Case law

State v. Nicolls

61 Wash. 142 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 10, 1910

In the statute before us no qualifying words are employed. One who'sells, gives, or barters intoxicating liquor to an Indian or one of mixed blood, is guilty. … The fact of selling being established, the law supplies the element of intent.

Furfaro v. City of Seattle

27 P.3d 1160 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 2, 2001

The Court of Appeals also recognized, in its discussion of the qualified immunity issue, that the warrant requirement was not clearly established. … Qualified immunity is appropriate in this case precisely because the right violated was not clearly established: "The contours of the right to perform a nude stage dance without fear of warrantless arrest are not clearly

Hocker v. Woody

95 Wash. 2d 822 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 23, 1981

They have, however, a qualified immunity so that they may exercise their discretion without undue timidity. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 , 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974); Wood v. … The petitioner's constitutional rights were therefore not clearly established at the time of the conduct and she could recover only if Woody's actions showed a malicious intent.

State Ex Rel. Golden v. Crawford

165 S.W.3d 147 · Supreme Court of Missouri · May 31, 2005

Section 190.307 provides the shielded entities with a qualified immunity allowing civil liability only in instances where gross negligence can be established. … At the time the trial court ruled on the summary judgment motion, it did not have the benefit of this Court’s opinion finding the qualified immunity under section 190.307 supplants the absolute immunity under the common law

City of Grand Junction v. Sisneros

1998 Colo. J. C.A.R. 1316 · Supreme Court of Colorado · Mar 23, 1998

Consequently, the court of appeals remanded for further proceedings on the issue of defendants’ immunity. II. Subject to certain conditions, the GIA establishes tort immunity for public entities. … Macaluso, 892 P.2d 271 (Colo.1995), we explained that the GIA “establishes immunity ... when public employees are pursuing criminals or are responding to fire alarms.” Id. at 275 .

Arkansas River Education Service Cooperative v. Modacure

371 Ark. 466 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Nov 8, 2007

Although the tentative geographic boundaries of co-ops are established by the Department of Education, 75% of the school districts in a proposed co-op must request formation of the co-op by formal resolutions. … Clearly, the growth, utilization, and maintenance of the co-op stems from the participating school districts and, as an entity, the co-op is comparable to a school district. Ozarks Unlimited Res. Co-op., Inc. v.

Calvert Investments, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District

805 S.W.2d 133 · Kentucky Supreme Court · Mar 14, 1991

As such they do not qualify for sovereign immunity. … Kentucky Center for the Arts Corporation does not qualify for sovereign immunity under this concept.” ( 801 S.W.2d at 332 ) (emphasis added).

Minch v. District of Columbia

952 A.2d 929 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 17, 2008

Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 , 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (in the context of qualified immunity of a police officer, “[i]f no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is … If the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate.”

Entila v. Cook

187 Wash. 2d 480 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 12, 2017

RCW 51.08.013 then establishes employer immunity and defines “acting in the course of employment.” … These statutory provisions demonstrate that benefit eligibility and employer immunity are analytically tied—if an injured worker qualifies for benefits, the employer cannot be sued. ¶7 Although RCW 51.08.013 establishes benefit

Brunsvold v. State

250 Mont. 500 · Montana Supreme Court · Oct 30, 1991

In Knutson , we said clearly that sentencing is a judicial act. Knutson, 211 Mont. at 128 , 683 P.2d at 490 . … a probation officer not pursuant to such court direction do not qualify for judicial immunity.

Chatman v. Hall

128 N.J. 394 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 29, 1992

The use of the words “any immunity of the public employee provided by law ” was clearly calculated. … Its primary function is to confer immunity, not to establish liability.

Webb v. County of Lincoln

536 So. 2d 1356 · Mississippi Supreme Court · Dec 21, 1988

An affidavit contained in the record establishes the fact that said road and intersection were not part of the state highway system. … Thus, as stated in Lewis , "the board's qualified immunity remains intact."

Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc.

89 N.W.2d 102 · North Dakota Supreme Court · Apr 3, 1958

If WDAY is immune from liability such immunity is a privilege granted by section 315, and is either an absolute privilege or a qualified privilege. 53 C.J.S. … In the same volume, § 89, pages 143, 144, 145, qualified privilege is defined as follows : “Qualified privilege exists in a larger number of cases than does absolute privilege.

McNally v. Mokarzel

386 A.2d 744 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · May 26, 1978

In the latter circumstance only a qualified privilege attaches, one which can be overcome by a showing of actual malice. … Id. at 112 . 2 In the case at bar, the complaint clearly alleges actual malice on the Defend *747 ants’ part, and this allegation would be sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if no more than the qualified privilege

Paul Stieler Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Evansville

2 N.E.3d 1269 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 11, 2014

Thus, the two distinguishing characteristics upon which the Amending Ordinance establishes different classes for unequal treatment are: (1) whether the establishment is floating or land-based and (2) whether the establishment … The Evansville City Council clearly distinguished riverboat casinos from land-based bars and clubs, and we do not fault these classifications.

State v. Brown

315 Neb. 336 · Nebraska Supreme Court · Oct 13, 2023

(a) Motor Vehicle Carve-Out Brown argues that his claim clearly arises out of a state employee’s operation of a motor vehicle in the course and scope of employment and that we therefore need not address the rest of the … Notwithstanding these rules of interpretation, Brown argues that the riding lawnmower Blazek operated qualifies as a motor vehicle.

TX. Nat. Res. Con. Com'n v. White

46 S.W.3d 864 · Texas Supreme Court · Jun 21, 2001

has not been clearly and explicitly waived. … clearly intended."

Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Robert J. and Billye S. Front, etc.

231 W. Va. 518 · West Virginia Supreme Court · Jun 19, 2013

Prince George’s County, Md., 309 F.3d 224 , 229 (4th Cir.2002) (“Because qualified immunity is an immunity from having to litigate, as contrasted with an immunity from liability, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously … Traditional appellate review of a qualified immunity ruling cannot achieve the intended goal of an immunity ruling: “the right not to be subject to the burden of trial.” Hutchison [v.

Jay Kurowski f/n/f Christopher Kurowski v. Town of Chester

170 N.H. 307 · Supreme Court of New Hampshire · Sep 21, 2017

The plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred when it found that his allegations were insufficient to establish that either of two statutory exceptions to recreational immunity applied to the Town. … To establish that the trial court erred, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the trial court’s ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case.

Burke v. Deiner

97 N.J. 465 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 2, 1984

, however, our cases make plain that qualified immunity represents the norm. … In part II of this opinion, infra at 475-478, we shall discuss the reach of this qualified immunity.