Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
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2.35s
243 B.R. 156 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. · Jan 5, 2000
If the Debtors in the instant case had held the subject funds for investment in a *159 new homestead, the funds clearly would be exempt under Orange Brevard. … Furthermore, the Trustee has failed to establish any factual basis for denying the Debtors’ homestead exemption in the Okeechobee property.
Cited 4 timesPublishedBrooklyn Jenapo Federal Credit Union v. Shain (In Re Shain)
47 B.R. 309 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. New York · Mar 14, 1985
It is to be noted, as the facts above clearly demonstrate, at the time the debtor filed his petition in bankruptcy, he no longer had any interest in the subject property. … (stating the date of entry or filing of the order)”; in the case of a qualified discharge, “Qualified discharge by order of the court; see order entered (or filed).
Cited 4 timesPublishedIn re 35th & Morgan Development Corp.
510 B.R. 832 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois · Apr 30, 2014
“Qualified Creditor.” … The Alleged Debtor is clearly not generally paying its debts as they become due. CONCLUSION The petitioning creditors were entitled to bring the involuntary petition against Alleged Debtor.
Cited 1 timesPublished146 B.R. 860 · United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida · Sep 24, 1992
The record as established at the duly noticed hearing reveals the following facts relevant to resolution of the Bank’s objection. Prior to 1984, the Debtors resided in New Hampshire. … therefore, on the date of the commencement of the case, the Fort Myers residence could not qualify for the homestead exemption provided by the Constitution of this State.
Cited 7 timesPublishedCraig v. Novotny (In Re Novotny)
17 B.R. 196 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. South Dakota · Jan 15, 1982
Local Rule 6(b) clearly provides a trustee must object to a debtor’s claimed exempt property no later than fifteen (15) days after the first date scheduled for the first meeting of creditors. … The report shall be filed with the court no later than 15 days after the trustee qualifies.
Cited 6 timesPublished542 B.R. 619 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia · Nov 4, 2015
The Debtor’s interest in the TRAM “is clearly a property interest encompassed by the broad scope of section 541(a).” Id. … The parties have stipulated that the TRAM plan is established by Minnesota Statutes Chapters 11A, 354, 356, 356A, and 356B. Accordingly, the Court -will look to Minnesota law to determine whether the TRAM is a trust.
Cited 4 timesPublishedCuda v. Nigro (In Re Northview Motors, Inc.)
202 B.R. 389 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · Nov 14, 1996
. § 9203(a) (ie., attachment had occurred), 5 and (b) was perfected at the time of the commencement of this case, thereby immunizing said interest from avoidance by the trustee. … Because Chrysler has neither alleged facts establishing this form of inequity, nor any facts from which another form of inequity regarding the creditors in this case may be established, Trasks’ Charolais and DiSanto are inapposite
Reversed on other grounds by Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corporation Joseph P. Nigro, Trustee Northview Motors, Inc. Frank P. Cuda Joann Cuda, 186 F.3d 346 (1999)Cited 11 timesPublished8 B.R. 882 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. South Dakota · Feb 3, 1981
However, a person who may qualify as a resident for purposes of obtaining a hunting or fishing license may not qualify for the purposes of voting. … The particular facts in this case clearly indicate that Debtors have sufficient interest in the estate to justify such a holding.
Cited 7 timesPublished123 B.R. 749 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Michigan · Dec 10, 1990
The third factor is also met, as farmland and a farm house are clearly “traditional farm assets.” … We therefore hold that the $31,-200.00 in farm rental income qualifies as farm income for purposes of § 101(17) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Cited 10 timesPublishedIn Re Shangri-La Nursing Center, Inc.
31 B.R. 367 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. New York · Jun 29, 1983
It is a well established rule in Mary *371 land that parol or extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to add to, Contradict or vary the terms of a written contract. Kverda v. … In short, we find that an objective analysis of the pertinent terms of the agreement clearly favor an interpretation of it as one intended for security thus rendering it immune from rejection by the trustee. D.
Cited 18 timesPublished135 B.R. 717 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. New Hampshire · Dec 20, 1991
With regard to the question of immunity and the pending state criminal proceeding, bankruptcy courts have the statutory power to grant use immunity to persons required to provide information in a bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C … This circuit has held that any such immunity granted insulates the person given the immunity from state prosecution based on the information disclosed. In re Bianchi, 542 F.2d 98 (1st Cir.1976).
Cited 14 timesPublished74 B.R. 401 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio · May 29, 1987
Each creditor grounds its motion upon the alleged failure of the debtors to qualify as “family farmers” under the new chapter 12 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. … Had the debtors filed jointly in 1986, it is mathematically clear that they would qualify as debtors to seek relief of chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Cited 19 timesPublishedAckley v. Ackley (In Re Ackley)
186 B.R. 1005 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia · Dec 19, 1994
West (In re Long), 794 F.2d 928, 931 (4th Cir.1986). 3 Plaintiff argues that the label affixed to the award in state court does not conclusively establish the nature of the obligation in question. … Given such ambiguity, this Court, at best, can only conclude that the award’s resulting immunity from remarriage is not a reliable indicator of purpose.
Cited 1 timesPublished211 B.R. 399 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Kansas · Aug 5, 1997
Creditors like Lyons argue Congress omitted the phrase in order to preclude the fees of debtors’ attorneys from qualifying as administrative expenses. … The provision does not generally make administrative expenses of all the fees charged by a chapter 12 or 13 debtor’s attorney but instead establishes an exception to the general rule set out in (a)(4)(A) that courts may not
Cited 14 timesPublishedShafman v. United States Department of the Treasury (In Re Shafman)
267 B.R. 709 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. West Virginia · Aug 2, 2001
Innocent Spouse Relief Under § 6015(c) For Taxpayers No Longer Married Although Shafman does not qualify for innocent spouse relief under § 6015(b), she does qualify for limited liability under § 6015(c). 1. … Shafman clearly demonstrated a lack of knowledge as to the majority of the financial affairs of the marriage and of Tenney’s business transactions in 1991, and the IRS did not prove otherwise.
Cited 1 timesPublished398 B.R. 699 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Idaho · Jan 6, 2009
An Idaho debtor is permitted to claim an exemption in a qualifying homestead. … Debtors did not, therefore, qualify for an automatic homestead exemption.
Cited 9 timesPublishedIn Re Cold Harbor Associates, L.P.
204 B.R. 904 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia · Jan 16, 1997
The contract by which Tes Lawn Service was employed clearly states that the agreement is between Tes and Cold Harbor Associates. … Although the bills were sent to Drueker & Falk, they quite clearly state that they are charges to Cold Harbor Associates, L.P.
Cited 49 timesPublished332 B.R. 614 · United States Bankruptcy Court, C.D. California · Oct 13, 2005
Debtor argues that he qualifies for the larger exemption found at Cal. Civ. … A twelve month period is clearly the appropriate measure for determining a Cal. Civ.
Cited 3 timesPublished161 B.R. 479 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. California · Dec 1, 1993
reason to believe that it would not qualify for employment. … As in Grabill, the Court concludes that the claimant has failed to establish that this is an appropriate ease.
Cited 4 timesPublishedMiller v. The United States of America
United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Utah · Mar 31, 2020
Cir. 2004) (“If a statute is susceptible to a plausible reading under which sovereign immunity is not waived, the statute fails to establish an unambiguous waiver and sovereign immunity therefore remains intact.” … The statute contains no exceptions, qualifiers, or carve-outs in its language, “indicating a clear legislative intent to be as broad as possible in abrogating sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy context.”63 Of particular
Cited 0 timesUnknown
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