Case law

SOS Staffing Services, Inc. v. Fields

54 P.3d 761 · Wyoming Supreme Court · Sep 24, 2002

Consistent with subsection (F), subsection (G) clearly provides that the term "employer" includes anyone using the services of a worker furnished by another, except in the case of a temporary service contractor furnishing … Stated differently, employee immunity is merely an extension of the employer immunity.

Williams Ex Rel. Williams v. Randolph Hospital, Inc.

237 N.C. 387 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Mar 25, 1953

Thus the rule to which we adhere is that of qualified immunity. The plaintiff, conceding the existence of the rule which obtains with us, takes a dual position in prosecuting this appeal. … The range of decision is from absolute liability to complete immunity, with the weight of authority being on the side of immunity, either total or qualified.

Johnson v. Callisto

287 Minn. 61 · Supreme Court of Minnesota · Apr 24, 1970

We held that the commissioner in causing damage to plaintiff’s land, which was “not acquired nor intended to be acquired by him for the state, * * * clearly departed from the scope of his authority.” 188 Minn. 586 , 248 N … The briefs and record supporting plaintiffs’ doubtful claim do not suggest a good reason for this court to abolish or qualify the doctrine as it applies to the state.

City of Jackson v. Estate of Stewart Ex Rel. Womack

908 So. 2d 703 · Mississippi Supreme Court · Aug 4, 2005

We find the Estate produced sufficient evidence to establish causation. ¶ 49. … We find that matters of contract interpretation were clearly outside the tendered expertise of Mr. Waites. In Hart v.

Worthington v. State

598 P.2d 796 · Wyoming Supreme Court · Jul 18, 1979

Only the sovereign’s own consent could qualify the absolute character of that immunity.” … These clearly obviate the necessity of this court’s testing its power to remove this immunity and to brush aside the rule of stare decisis by setting aside well-established and long-followed rules in this jurisdiction.

Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P. v. Harris County Toll Road Authority

52 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 579 · Texas Supreme Court · Apr 3, 2009

Other statutes clearly speak to the subject. … Because section 251.102 does not clearly waive governmental immunity, and because Harris County has not otherwise waived its immunity from suit, SBC’s statutory reimbursement claim is barred.

Lane v. Atchison Heritage Conference Center, Inc.

283 Kan. 439 · Supreme Court of Kansas · Mar 16, 2007

Because the AHCC’s “primary function” was not recreational, the court held that the AHCC had not met its burden of establishing immunity from the KTCA. … In concluding that the use of the pubhc school’s property qualified for the exemption, Jackson I emphasized that a governmental entity has qualified immunity from tort hability for ordinaiy negligence when that entity is

Bond v. Cedar Rapids Television Co.

518 N.W.2d 352 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 22, 1994

The burden is clearly on the plaintiffs to raise and negate Noerr immunity. MAPCO, 958 F.2d at 1558 n. 9 (stating plaintiff has burden to show Noerr immunity did not attach to plaintiffs action); Hospital Bldg. … Erickson, 485 N.W.2d at 86 (statutory immunity from suit not an affirmative defense, but part of plaintiffs burden to establish strict liability).

McNair Builders, Inc. v. Taylor

3 A.3d 1132 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 9, 2010

As the privilege is absolute, not qualified, and well established in our jurisdiction, we would anticipate few cases where the conduct of litigants and counsel will be influenced by the “small risk that the law will be misapplied … Attorney General’s claim of qualified immunity was appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 4 .

Baldwin v. State of California

6 Cal. 3d 424 · California Supreme Court · Jan 3, 1972

Johnston (1967) 67 Cal.2d 163 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 485 , 430 P.2d 43 ], we previously considered this problem and held that the design immunity remained intact even though changed circumstances had clearly revealed the defects … State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782, 798 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 240 , 447 P.2d 352 ]), and that “[u]nless the Legislature has clearly provided for immunity, the important societal goal of compensating injured parties for damages

Staheli v. Smith

548 So. 2d 1299 · Mississippi Supreme Court · Aug 23, 1989

The trial court was correct in granting summary judgment on the issue of qualified governmental immunity. … Summary judgment was appropriate in this case because the Dean enjoys a qualified immunity, as a governmental employee, and a qualified privilege, in this employment context. AFFIRMED.

United States v. Carter

799 A.2d 1232 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jun 25, 2002

The factual basis for this contention is not clearly articulated, but even if there is information about this suit being reported to credit agencies, the reporting is temporary, and is a necessary incident to litigation of … United States, 64 F.3d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir.1995) (official immunity is different from other defenses because "the judicial inquiry itself, rather than just a merits judgment, causes the disruption that the doctrine of immunity

Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County

119 Wash. 2d 91 · Washington Supreme Court · May 14, 1992

State, 103 Wn.2d 144, 153 , 690 P.2d 1163 (1984) (municipality enjoys the qualified immunity of its police officers). But cf. Babcock v. … State, supra at 619-22, where we held that the State does not get the benefit of the qualified or absolute immunity of its Department of Social and Health Services caseworkers.

Bond v. Marion County Bd. of Sup'rs

807 So. 2d 1208 · Mississippi Supreme Court · Dec 13, 2001

The court also found that the members of the Board and the EDD were entitled to legislative immunity and qualified immunity. ¶ 11. Bond timely filed a notice of appeal on April 7, 2000. … The circuit court concluded that the members of the Board and of the EDD, named in their individual capacities, were entitled to absolute immunity as well as qualified immunity.

Ritchie v. Donnelly

324 Md. 344 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Oct 29, 1991

immunity.. … The police officer in Clea was clearly acting within the scope of his employment.

Canico v. Hurtado

144 N.J. 361 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 18, 1996

To further the legislative goal of encouraging pursuits, however, both Tice and Fielder relied on section 2(b)’s grant of absolute immunity, rather than section 3-3’s qualified immunity. … Unlike the absolute immunity of section 2(b), section 3-3 requires that to enjoy qualified immunity public employees must act in “good faith.”

Baker v. Bhajan

117 N.M. 278 · New Mexico Supreme Court · Mar 14, 1994

Because there was no consent to the statements not made in response to the background investigation, the Gengler court held that the former employer did not have absolute immunity from suit, but rather qualified immunity … The two primary executive officers in the State of New Mexico, the Governor and the Attorney General, clearly have a legitimate interest in the background of candidates for employment in the NMSP.

Johnson v. State of Vermont Department of Health

165 Vt. 588 · Supreme Court of Vermont · Jul 3, 1996

Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that sovereign immunity protects the State from suit, and qualified immunity protects the individual defendants from suit. … Aldrich, 149 Vt. 76, 81 , 539 A.2d 981, 984 (1987) (discussing doctrine of qualified immunity).

Hurst v. Capitell

539 So. 2d 264 · Supreme Court of Alabama · Jan 16, 1989

for the judiciary, to change an established rule of law.... "... … Because the doctrine was judicially created, it is not exclusively a legislative issue and it may be judicially qualified.

State Ex Rel. Whetsel v. Wood

207 Okla. 193 · Supreme Court of Oklahoma · Apr 23, 1952

powers to the Oklahoma Board of Examiners in Watchmaking and gives such Board unlimited powers to permit a certain class to engage in watchmaking, to the exclusion of others, thus giving such Board legislative powers to establish … The Watchmaking Act clearly prohibits one who may be fully qualified by years of training and experience from following his chosen craft and forces him to seek some other work or trade, thus depriving him of the fruits of