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461 F. Supp. 193 · District Court, S.D. Illinois · Nov 15, 1978
A state or county tax official will be liable for damages under § 1983 only if he violated the plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights intentionally or with reckless disregard of those rights. … The question of whether defendants can establish that they have qualified immunity in the circumstances of this case remains.
Cited 2 timesPublishedDistrict Court, C.D. Illinois · Sep 30, 2025
To overcome a qualified immunity defense, “a plaintiff must show the deprivation of a constitutional right, and must also show that the right was clearly established at the time of the violation.” Walker v. … Rather, public officials lose their qualified immunity status only if the plaintiff can show the violation of a clearly established Constitutional right. Id.; Kraushaar v.
Cited 0 timesUnknown968 N.E.2d 1074 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 20, 2012
City of Bloomington, 204 Ill. 2d 392, 398 (2003)) and well- established rules of statutory construction (People v. Easley, 119 Ill. 2d 535, 539 (1988)). … interpretation is found in the fact that when the legislature wanted to immunize the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, it clearly expressed its intent in the statute.
Cited 2 timesPublished2020 IL 125017 · Illinois Supreme Court · Nov 19, 2020
Defendants responded that the new law established in Coleman should only be applied prospectively. … ¶ 29 As to the first factor, defendants correctly assert that Coleman clearly established a new principle of law by overturning decades of existing precedent.
Cited 1 timesPublishedIllinois Supreme Court · Apr 20, 2006
Section 4B102 of the Tort Immunity Act provides: ANeither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to establish a police department or otherwise provide police protection … Section 305 and sections 4B102 and 4B107 cannot be harmonized because clearly the immunity provided by both statutes applies to Moore=s allegations.
Cited 0 timesPublishedUnited States v. Pullman Construction Industries, Inc.
210 B.R. 302 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · Jun 10, 1997
Pullman has the burden to establish all elements of § 547(b) by a preponderance of the evidence. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (g). … The Bankruptcy Code, however, does not expressly waive the United States’ sovereign immunity with regard to an award of prejudgment interest. WJM, Inc. v.
Cited 5 timesPublishedDoe v. Illinois Masonic Medical Center
297 Ill. App. 3d 240 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 1, 1998
Furthermore, that federal law mandates the establishment of an IRB in this experimental type of medical study does not negate the IRB’s status as a hospital committee. … The IRB here qualifies as the type of committee covered by the Act.
Cited 8 timesPublishedU.S. Futures Exch., LLC v. Bd. of Trade of Chi., Inc.
346 F. Supp. 3d 1230 · District Court, E.D. Illinois · Oct 31, 2018
through the ordinary channels of legislative and regulatory process" as long as they qualify as a baseless "sham." … It is plaintiffs' job on summary judgment to clearly articulate their legal theories, United States v.
Cited 1 timesPublished207 Ill. 2d 82 · Illinois Supreme Court · May 8, 2003
Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499 (2002), the legislature has clearly indicated the “temporal reach” of every amended statute. … Clearly, the 1999 amendment to section 201(k) is a substantive change in the law, as it establishes an income tax credit for S corporation shareholders that previously did not exist.
Cited 129 timesPublished413 Ill. 503 · Illinois Supreme Court · Nov 20, 1952
Nevertheless, it is clearly established that a wife may sue her husband in a contract action under the act of 1874. (Thomas v. Mueller, 106 Ill. 36 .) … The statute cannot be construed to abrogate a husband’s common-law immunity from suit by his wife for contract purposes, and be construed to perpetuate his immunity for another purpose.
Cited 44 timesPublished29 B.R. 916 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois · May 13, 1983
The defendants cite In re Turpin, 644 F.2d 472 (5th Cir.1981) and In re Parker, 473 F.Supp. 746 (W.D.N.Y.1979) for the proposition that qualified ERISA pension plans are immune from the reach of a Chapter 7 trustee. … This court finds that the pension plan herein does not satisfy the definition of a spendthrift trust, as established in Illinois.
Cited 29 timesPublished107 Ill. App. 3d 378 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 11, 1982
Moreover, it is well established that a police report which an identifying officer neither prepared nor signed does not constitute grounds for impeachment. (People v. Spain (1980), 91 Ill. … Immunity will be denied if the proffered testimony is found to be ambiguous, not clearly exculpatory, cumulative or if it is found to relate only to the credibility of the government’s witnesses.
Cited 6 timesPublishedO'Brien v. Township High School District 214
83 Ill. 2d 462 · Illinois Supreme Court · Oct 17, 1980
In our opinion, the negligence alleged clearly went beyond and was totally outside the ambit of a teacher’s supervisory function. … Indeed, public policy, as expressed in the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (Ill. Rev.
Cited 78 timesPublishedFirestone v. Metropolitan Life Insurance (In re Di Piazza)
29 B.R. 916 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois · May 13, 1983
The defendants cite In re Turpin, 644 F.2d 472 (5th Cir.1981) and In re Parker, 473 F.Supp. 746 (W.D.N.Y.1979) for the proposition that qualified ERISA pension plans are immune from the reach of a Chapter 7 trustee. … This court finds that the pension plan herein does not satisfy the definition of a spendthrift trust, as established in Illinois.
Cited 19 timesPublished2014 IL App (1st) 121545 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Aug 12, 2014
This clearly isn’t the case in this case. *** I would be doing a great disservice to the state of the law to actually grant this motion, and it would be clearly wrong. … To determine whether a lawsuit qualifies as a SLAPP, thus activating the Act’s protective mechanisms, the legislature articulated a test, the first part of which is contained in section 15 of the Act:
Cited 6 timesPublishedC.D.L., Inc. v. East Dundee Fire Protection District
252 Ill. App. 3d 835 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Nov 23, 1993
Section 5 — 106 clearly relates to negligent operation, as opposed to the condition, of fire fighting vehicles and/or equipment, which is not at issue here. … To be qualified as an expert, he had to be asked quite extensively about his experiences as a heavy equipment mechanic.
Cited 8 timesPublishedLakeside Condominium "C" Ass'n v. Frediani Developers, Inc.
135 Ill. App. 3d 972 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Aug 22, 1985
Finally, Lakeside alleged that by virtue of the purchase of insurance the village had waived all immunities granted to it under section 2 — 105 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (see Ill … Since this cause was decided on the basis of a failure to establish a common law duty and not on the issue of immunity, the plaintiff’s contention that the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act is
Cited 16 timesPublishedMoran v. Illinois Civil Service Commission
120 Ill. App. 3d 884 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 27, 1983
Plaintiff’s signature appeared at the bottom of the immunity agreement. … In this case, the evidence clearly establishes that plaintiff testified falsely before the Federal grand jury.
Cited 1 timesPublishedRichard J. Vinet v. David Chadek, et al.
District Court, N.D. Illinois · Feb 27, 2026
immunity because his actions did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. … “A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from suit unless he violated a clearly established right.” Dockery v.
Cited 0 timesUnknown106 Ill. App. 3d 1066 · Appellate Court of Illinois · May 19, 1982
Pursuant to section 2 — 202 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (the Tort Immunity Act) (Ill. Rev. … Clearly, the defendant officers were executing or enforcing a law at the time the decedent was injured.
Cited 49 timesPublished
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