Case law

State v. Chadroff

234 So. 2d 412 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Apr 20, 1970

In the caption of the waivers of immunity, it clearly stated that the defendant was voluntarily appearing. … Clearly, the defendant was not in custody, was not under compulsion, and was informed in clear, specific and unambiguous language that he was voluntarily appearing and waiving his rights to any immunity under the Constitution

Harris County Flood Control District v. Mihelich

512 S.W.2d 393 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Jun 13, 1974

Clearly, the purpose of Section 59(c) of Article 16 is to control and limit the incurring of indebtedness for improvements and their maintenance by certain districts. … The liability thus established is fortuitous; it is not a voluntary indebtedness of the District.

Battelle Memorial Institute v. Big Darby Creek Shooting Range

192 Ohio App. 3d 287 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Feb 22, 2011

At the time of its establishment, a shooting range shall comply with all existing local ordinances, regulations, or laws. 1 {¶ 5} R.C. 1533.85 is titled “Immunities regarding noise at shooting ranges.” … Davis, was qualified by the trial court as an expert witness, but it is not entirely clear from the record the specific area in which Davis was qualified as an expert.

People v. O'Malley

2021 IL App (5th) 190127 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 19, 2021

their immunity. … raising and proving their immunity.

City of San Antonio v. Casey Industrial, Inc.

Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · Jul 1, 2015

CPS argues that, under our 2012 opinion, the trial court did not have jurisdiction unless Casey established there were signed change orders. … Direct damages for breach—‘the necessary and usual result of the defendant’s wrongful act’— certainly qualify.” Id.

People v. Kelly

163 Cal. App. 4th 124 · California Court of Appeal · May 22, 2008

(d).) [5] (3) The CUA does not grant *131 immunity from arrest. ( People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 468-469 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326 , 49 P.3d 1067 ].) It grants a limited immunity from prosecution. … It clearly does.

Rothman v. Sternberg

207 A.D.2d 438 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Aug 15, 1994

Moreover, there *441 is no First Amendment constitutional imperative that affords immunity to the defendant absent qualifying under the "opinion immunity doctrine”. … As a corollary to such protection, the opinion must be a valid opinion, not a camouflage for the utterance of clearly defamatory factual language.

U.S. Taekwondo Comm. v. Kukkiwon

411 P.3d 782 · Colorado Court of Appeals · Jul 3, 2013

Starks, 36 P.3d 168 , 171 (Colo.App.2001) (ruling on CGIA qualified immunity not immediately appealable because CGIA "qualified immunity is not a jurisdictional issue of sovereign immunity, but rather, an affirmative defense … " that provides immunity from liability); see also Furlong, 956 P.2d at 551 (distinguishing CGIA qualified immunity from qualified immunity in a § 1983 case and concluding that "qualified immunity under the CGIA does not

Perillo v. Dreher

126 N.J. Super. 264 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 16, 1974

The Legislature may, within constitutional limits, nullify or qualify a ruling. Rosenberg v. North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190 (1972). … Moreover, allowance of the Willis claim represents legislative recognition of established judicial policy to provide relief to the litigant before the court.

Meyer Land & Cattle Co. v. Lincoln County Conservation District

29 Kan. App. 2d 746 · Court of Appeals of Kansas · Sep 14, 2001

As a result, potential defenses under the Kansas Tort Claims Act, K.S.A. 75-6101 el seq., and Lincoln’s claims of qualified immunity for its individual board members are not relevant at this time. … Kansas State Board of Regents, 269 Kan. 881, 888 , 9 P.3d 1251 (2000) (qualified immunity is an affirmative defense requiring plaintiff to show defendant violated a clearly established constitutional right).

