Case law

Poirier v. Town of Plymouth

374 Mass. 206 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 10, 1978

Further, the inspection should be undertaken only by qualified specialists. … Leahy Co., 300 Mass. 565, 568 (1938). 4 The defendant, maintaining that it is a common employer, thus argues that it enjoys immunity from tort suit.

Clapp v. Massachusetts Benefit Ass'n

146 Mass. 519 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 7, 1888

He further held, that the words “ to the best of my knowledge and belief,” found in the first clause of the acknowledgment, were applicable to the second clause, and qualified it as they qualified the earlier clause, and … answers were untrue, and known or believed by him to be so, it has successfully sustained that burden in several instances, and that the jury should have been instructed to render a verdict in accordance with the facts thus established

Hankey v. Town of Concord-Carlisle

136 F. Supp. 3d 52 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 30, 2015

Moreover, the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity on the ground that it was not clearly established that Defendants created a danger in this case sufficient to give rise … See, e.g., Melendez-Garcia, 629 F.3d at 37 (affirming qualified immunity on failure-to-protect theory of substantive due process). .

Feeley v. Baer

41 Mass. App. Ct. 239 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Sep 3, 1996

“So clearly, the risk to the mother is very small with induction of labor, and clearly the risk of waiting is one of infection.” … physician or, in the case of a specialty, by the average qualified physician practicing that specialty.”

Carleton v. Commonwealth

447 Mass. 791 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 7, 2006

We do not construe Carleton’s art. 114 right to be free from employment discrimination based on handicap more *813 broadly than that which is provided him in § 4 (16). 37 Because he is unable to establish that he is a “qualified … Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979), we construe “otherwise qualified” to mean qualified in spite of (as opposed to except for) a handicap.

Schwalm v. Schwalm

Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jul 7, 2023

Because the MUTC was effective six years before the trust was established, we assume William was aware of the relevant aspects of the MUTC as it related to the trustee's obligations to the trust beneficiaries. … Here, we conclude, and the parties agree, that the children are not qualified beneficiaries, and they will not be so qualified until Karen's death.

Abdullah v. Rapone

4 Mass. L. Rptr. 615 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 15, 1995

Thus the only question remaining is whether there was a violation of clearly established constitutional rights. … If the law at that time was clearly established, the immunity defense should ordinarily fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.

Taylor v. Town of Falmouth

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 6, 2019

“Qualified immunity affords limited protection to public officials faced with liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory … “Clearly Established” Having sufficiently shown a constitutional violation, Taylor must next show that the right was “clearly established” at the

Bateman v. Federal Deposit Insurance

112 F. Supp. 2d 89 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 22, 2000

Sovereign Immunity i) The Federal Tort Claims Act The FDIC is an instrumentality and agency of the United States and cannot be sued absent a waiver of sovereign immunity. … The evidence establishes that the purpose of Bateman’s negotiations with the FDIC was to settle his obligations under the Note.

Hootstein

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 8, 2025

Qualified immunity protects public officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known … The two-part test applicable to the defense of qualified immunity are (1) whether the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was clearly established

Bruno v. Board of Appeals

62 Mass. App. Ct. 527 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 29, 2004

Ct. at 59 , where this court stated that “the by-law, by utilizing separate chapters, clearly differentiates between processing of applications for site plan review and applications for special permits.” … that immunity and the fact that the “noncompliance [was] not highly significant.”

Grannum v. Evangelidis

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 27, 2019

A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity from damages for civil liability if the defendant’s conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable … To determine if a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, this Court asks whether: (1) the plaintiff’s allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation; (2) the right that was allegedly violated was clearly

Abdul-Hasib v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation

District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 28, 2019

It is true that to defeat a claim of qualified immunity, the precedent invoked “must be clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” … Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (per curiam) (finding no clearly established rule prohibiting the “takedown” of a person engaged in the misdemeanor offense of resisting a police officer).

Washington v. St. Amand

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 9, 2018

Qualified Immunity Qualified immunity protects all public officials except the “plainly incompetent [and] those who knowingly violate the law.” … Second, we inquire whether the violated right was clearly established at the time that the offending conduct occurred.

Blizard v. Fielding

454 F. Supp. 318 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 11, 1978

Moreover, one witness, Edward Kuypers, a former state employee who had previously worked with plaintiff, testified that he considered her excellently qualified for the position she sought. … Blizard’s actions at work went beyond the scope of protected opposition and thus were not immunized by the statute.

Biogen, Inc. v. SCHERING AG

954 F. Supp. 391 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 4, 1996

Contrary to defendants’ contention, this conclusion is not qualified because Biogen was on May 3, 1996 immune from suit by virtue of the “safe harbor” provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1) and, therefore, knew it could not … Accordingly, Biogen had by May 3, 1996 clearly manifested by its actions its intent to market Avonex as soon as possible.

Harris v. City of Boston

312 F. Supp. 2d 108 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 8, 2004

The Agawam Court clearly answered the precise question addressed in Maldonado and that is raised in this case. … The Court found that the Town had not established a qualifying work period. See Agawam, 350 F.3d at 291.

King v. Higgins

370 F. Supp. 1023 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 30, 1974

The decision to order plaintiff from the minimal security of the prison farm 4 to segregation, with the attendant possibility of reclassification and future re-punishment, 5 is clearly one that markedly changed his status … “use” immunity for statements the inmate might make at the disciplinary hearing and a requirement that the inmate be informed at the hearing of *1028 this immunity and its consequences; 2. permission for the inmate to bring

Chenery v. Goodrich

98 Mass. 224 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 15, 1867

In considering the several grounds of demurrer to the declaration in the present case, it is to be borne in mind that, under the rules of pleading established by statute in this Commonwealth, essential changes have been made … But, if we are wrong in this view of the case, we are clearly of opinion that the action is maintainable on another ground.

In Re NSCO, Inc.

427 B.R. 165 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 29, 2010

DERIVED JUDICIAL IMMUNITY The DOL alleges that denial of the Proposed Order does not involve the Trustee’s derived judicial immunity and that in any event, he is not entitled to an order conferring judicial immunity in the … In addressing whether the trustee’s derived judicial immunity by acting with the permission of the court established jurisdiction, the AB & C Group court stated: It may be that when the Trustee acts as a Plan administrator