Case law

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  • McKibben v. Titus County Appraisal District (In Re McKibben)

    233 B.R. 378 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Texas · Apr 23, 1999

    The individual Defendants have again asserted the defense of qualified immunity from suit. … Qualified immunity protects public officials against the risk of trial and personal liability for the consequences of their actions taken to carry out their duties if there is no violation of well established law.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Coats v. Vawter (In Re Coats)

    168 B.R. 159 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas · Dec 9, 1993

    Therefore, § 106(c) does not apply to Montgomery County because, as already established, it does not enjoy sovereign immunity in the first place. … This Court agrees that Constable Bishop would have qualified immunity in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Roman Forest Public Utility District No. 3 v. Roman Forest Consolidated Public Utility District (In re Roman Forest Public Utility District No. 3)

    339 B.R. 891 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas · Feb 8, 2005

    Qualified Immunity does not Shield Individual Defendants from Deposition Even if the Individual Defendants do not have absolute legislative immunity, they next contend that they have qualified immunity. … Government officials performing discretionary functions receive qualified immunity — ie., are shielded from liability for civil damages — so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Lake Whillans Fund I LP v. Delaware Trust Company

    United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas · Apr 30, 2024

    Delaware Trust is entitled to qualified immunity for these actions. … Delaware Trust has qualified immunity for the actions challenged by Lake Whillans and Clear Harbor. Its qualified immunity would apply to both the third and fourth claims for relief.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Lankford v. Texas, Comptroller of Public Accounts (In Re Lankford)

    261 B.R. 410 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas · Mar 29, 2001

    . § 106 (a) allows the suit with this court being the only “qualified” court to decide this suit. The court conducted a hearing on the motion on February 15, 2001. … Having established the immunity from suit, this court respectfully recommends that the state consider waiving the immunity or consenting to the suit of a citizen of Texas in a court in a federal district in Texas to determine

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Blue Cactus Post, L.C. v. Dallas County Appraisal District (In Re Blue Cactus Post, L.C.)

    229 B.R. 379 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas · Jan 19, 1999

    Sovereign Immunity The DCAD asserts that sovereign immunity bars this suit against it because it is an “arm of the state,” and is therefore entitled *382 to immunity from suits in federal courts. … Also, Dallas County argues that it is barred from valuing property for tax purposes or hiring a qualified appraiser to assist with this task. 34 The DCAD counters *386 with the argument that its role is strictly valuing real

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Teraforce Technology Corp. v. Vista Controls, Inc. (In Re Teraforce Technology Corp.)

    379 B.R. 626 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas · Nov 13, 2007

    For example, in Peoples, the case that the Defendants cite to establish the elements of a tortious interference claim, Memorandum at p. 5, the defendant was a former employee who had gone to work for a competitor and subsequently … Therefore, this Court cannot hold that Curtiss-Wright is immune from liability based solely on its “non-outsider” status. 2.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • In Re Stephenson

    84 B.R. 74 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas · Mar 21, 1988

    It is well established that the government may setoff funds owed by one agency in order to collect debts owed to other agencies. … The Debtors’ claims under the 1987 Act are clearly postpetition and, therefore, cannot be offset against the FmHA’s prepetition claims.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • In Re Volpe

    100 B.R. 840 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Texas · Apr 28, 1989

    Clearly, this legislation is intended to “move” the ERISA-qualified plan, sought to be exempted by debtors such as the Volpe’s, out of the “federal law” portion of Code § 522(b)(2)(A) and “convert” it to “state law”. … Clearly, the Debtors could have consolidated their various IRA qualified accounts into one and have kept exactly the same amount of benefits.

    Cited 40 timesPublished
  • Texas v. Davis (In Re Davis)

    340 B.R. 767 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Texas · Mar 16, 2006

    Though the Eleventh Amendment is clearly not implicated in the issuance of the discharge order nor in the binding effect thereof upon the State, even if such *771 protection was available, any claim of sovereign immunity … Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 967 F.Supp. 920, 925 (S.D.Tex.1997) ["It is well established that a federal district court must generally apply an interpretation of law articulated by its circuit court of appeals.”].