L.L.C., Inc. and Fun Holdings, LLC v. Glenn Hegar, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas and Ken Paxton, Attorney General of the State of Texas

Texas Court of Appeals, 13th District · Jun 8, 2023

. § 111.0041. 4 the SOB Fee against certain types of establishments (adult cabarets and specifically latex clubs) but not against other businesses which also qualify … Sovereign immunity deprives a trial court of jurisdiction over lawsuits in which the State and its various agencies have been sued unless immunity is clearly and unambiguously waived by the legislature. Travis Cent.

Texas Department of Transportation v. Albert Lara, Jr.

577 S.W.3d 641 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 9, 2019

“Immunity from suit bars a suit against the State unless the Legislature expressly consents to the suit.” Texas Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. … Qualified Individual While conceding the existence of Lara’s disability, the Department argues that Lara is not a qualified individual with a disability.

City of New Braunfels, Texas v. Carowest Land, Ltd.

432 S.W.3d 501 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Apr 30, 2014

I, § 17). 24 See id. 13 and governmental immunity.25 Conversely, if a plaintiff “cannot establish a viable takings claim” against a governmental entity … The City’s insistence on such specificity appears to be grounded on a misunderstanding that Carowest is relying (or can only rely) on the “ultra vires” exception to immunity to establish the district court’s jurisdiction

De La Cruz v. State

192 Ariz. 122 · Court of Appeals of Arizona · Feb 24, 1998

under § 12-820.01(B)(3) or qualified immunity under § 12-820.02(A)(6). … ADOSH inspectors do not, therefore, enjoy absolute immunity for their inspections undér § 12-820.01(B)(3). ¶ 13 We also reject the State’s argument that the inspectors have qualified immunity under § 12-820.02(A)(6).

Higgins v. City of Oneonta

208 A.D.2d 1067 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Oct 20, 1994

Following completion of discovery, defendants moved for sum *1069 mary judgment dismissing the complaint on the grounds of privilege and qualified immunity. … Because the excessive force inquiry is governed by the same "objective reasonableness” standard as the qualified immunity standard, we have not considered the qualified immunity defense in the context of this claim (see,

Rasmussen v. Hancock Cty. Commrs., 5-06-54 (5-27-2008)

2008 Ohio 2498 · Ohio Court of Appeals · May 27, 2008

First, the court must determine whether the entity claiming immunity qualifies as a political subdivision and whether the harm occurred in connection with a *Page 13 governmental or proprietary function. … may be asserted to establish nonliability: (3) The political subdivision is immune from liability if the action or failure to act by the employee involved that gave rise to the claim of liability was within the discretion

Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine v. Tyson Foods, Inc.

13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 926 · California Court of Appeal · Jun 1, 2004

Com. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 388, 393 [ 182 P.2d 159 ], “[i]t is an established canon of interpretation that statutes are not to be given a retrospective operation unless it is clearly made to appear that such was the legislative … Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17 clearly deprives Tyson of any basis to strike PCRM’s suit pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute.

Farooq v. Coffey

206 A.D.2d 879 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Jul 15, 1994

Defendant established that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that there is no triable question of fact on the issue whether the statements were protected by a qualified privilege (see, Buckley … Similarly, two nearly identical statutes, Education Law § 6527 (5) and Public Health Law § 2805-m (3), provide for qualified immunity on the part of "any person * * * or * * * entity on account of the communication of information

People v. Hull

243 Cal. Rptr. 3d 375 · California Court of Appeal, 5th District · Jan 31, 2019

Additionally, the prosecutor here was not *1008 required to provide immunity because the defense did not establish that what it hoped to gain by cross-examination was clearly exculpatory and essential. … We have already summarized the overwhelming evidence establishing defendant's guilt in our discussion of defendant's immunity argument.

Villa v. Arthur Rubloff & Co.

183 Ill. App. 3d 746 · Appellate Court of Illinois · May 19, 1989

The word “agents” is not limited or qualified in any way by the Act. The court in Mier v. Staley (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 373 , held that under section 5(a), directors were agents of a corporation.. … The relationship between Evergreen Plaza and Rubloff is clearly that of principal and agent in the traditional sense and is encompassed by the Act.