore since no compensation flowed from the victim to Transcare then Transcare qualifies under … And 5-604 does not use the word ambulance it only used fire and rescue companies as the, as the entities that are entitled to qualify for immunity.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Brown v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs.

    383 F. Supp. 3d 519 · District Court, D. Maryland · May 13, 2019

    Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants assert qualified immunity as a defense to Plaintiff's constitutional claims. … clearly established at the time of its alleged violation."

    Cited 56 timesPublished
  • Adams v. Montgomery College

    834 F. Supp. 2d 386 · District Court, D. Maryland · Jun 30, 2011

    of sovereign immunity. … Defendants intentionally violate the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by demonstrating deliberate indifference when they “[have] notice of the potential risk of their decision, and clearly [refuse] the accommodation knowingly

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Biser v. Deibel

    128 Md. App. 670 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Oct 29, 1999

    The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees and held that Deibel qualified for immunity by virtue of her position, but Docken did not. … Clearly, the positions of Director of Planning and of Zoning Administrator are established by the Code of the Town of Bel Air as public offices that are appointed by the commissioner and created by law.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Pathways Psychosocial v. Town of Leonardtown, MD

    223 F. Supp. 2d 699 · District Court, D. Maryland · Aug 9, 2002

    Qualified immunity Defendants contend that Muchow should be qualifiedly immune because the court was wrong in stating, on summary judgment, that the “law was clearly estab *714 lished since 1985 that public officials cannot … Defendants are “entitled to summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity if they can establish that reasonable officials could have believed that their actions were lawful in light of both clearly established law

    Cited 27 timesPublished
  • Hicks v. Cassilly

    971 F. Supp. 956 · District Court, D. Maryland · Jul 24, 1997

    Rather, where a clearly established right is involved, a finding of qualified immunity depends on whether defendants’ actions were reasonable. … (finding that Ybarra doctrine is clearly established and, therefore, that qualified immunity does not shield police defendants who conducted a pat-down search of customers at a bar); Johns v.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Maryland State Conference v. Maryland State Police

    454 F. Supp. 2d 339 · District Court, D. Maryland · Sep 29, 2006

    “If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity. … The troopers involved in the Rodwell stop are not entitled to qualified immunity.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Imperial v. Drapeau

    351 Md. 24 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Aug 27, 1998

    privilege rather than perhaps given qualified immunity by a privilege such as fair comment on matters of public concern or a similar qualified privilege. … If Imperial did enjoy qualified immunity for his letters, Drapeau would finally have an opportunity for a judicial proceeding to clear his name, since the record establishes that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to

    Cited 14 timesPublished

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