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Corletta v. Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board

    531 B.R. 647 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Texas · May 19, 2015

    At the very least, this establishes that the THECB is an “agency, or. instrumentality” of Texas. … This is simply not enough to establish clear error. .

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Corletta v. Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (In re Pappas)

    517 B.R. 708 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Texas · Sep 8, 2014

    Plaintiff maintains that Muir establishes that a state entity does not qualify as a gov *721 ernmental agency if it is not an "arm of the state.” Muir, 239 B.R. at 217 . That is partially correct. … Muir holds that for an entity to assert sovereign immunity as a defense to a suit, the affected agency must be an "arm of the state.” Id.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • In Re American Coastal Energy Inc.

    399 B.R. 805 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas · Jan 15, 2009

    The TransAmerican opinion only held that a claimant may establish that its claim qualifies as an administrative expense under § 503(b)(1)(A) by demonstrating that the claim arose from a transaction with the debtor-in-possession … Since they clearly will not do so unless their claims for payment will be paid ahead of the pre-petition debts ...

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • Freudenmann v. Drainage District 2 (In Re Freudenmann)

    76 B.R. 600 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas · Jul 27, 1987

    Clearly the District has express authority to sue and to be sued in its corporate name. Equally clear is the fact that the District is concerned only with local as opposed to statewide problems. … In order to limit that jurisdiction and allow litigation in a different forum, the parties must establish that justice would be best served by the court abstaining.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Great Western Coal, Inc. v. Brown (In Re Great Western Coal, Inc.)

    146 B.R. 702 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas · May 6, 1992

    Due process was clearly served. … Though it, too, waives sovereign immunity, it fails to establish unambiguously that, the waiver extends to monetary claims. At -, 112 S.Ct. at 1015 , 117 L.Ed.2d at 188 . (emphasis added).

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • In Re Komet

    104 B.R. 799 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Texas · Jul 5, 1989

    ERISA plans which comply with Section 401(a)(13) of Title 26 (the Internal Revenue Code enactment of ERISA § 206(d)(1)) are immune from creditor attachment without further resort to whether the plans also qualify for protection … While ERISA preempts state law, 29 USC § 1144 (a), it clearly was not intended to affect the operation of other federal law....

    Declined to follow by In re Smith, 119 B.R. 262 (1990)Cited 52 timesPublished
  • In Re Crum

    414 B.R. 103 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas · Feb 20, 2009

    The parties have stipulated that the Group SAMA account is not a “qualified” retirement account; it is clearly property of the estate. … Crum clearly failed to satisfy the requirements of the exemption.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • In Re All Media Properties, Inc.

    5 B.R. 126 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas · Jun 25, 1980

    The Congressional intent is rather clearly to qualify as a petitioning creditor any party holding a non-contingent claim, leaving to later or other proceedings the issue of substantial disputes as to liability. … The evidence at trial clearly established that Artlite owed Atlas the amount of its claim when the involuntary petition was filed and it is one which is not contingent as to liability.

    Cited 251 timesPublished
  • In Re Schott

    449 B.R. 697 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Texas · Mar 16, 2011

    The debtor bears the burden of establishing that a particular property qualifies as his homestead. … The court concluded that the debtor had clearly established the 5.056 acres on the undeveloped parcel as her homestead because she had been living there. Id. at 938-39 .

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • In Re Express One International, Inc.

    217 B.R. 207 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Texas · Jan 12, 1998

    The Court was more impressed with the testimony of Sidney Hurst, who seemed extraordinarily qualified in this field. Mr. … The testimony clearly established that the parties were in constant contact during the work on the aircraft and Express One’s internal documents demonstrated that it felt that the work was progressing on schedule and certainly

    Cited 7 timesPublished

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