Case law

Beard v. Baum

796 P.2d 1344 · Alaska Supreme Court · Aug 3, 1990

First, the court held that the individual appellees were shielded from liability under their qualified immunity as public officials. … Whether an official may prevail in his qualified immunity defense depends upon the “objective reasonableness of [his] conduct as measured by reference to clearly established law.” Davis v.

Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights

139 Ill. 2d 501 · Illinois Supreme Court · Nov 30, 1990

He maintains that his complaint clearly alleges that he was a “beginner adult swimmer” and that defendant purportedly supplied a “qualified” swimming instructor. … This not only would run against the grain of the common law, but is clearly prohibited by the Tort Immunity Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 85, pars. 3-106, 3-108, 3-109.

Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners

115 Wis. 2d 289 · Wisconsin Supreme Court · Nov 30, 1983

any qualified immunities. 436 U.S. at 701. … It is evident therefore, that the qualified immunity urged by the Village in this case was not “well established at common law at the time sec. 1983 was enacted.” Owen, 445 U.S. at 638 .

LaVonne Pfeil, Individually and as Trustee for Heirs of Henry Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Unaltered Augsburg Confession of Worthington, Nobles County, Minnesota

877 N.W.2d 528 · Supreme Court of Minnesota · Apr 6, 2016

Indeed, the fact that under' Pfeils’ rule “clearly religious” statements would be immune from suit while more factually based “secular” statements would not be only exacerbates the chilling effect of which respondents warn … "[Tjhe question of whether [a qualified] privilege was abused is a jury question.” Id.

Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District v. Jennifer Albright, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of David K. Albright

Kentucky Supreme Court · Mar 20, 2025

It is therefore a clearly distinguishable function from, for example, the enforcement of laws and regulations establishing safety standards for the construction and use of buildings held to be immune in Grogan, or the … Despite David’s death clearly establishing the danger this pipe poses to human life, MSD argues its policy justifies a permanent rejection of taking any corrective action.

E.B. v. W. Va. Regional Jail and Correctional Authority, etc.

West Virginia Supreme Court · Jan 27, 2017

immunity analysis requires consideration of the requirement that the asserted violated right is “clearly established.” … the particular action is a violation) violates a clearly established right.

MacKintosh v. Carter

451 N.W.2d 285 · South Dakota Supreme Court · Jan 31, 1990

Thus, immunity attaches pursuant to SDCL 26-10-14. … Once the qualified privilege is established, a plaintiff “must establish that there was a reckless disregard for the truth on the part of the [defendant],” i.e., the defendants “in fact entertained serious doubts” regarding

Harrell v. Pineland Plantation, Ltd.

337 S.C. 313 · Supreme Court of South Carolina · Nov 22, 1999

Was Pineland immune from a tort suit by Harrell due to the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act even though it did not purchase its own Workers’ Compensation coverage or otherwise qualify as self-insured … The plain language of our Act clearly does not support Pineland’s position.

District of Columbia v. Thompson

570 A.2d 277 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 12, 1990

As we shall also detail further, mandatory and discretionary duties commonly give rise to absolute immunity whereas ministerial duties at best evoke a qualified immunity. … This means that official immunity will help appellants only if it is absolute; qualified immunity would afford no more protection than the malice-destructible, qualified privilege available to any employer.

McNamara v. Honeyman

406 Mass. 43 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 13, 1989

It is silent as to gross negligence and hence, we conclude that a public employee is immune from a claim arising out of gross negligence because such a claim qualifies as a “negligent or wrongful act or omission” under § … or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Crawn v. Campo

136 N.J. 494 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 21, 1994

and, consequently, do not warrant an immunity. … A witness, although otherwise qualified as an expert by virtue of specialized education, training, or experience to testify on the rules that generally govern a sport, would not thereby be qualified as an expert on a specific

People v. Koon

494 Mich. 1 · Michigan Supreme Court · May 21, 2013

The MMMA does not define what it means to be “under the influence,” but the phrase clearly contemplates something more than having any amount of marijuana in one’s system and requires some effect on the person … when a registered patient is outside the MMMA’s protection.21 In sum, we conclude that the MMMA is inconsistent with, and therefore supersedes, MCL 257.625(8) unless a registered qualifying patient loses immunity

Grosjean v. Imperial Palace, Inc.

125 Nev. 349 · Nevada Supreme Court · Jul 30, 2009

Generally, qualified immunity applies to protect “state officials from civil liability for damages resulting from discretionary acts, so *360 long as those acts do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional … Thus, the policy considerations underlying qualified immunity noted above would not be served by permitting Imperial Palace and Espensen to assert qualified immunity.

Maxwell v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc.

460 Mass. 91 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 30, 2011

Under the statute, however, immunity is available, in “the absence of malice or bad faith.” Id. This is a form of qualified immunity. See Kobrin v. … Ct. 922, 923-924 (1988) (persons filing reports with board of podiatry enjoy qualified immunity and plaintiffs “hav[e] the burden of overcoming [statutory] immunity”).

City of Postville, Iowa and Jason Meyer v. Upper Explorerland Regional Planning Commission, Martin Brennan, Kathy Campbell, Ray Whalen, Leon Griebenow, Andrew Wenthe, Karla Organist, Warren Steffen, Michael Kenedy, Janet McGovern, Dean Darling, Les Askelson, and Randy Uhl

834 N.W.2d 1 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 7, 2013

Immunity. … It is undisputed the individuals serving on the Commission qualify as members of a governmental body and thus, are subject to IOMA.

People v. Evans

247 Ill. 547 · Illinois Supreme Court · Dec 21, 1910

It was clearly the intention of the framers of this constitutional provision that the appointing power,- in cases of all offices established by the constitution or created by law, should be vested in the Governor, unless … The language found in said section of the constitution, “and whose appointment or election is not otherwise provided for,” is plain and unambiguous; and clearly- indicates that if by the constitution an office is established

Trinity Christian Sch. v. Comm'n on Human Rights

329 Conn. 684 · Supreme Court of Connecticut · Aug 7, 2018

not be liable," 14 "no action may be brought," 15 "shall be **697 immune from civil liability," 16 or by using other similar language. 17 Under well established rules of statutory construction, we must assume that, if the … Whiteman , 204 Conn. 98 , 103, 526 A.2d 869 (1987) ("[i]t is not the function of courts to read into clearly expressed legislation provisions [that] do not find expression in its words" [internal quotation marks omitted]

Oliver v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines

111 Nev. 1338 · Nevada Supreme Court · Nov 1, 1995

Barrick claimed statutory immunity under the NIIA on grounds that it was Oliver’s “statutory employer.” DISCUSSION This court’s standard of review on summary judgment is well established. … qualified him for coverage under the Nil A. 9 *1348 The appropriate definition of “same trade” to use in the present case is clearly stated in Meers v.

State of Idaho v. Gannon Manuelito

Idaho Supreme Court · May 7, 2026

Subsection (2) governs immunity for the person experiencing the drug-related emergency and omits the “acting in good faith” qualifier. Only subsection (1) has a “good faith” requirement. … The court erred in determining that the manager’s good faith in calling emergency services qualified Manuelito for immunity under Idaho Code section 37- 2739C.

Sheley v. Alaska Bar Ass'n

620 P.2d 640 · Alaska Supreme Court · Oct 16, 1980

Since she planned to move to Alaska in June, 1980, and establish a law practice, she applied to take the February bar exam. … The thirty-day residency requirement of the rule clearly discriminates against nonresidents, because they are denied the opportunity to take the bar examination and, thus, precluded from practicing law.