Case law

Arkansas Motor Vehicle Commission v. Cantrell Marine, Inc.

305 Ark. 449 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · May 13, 1991

Hill, 233 Ark. 59 , 342 S.W.2d 657 (1961), we held that “[t]he rule is well established that a litigant must exhaust his administrative remedies before instituting litigation to challenge the action of the administrative … Failure on the part of Cantrell Marine to seek a hearing before the Commission with respect to the Director’s action was clearly a failure to exhaust its administrative remedies. Dixie Downs, Inc. v.

Adams v. City of Tenakee Springs

963 P.2d 1047 · Alaska Supreme Court · Aug 21, 1998

Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 73 (Alaska 1987) (holding that where officials exercised discretion within the scope of their authority, they were entitled to qualified immunity so long as they did not violate “clearly established” law … We must determine whether clearly established law required Tenakee Springs to hire firefighters.

Cope v. Utah Valley State College

342 P.3d 243 · Utah Supreme Court · Nov 21, 2014

such immunity.” … The duties of firefighters and police officers, which are clearly public obligations, end at the border of the city or county that they serve.

Lyon v. Jones

291 Conn. 384 · Supreme Court of Connecticut · May 5, 2009

“The most typical method used by plaintiffs to establish the fourth prong of a prima facie case is to introduce evidence that the defendant . . . promoted comparably qualified individuals not in a protected class of individuals … Clearly, a complaint must be properly filed before a release can be obtained.

Edwards v. Gerstein

237 S.W.3d 580 · Supreme Court of Missouri · Oct 30, 2007

to supersede the common law official immunity doctrine for the enumerated individuals and agencies,” this Court held that “section 190.307 provides the shielded entities with a qualified immunity allowing civil liability … Like the statute at issue in Golden, the statute at issue in this case supersedes absolute common law immunities and establishes qualified statutory immunity from liability except in cases of gross negligence.

Montgomery v. Philadelphia

392 Pa. 178 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 24, 1958

Whereas qualified privilege could be successful only after a full trial, thus placing a government official at the whims and mercy of a jury, the purpose of absolute immunity is to foreclose the possibility of suit. “. . … “It has been argued, however, that free disclosure would be sufficiently encouraged by the granting of a qualified privilege.

Pike v. South Carolina Department of Transportation

343 S.C. 224 · Supreme Court of South Carolina · Nov 6, 2000

According to Thompson, Wilson was qualified to gather data upon which sight distances could be calculated, *228 but he was not qualified to actually calculate sight distance. 2 Wilson stated that in November 1990 he estimated … Moreover, given the standard a governmental entity must meet to establish discretionary immunity, we find that the burden of proof must be one of persuasion.

State v. Thomas

311 Kan. 403 · Supreme Court of Kansas · Apr 24, 2020

In response, the State argued Thomas did not qualify for statutory immunity because his use of deadly force was not justified under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5222 and because Thomas was the initial aggressor under K.S.A. 2019 … In Hardy, we noted the self-defense statutory scheme confers a "true immunity" for those who qualify.

Tonelli v. Board of Education

185 N.J. 438 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 28, 2005

But even if we were to conclude that the Board’s organizational structure does not clearly exclude it from the Act, that would not be the end of the inquiry. … the statute confers either total or limited immunity (“nonprofit corporation,” etc.) have developed an established connotation in our law, i.e., a private charity which depends on charitable contributions and whose funds

Lythgoe v. Guinn

884 P.2d 1085 · Alaska Supreme Court · Nov 25, 1994

This danger is clearly present in the context of the court-appointed professional. … Caselaw and policy considerations clearly support the granting of absolute quasi-judicial immunity to Dr.

Bill O. Gant v. Lila Maness

Mississippi Supreme Court · Jun 30, 1999

This, according to longstanding Mississippi law, is clearly insufficient to establish a duty of care owing to him in particular: when the duty imposed upon an officer is one solely to the public, the failure … Now, in developing his argument for qualified immunity, Gant asserts that his duties regarding Thompson's incarceration were discretionary and that he is, thus, entitled to qualified immunity.

University of Wyoming v. Gressley

978 P.2d 1146 · Wyoming Supreme Court · Apr 29, 1999

42 U.S.C. § 1983 , and that the complaint was not sufficient to meet Gressley’s burden of showing facts and law to establish that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to those claims. … and qualified immunity.

Taggart v. State

118 Wash. 2d 195 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 9, 1992

Qualified Immunity for Parole Officers' Supervisory Decisions. … State, 116 Wn.2d 596 , 809 P.2d 143 (1991) suggests the parameters of this qualified immunity.

Shook v. CITY OF DAVENPORT, IOWA

497 N.W.2d 883 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 24, 1993

The language of federal Rule 26(b)(3) makes it clear that [i]n order to come within the qualified immunity from discovery created by Rule 26(b)(3) three tests must be satisfied. … Otherwise, the privilege, often referred to as “qualified immunity” is not available. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 603 . In Ashmead v.

Ex Parte Cranman

792 So. 2d 392 · Supreme Court of Alabama · Nov 22, 2000

It has long been recognized, however, that not every person or agency infused with some aspect of governance qualifies for § 14 immunity. … Under this distinction, physicians still enjoy immunity for the exercise of "governmental discretion," that is, decisions establishing governmental policy.

Yellowback v. City of Sioux Falls

600 N.W.2d 554 · South Dakota Supreme Court · Aug 25, 1999

Since no constitutional violation occurred, logically there is no need to pursue the qualified immunity inquiry further. … Since there was no violation of law, there is no need to inquire whether a reasonable officer would have known that his conduct violated clearly established law. See Cole, 993 F.2d at 1334 ; Krueger, 991 F.2d at 439 .

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. City of Philadelphia

627 Pa. 470 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 24, 2014

The • court concluded: “Clearly then, as an agency and instrumentality of the Commonwealth, SEPTA qualifies as an ‘employer’ for purposes of the [Human Relations] Act, subject to the jurisdiction of the [Pennsylvania Human … The fact that the Commonwealth Court did not employ the magic words — sovereign immunity — is of no consequence, as the court clearly recognized SEPTA’s enabling statute and its existence as a Commonwealth Agency subject

Cantey Hanger, Llp v. Philip Gregory Byrd, Lucy Leasing Co., L.L.C., and Pgb Air, Inc.

467 S.W.3d 477 · Texas Supreme Court · Jun 29, 2015

We hold that the firm established its affirmative defense of attorney immunity as a matter of law and therefore reverse the court of appeals’ judgment. I. … The court held that, although attorneys enjoy qualified immunity from civil liability to non-clients for actions taken in connection with representing a client in litigation, Cantey Hanger was not entitled to such immunity

Marcie Normandin v. Encanto Adventures

246 Ariz. 458 · Arizona Supreme Court · May 17, 2019

In 1991, the City of Phoenix (the “City”) and Encanto’s predecessor executed a concessionaire agreement (the “Agreement”) to establish the amusement park wherein the City licensed certain exclusive rights to construct, maintain … On review, we reversed because the State did not qualify as an “occupant” under the statute. Id. at 362–63.

Meier Ex Rel. Meier v. Champ's Sport Bar & Grill, Inc.

241 Wis. 2d 605 · Wisconsin Supreme Court · Mar 13, 2001

that leads to the underage drinker's intoxication, they cannot qualify as a "third party" under this definition. … a party that provides intoxicants to an underage person, and that strict construction of the statute requires liability where immunity is not clearly and unambiguously established.