Case law

Jeun v. United States

128 Fed. Cl. 203 · United States Court of Federal Claims · Sep 8, 2016

Pincus provided a note for plaintiff’s command stating: SPC Chi Jeun has cognitive disorder which impairs his ability to follow directions unless very clearly communication [sic] verbally or in writing. … See id. at 114 “Only a serious impediment can qualify to suspend the running of the statute.” Id. at 113.

Timothy v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims · Mar 28, 2023

Gershwin] can identify within the medical records that would have led to trigeminal neuralgia,” he opines petitioner’s immunization “should have produced an immune reaction.” (Id.) Dr. … Gadipudi’s records clearly indicate the presence of facial pain (i.e., trigeminal neuralgia) plus facial spasms (i.e., hemifacial spasms). (Ex. 4, pp. 1-6.)

US JVC Corp. v. United States

15 F. Supp. 2d 906 · United States Court of International Trade · Jul 7, 1998

These decisions were based on well-settled principles of sovereign immunity; since the United States can only be sued if it explicitly waives its sovereign immunity, and the terms of a statute waiving sovereign immunity define … Since 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (a) clearly waives the Government’s immunity from suit, the Court focuses on 19 U.S.C. § 1514 and whether it either expressly or by fair implication provides for equitable tolling.

Towne v. Commissioner

78 T.C. 791 · United States Tax Court · May 12, 1982

The parties agree that the ManuLife policy does not by itself qualify as group term life insurance. … The trust just as clearly stated that it was designed to establish a revised plan of group insurance which would include both the existing master group policy and any individual policies issued to the trustee.

Marathon Oil Co. v. United States

56 Fed. Cl. 768 · United States Court of Federal Claims · Jun 19, 2003

Thus, the language of the Federal Circuit’s opinion and judgment, both dated December 28, 2000, clearly state that the court was affirming the prior judgments of the Court of Federal Claims, not substituting its own judgment … But Marathon and Mobil have not established their entitlement to any such interest because they cannot demonstrate a waiver of sovereign immunity by the government.

Small v. United States

130 Fed. Cl. 88 · United States Court of Federal Claims · Nov 22, 2016

Cir. 2000) (explaining that EAJA *101 is a waiver of sovereign immunity). … was based on agency error, in order for a moving party to establish its status as a prevailing party.

Hickman v. United States

10 Cl. Ct. 550 · United States Court of Claims · Aug 8, 1986

The bench ruling detailed those facts which clearly established that each plaintiff properly has been classified as exempt consistent with the applicable legal standards and with the principle that FLSA exemptions must be … You cannot have an individual structuring the performance of his duties to qualify or not qualify for the FLSA exemption.

Buzzetta Constr. Corp. v. Commissioner

92 T.C. 641 · United States Tax Court · Mar 27, 1989

Respondent was not clearly required by that regulation to allow correction in this case. … That the corporation made plan contributions in excess of the section 415 maximum dollar limitations was clearly a change in the facts upon which the plan’s tax-exempt ruling was based.

Rogero v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims · Sep 27, 2017

Thus, Petitioners’ claim clearly fails under Prong 1 of Althen. C. Petitioners have failed to establish Prong 2 of Althen in this case. … Thus, Petitioners have clearly failed to establish Prong 3 as well. 84 E. This is not a close case.

Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, Inc. v. Kendall

210 F.2d 283 · Emergency Court of Appeals · May 3, 1954

Holub stated that Section 3 of Ceiling Price Regulation 5 qualifies as prepared scrap, the scrap which is usable in any one of the standard furnace or foundry operations, namely Grades 2 through 31, the specifications of … Moreover, we find that the evidence clearly preponderates in favor of the government's contention that there is a customary trade meaning of the term, "Unprepared scrap," and that such scrap consists of all not included within

Semper v. United States

100 Fed. Cl. 621 · United States Court of Federal Claims · Sep 27, 2011

Title 5 does not ignore judicial branch personnel in establishing laws relevant to the civil service. … (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3602 (a)). *636 Plaintiff argues that “Semper’s discharge without cause, if proven, clearly qualifies as an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action as envisioned by the Back Pay Act.”

Maine Community Health Options v. United States

133 Fed. Cl. 1 · United States Court of Federal Claims · Jul 31, 2017

CHO is approved by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) to offer qualified health care plans (“QHPs”). … The Secretary shall establish and administer a program of risk corridors for calendar years 2014, 2015, and 2016 under which a qualified health plan offered in the individual or small group market shall

MOURILLON

18 I. & N. Dec. 122 · Board of Immigration Appeals · Jul 1, 1981

Here, the record does not clearly show whether the petitioner's father and the.beneficiary's mother are still alive and remain married. … Therefore, it has been established that they were "children" of a common "parent" and that their relationship as stepbrother and stepsister continues to exist.

Hughes v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims · Mar 5, 2021

Richards et al., Complex Regional Pain Syndrome Following Immunization, (0) Arch. Dis. … And as special master I am not called upon (or even qualified) to make such a diagnosis myself.

Defenza v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims · Jun 16, 2026

“In such instances, clearly the special master must evaluate what evidence a claimant presents as part of determining whether the claimant makes a prima facie case.” Id. … Polakowski expressly qualified her study by acknowledging that her “ability to account for preceding respiratory/gastrointestinal illness was limited.”

Jungreis v. Commissioner

55 T.C. 581 · United States Tax Court · Dec 24, 1970

The educational expenses incurred by him were clearly for the purpose of “commencing” and “increasing,” rather than for “carrying on” or “preserving,” and therefore do not constitute allowable deductions under section 162 … Moreover, the facts of the instant case clearly give rise now to a nondeductible educational expense deduction under section 1.162-5 (b) (2) (iii), Example (2), of the 1967 regulations. 7 Cf. Jeffry L.

Colon v. United States

71 Fed. Cl. 473 · United States Court of Federal Claims · May 24, 2006

Colon bears the burden of establishing by “‘cogent and clearly convincing evidence’” that the ABCMR’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or contrary to law. Wronke v. … Consequently, the court holds that plaintiff has failed to establish that the ABCMR’s denial of Mr.

Bledsoe v. Derwinski

1 Vet. App. 32 · United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims · Sep 19, 1990

He had difficulty with school work and despite a great deal of special education never qualified for a high school diploma; he received a certificate of completion. … It follows that the decision below was not clearly erroneous. The failure to establish the permanent disability prior to the 18th birthday of the appellant’s son is dispositive.

State of California v. United States

47 Fed. Cl. 688 · United States Court of Federal Claims · Sep 26, 2000

The making of such inherently contradictory claims, however, does not establish that if one is rejected the other is necessarily justified. Rains v. … Plaintiff argues that the Tucker Act of 1887, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994), which waives sovereign immunity for contract actions, was not partially repealed by the Flood Control Act of 1928, and did not establish immunity from

RCA Corp. v. United States

12 Cl. Ct. 569 · United States Court of Claims · Jun 30, 1987

costs of the qualified film. … The court does not believe that the language of § 48(k) clearly defines “owner” only as the party bearing the risk of loss; the statutory language is ambiguous.