Case law

Sattler v. Northwest Tissue Center

110 Wash. App. 689 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 18, 2002

The standard of good faith is objective; it affords immunity to qualified individuals and entities who demonstrate that they acted with an honest belief, without malice and without a design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable … We conclude Northwest qualifies as an “other person” and is entitled by statute to assert the defense.

Melinda M. Binkley, Trustee on behalf of the heirs and next of kin of Kirk T. Lloyd, II v. Allina Health System

860 N.W.2d 707 · Court of Appeals of Minnesota · Feb 9, 2015

Contrary to respondent’s argument, granting immunity here would not incorporate voluntary “admissions” under the term 5 “commitment”; rather, voluntary admissions qualify … The district court did not conclude and the respondent does not argue that the immunity provision is ambiguous, and, in fact, this court has held that “[t]he language of the immunity provision is not ambiguous—it clearly

Essman v. Portsmouth

2010 Ohio 4837 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Sep 29, 2010

However, some general rules have been established. … ‘“‘The court must look to the statute itself to determine legislative intent, and if such intent is clearly expressed therein, the statute may not be restricted, constricted, qualified, narrowed, enlarged

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. City of Philadelphia

20 A.3d 558 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 13, 2011

Clearly then, as an agency and instrumentality of the Commonwealth, SEPTA qualifies as an "employer" for purposes of the Act, subject to the jurisdiction of the PHRC. … Since the Commission does not have jurisdiction over SEPTA, the petition is not clearly insufficient to establish SEPTA's right to injunctive relief.

Wyman v. Missouri Department of Mental Health

376 S.W.3d 16 · Missouri Court of Appeals · Apr 10, 2012

W.D.1989), this Court held that the inclusion of “the state” in the definition of an “employer” in § 287.030 was insufficient to establish a waiver of sovereign immunity, because— according to Krasney — “[t]he waiver of sovereign … “The liability of a public entity for torts is the exception to the general rule of immunity for tort and it is incumbent upon a plaintiff who seeks to state a claim for relief to specifically allege facts establishing that

People v. McIntire

232 Mich. App. 71 · Michigan Court of Appeals · Jan 8, 1999

The issue we address here is simply whether testimony must be truthful in order to qualify for immunity from prosecution, i.e., whether a statutory requirement that one “answer” questions in a legal proceeding be construed … The prosecutor moved for a grant of immunity, for example, without even specifying that defendant was first required to testify in order to qualify for immunity under the statute.

City of McKinney v. Hank's Restaurant Group, L.P.

412 S.W.3d 102 · Texas Court of Appeals, 5th District (Dallas) · Sep 18, 2013

Categories four through seven4 clearly are not claims under Chapter 245, so section 245.006 does not waive the City’s immunity as to those claims. … HRG’s pleadings are not sufficient to establish a waiver of immunity under Chapter 245, but it is entitled to an opportunity to amend its pleadings.

People of Michigan v. Iskandar Manuel

Michigan Court of Appeals · Apr 18, 2017

A qualifying patient or primary caregiver who possesses more marijuana than allowed under § 4(a) and § 4(b) cannot establish the second element of immunity. … Finally, to establish the fourth element of § 4 immunity, a defendant must prove that he or she was engaged in the medical use of marijuana. Hartwick, 498 Mich at 219.

Brooks v. State

3 Md. App. 485 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Apr 3, 1968

be qualified lo serve.” … any qualified to serve.

Duffy v. Wetzler

174 A.D.2d 253 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Jan 15, 1992

We add only the observation that the defense of qualified immunity, which the court did not reach (see, Duffy v Wetzler, 148 Misc 2d 459, 469 , supra), provided a much simpler basis on which to reject the claims. … The claimed right under 4 USC § ill was not "clearly established” until Davis , and so the individual defendants are "shielded from liability for civil damages.”

City of San Antonio v. Dunn

796 S.W.2d 258 · Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · Aug 15, 1990

OFFICER ALONZO’S POINTS OF ERROR Alonzo first alleges the trial court erred in failing to give the jury his requested instruction and question regarding his defense of qualified immunity that he acted in good faith in making … The defense of qualified immunity arose as a result of plaintiffs’ contention that Alonzo had illegally restrained and arrested Dunn.

Glass v. Gates

311 Ga. App. 563 · Court of Appeals of Georgia · Sep 1, 2011

A waiver of sovereign immunity “must be established by the party seeking to benefit from the waiver.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Walker, 216 Ga. … App. 301, 303 ( 656 SE2d 584 ) (2008) (Caterpillar excavator qualified as “motor vehicle” under OCGA § 33-24-51).

Jefferson County v. Stines

523 S.W.3d 691 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Jun 22, 2017

Consequently, governmental immunity will bar an otherwise proper DJA claim that has the effect of establishing a right to relief against a governmental entity for which the Legislature has not waived immunity. Id. . . … It is well-established, however, that certain types of claims brought under the DJA do not implicate governmental immunity.

Demopolis v. Peoples National Bank

59 Wash. App. 105 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Sep 4, 1990

An Arizona case is instructive: As an immunity which focuses on the status of the actor, the privilege immunizes an attorney for statements made "while performing his function as such." … The burden of establishing an abuse of a qualified privilege rests on the defamed party, who must show that the speaker acted with actual malice; i.e., that he or she knew the statement was false, or had a high degree of

City of Beverly Hills v. Guevara

886 S.W.2d 833 · Texas Court of Appeals, 10th District (Waco) · Nov 9, 1994

actions are alleged to be negligent, so long as their actions meet the three-prong test established for finding official immunity.... … The Court also said, “conversely,” if an employee is protected from liability by qualified immunity, the governmental unit’s sovereign immunity remains intact Id.

Founders Ins.Co. v. Gurung

2017 Ohio 8983 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Dec 13, 2017

“We look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in the policy unless another meaning is clearly apparent from the contents of the policy.” Galatis at ¶ 11. … The plain and ordinary meaning of “privilege,” however, is “a right or immunity granted as a peculiar benefit, advantage, or favor * * *.”

City of Treasure Island v. PROVIDENT MGMT.

738 So. 2d 357 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Jun 11, 1999

Because there were few, if any, comparable sales of such businesses to use as a benchmark for the fair market value of the business, Provident's qualified expert relied upon total capitalized net cash flow to establish a … As Provident argues, it is difficult to square this holding with a determination that total immunity exists. We have struggled with the nature of a claim for wrongful injunction. It clearly is not a claim in contract.

City of Live Oak v. Arnold

10 Fla. L. Weekly 1060 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Apr 25, 1985

Hewiett determined that Long Street did not qualify as a "street" under the city's zoning and subdivision ordinances contained in the city code. … In order for the trier of fact to determine this issue, assuming the trial court finds liability can be established under the allegations of the complaint as presently framed ( Cf.

Marqueth Wilson v. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission

Texas Court of Appeals, 12th District (Tyler) · Nov 13, 2003

Wilson's third and fourth issues, as well as certain arguments in his first issue, relate to official immunity and qualified immunity. … A party can establish consent by referencing a statute or a legislative resolution clearly and unambiguously granting consent. Id. ; University of Texas Med. Branch v. York , 871 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. 1994).

Burge v. Exelon Generation Company, LLC

2015 IL App (2d) 141090 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 15, 2015

Plaintiffs assert that Wendt “may be qualified to testify that Defendant actually footed the bill for [Rick’s] benefits, but not that it was required to do so.” … The plaintiffs alleged that the employees who attempted to replace the valve were not qualified to do so.