Case law
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309 F. Supp. 2d 117 · District Court, D. Maine · Mar 17, 2004
With respect to the timing of the qualified immunity determination, the' Supreme Court has “stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation,” Hunter v. … established law.”
Cited 1 timesPublishedBenjamin v. Aroostook Medical Center
937 F. Supp. 957 · District Court, D. Maine · Aug 8, 1996
Consequently TAMC does not qualify as a state actor under this test. b. … TAMC claims immunity under this legislation and because they qualify the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count III. 1.
Cited 16 timesPublishedPicher v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland
974 A.2d 286 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 7, 2009
The court granted the Bishop’s motion, holding that the Bishop qualifies as a charitable organization and has not waived its charitable immunity pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 158 because it has no insurance coverage for the claims … In 1961, the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld a statute establishing charitable immunity for hospitals, but it stated that “[t]he question of whether such immunity as a matter of public policy is sound or otherwise may be
Cited 42 timesPublishedPollack v. Regional School Unit 75
12 F. Supp. 3d 173 · District Court, D. Maine · Mar 31, 2014
Determining whether a right was “clearly established” entails two further inquiries. … The Defendants argue that it was not “clearly established” that Allen’s actions violated the constitution under any of these theories, so the qualified immunity standard entitles Allen to dismissal.
Cited 12 timesPublishedEstate of Fortier v. City of Lewiston
997 A.2d 84 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jun 3, 2010
Only the governmental entity can have “ownership” of qualifying equipment. 4 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(1). … City has established that there is no available insurance coverage apart from the Maine Municipal Association self-insured risk pool, which is available only if the City is not immune pursuant to the MTCA.
Cited 10 timesPublishedTri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Waste Management, Inc.
803 F. Supp. 451 · District Court, D. Maine · Sep 23, 1992
It has been established that the Waste Management Defendants actions are in conformity with a clearly articulated state, policy. … As described above in the text, MMWAC’s alleged acts are properly delegated and undertaken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy, so it need not show active state supervision in order to qualify for state action
Cited 9 timesPublished344 F. Supp. 2d 219 · District Court, D. Maine · Nov 10, 2004
In this case, the jury’s factual determination of reasonableness is further complicated by the court’s own analysis of qualified immunity that will involve a similar, but different test of reasonableness applied to the same … Once those facts are established, if the court determines Cut-liffe is not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law, then the jury’s factual assessment of the reasonableness of the degree of force becomes the ultimate
Cited 2 timesPublished397 F. Supp. 2d 115 · District Court, D. Maine · Nov 2, 2005
Defendant Davey has raised the defense of qualified immunity. … Whether an official may prevail in a qualified immunity defense depends upon the “objective reasonableness of [his] conduct as measured by reference to clearly established law.” Harlow v.
Cited 6 timesPublished139 F. Supp. 2d 136 · District Court, D. Maine · May 18, 2001
Qualified Immunity Defendants also argue in their Motion that Catlin is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. … Given the factual dispute, the Court cannot conclude at this point that Defendant Catlin is entitled to qualified immunity.
Cited 3 timesPublishedGeary v. Stanley Medical Research Institute
939 A.2d 86 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jan 15, 2008
Reviewing these concerns, we conclude that the rationales mandating qualified immunity for public officials are not applicable to private parties.” Wyatt v. … Id. at 168 , 112 S.Ct. 1827 . [¶ 18] The good faith clause of the UAGA does not explicitly provide immunity from suit, nor is there any suggestion that qualified immunity is involved in this dispute between private parties
Cited 6 timesPublishedLightfoot v. School Administrative District No. 35
816 A.2d 63 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Feb 28, 2003
No. 35 is not immune from liability for its negligent acts. … No. 35’s allowing the wrestling team to run through the High School’s hallways does not qualify as the operation of a public budding. The Superior Court correctly concluded that S.A.D.
Cited 111 timesPublishedMarcoux v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Division
881 A.2d 1138 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Sep 19, 2005
S-1173 (1995). [¶ 12] Hence, the legislative history of section 104 establishes that the Legislature intended that a 3rd party em *1143 ployer’s immunity from suit by a temporary employee is subject to the requirement that … measures in order to establish a breach of duty.
Cited 26 timesPublished63 F. Supp. 2d 75 · District Court, D. Maine · Aug 30, 1999
violated clearly established law. … that the challenged conduct violated that clearly established right.
Reversed in part, on other grounds by Miller v. Kennebec County, 219 F.3d 8 (2000)Cited 1 timesPublished842 F. Supp. 2d 354 · District Court, D. Maine · Feb 2, 2012
The Court *360 dismissed Count One against Whittemore in her official capacity because it was redundant of the claim against CDS-Cumberland and against Whittemore in her individual capacity on qualified immunity grounds. … Hampshire Cnty., 307 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2002). 4 Ultimately, the First Circuit affirmed “the district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint against Whittemore, because she is entitled to qualified immunity in her individual
Cited 14 timesPublishedCamps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison
655 A.2d 876 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Mar 7, 1995
They all have the opportunity to qualify for an exemption by choosing to dispense the majority of their charity locally. … Furthermore, the burden on interstate commerce does not clearly exceed the local benefits.
Cited 2 timesPublishedShostak v. United States Postal Service
655 F. Supp. 764 · District Court, D. Maine · Feb 12, 1987
Economou, 438 U.S. 478 , 98 S.Ct. 2894 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), federal officials are entitled to only qualified immunity unless they are in an exceptional situation in which absolute immunity is essential for the conduct … No such exceptional situation has been shown to exist in this case and, therefore, questions of fact exist as to whether or not Defendants’ actions fall within the qualified immunity delineated in Butz .
Cited 5 timesPublished973 F. Supp. 2d 31 · District Court, D. Maine · Sep 23, 2013
The manual explains that: a public entity may not establish requirements for the program or activities of licensees that would result in discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities. … The licensing rules promulgated by DLRS clearly constitute substantive state law.
Cited 5 timesPublishedBartashevich v. City of Portland
308 A.2d 551 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 31, 1973
to liability because of the sovereign immunity doctrine. … Clearly, Section 145 does not purport to authorize an action against a municipality by the third party beneficiary under a contract between the municipality and another person.
Cited 5 timesPublishedNew Orleans Tanker Corp. v. Department of Transportation
728 A.2d 673 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Apr 28, 1999
is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed. … Accordingly, I would find that bridge leaf machinery qualifies as “other machinery or equipment, whether mobile or stationary” for which the DOT can be held liable for its negligent operation.
Cited 62 timesPublished184 F. Supp. 2d 38 · District Court, D. Maine · Feb 19, 2002
It fails against the individual Defendants because they are entitled to qualified immunity. … Qualified immunity “shields public officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages ‘insofar as théir conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
Cited 11 timesPublished
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