Case law

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  • In Re Zawisza

    73 B.R. 929 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · May 27, 1987

    However, clearly Kras is not controlling, being easily distinguishable. … IT HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT THE DEBTOR DOES NOT HAVE REGULAR INCOME Geriatric next asserts that the Debt- or does not have regular income, as required by § 109(e), and consequently is not qualified to file a Chapter

    Cited 22 timesPublished
  • In Re Andreotti

    16 B.R. 28 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. California · Oct 23, 1981

    The debtor, on the other hand, asserts that even if he had not qualified for these exemptions at the time of the filing of the involuntary petition, he had qualified for these exemptions on the date that relief was ordered … In this case, debtor was clearly head of a family before the separation agreement and his taking of a separate abode. But for the agreement and his physical absence, no other changes occurred.

    Cited 24 timesPublished
  • Flynn v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Flynn)

    169 B.R. 1007 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia · May 13, 1994

    Russellville Production Credit Ass’n, 777 F.2d 1544, 1549 (11th Cir.1985) (finding the “established rule” to be that “punitive damages cannot be recovered from the United States or its agencies.”); Painter v. … The waiver of immunity in this case, however, is found in the Bankruptcy Code rather than any sort of generic “sue and be sued” provision, and the former Fifth Circuit clearly recognized that Congress could otherwise waive

    Reversed on other grounds by United States v. Flynn (In Re Flynn), 185 B.R. 89 (1995)Cited 23 timesPublished
  • In Re Murray

    352 B.R. 340 · United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Georgia · Aug 22, 2006

    The instant case clearly does not involve a “transformation” scenario or even a refinancing scenario. … As such, this case is clearly distinguishable from the cases cited by Debtors and the rules developed in each are not applicable.

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Matter of Lumara Foods of America, Inc.

    50 B.R. 809 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Jun 12, 1985

    Similarly, the taxing priority of Section 64a(4) was modified to expand the enumerated list of qualified taxes and was clarified to expressly require that these taxes were to be pre-petition taxes. Id. at 357-358. … It is noted that when Lumara filed its petition for relief it did not become immune to the reach of federal, state or local taxing authorities. Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441 , 24 S.Ct. 695 , 48 L.Ed. 1060 (1904).

    Cited 38 timesPublished
  • In Re Stoecker

    202 B.R. 429 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois · Oct 17, 1996

    Thus, the Court finds that the sale from Prewitt Leasing to Chandler qualifies as an “occasional sale” exempt from proper assessment of the Illinois use tax. … erroneous. 29 The District Court clearly held *453 that the NPL shall be considered prima facie evidence of the Debtor’s willfulness.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • In Re Pacific Rollforming, LLC

    415 B.R. 750 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. California · Sep 30, 2009

    Dersovitz’s contention as to a December assignment clearly conflicts with his sworn Declaration filed May 15, 2009. … Even if Dersovitz were a qualified petitioner, the evidence established that abstention is appropriate in this case.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Johnson v. Lindsey

    16 B.R. 211 · United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida · Dec 2, 1981

    There is no doubt that the filing of a petition in bankruptcy does not immunize a debtor from criminal prosecution. … It is well established, however, that the Bankruptcy Court will not permit the State to use criminal prosecution for the sole purpose of collecting a debt dischargeable in bankruptcy, or to use law enforcement as a collection

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • In Re Lumb

    12 B.R. 862 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Wisconsin · Jul 23, 1981

    Alternatively, the trustee argued that if the debtor did qualify for the exemption, he should not be allowed to claim more than half of it because the property was jointly owned. … Eloff are all present in this case but, more importantly, the fact that the debtor had to leave home or risk being held in contempt of the Court Commissioner’s order as compared with Edward Riesch who left home voluntarily, clearly

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • GAF Holdings, LLC v. Rinaldi (In Re Farmland Industries, Inc.)

    376 B.R. 718 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Missouri · Jul 17, 2007

    No qualifying Competing Bids were received in accordance with the Procedures Order. … Even if the Court determined that GAF is not bound by collateral estop-pel to the Court’s earlier findings that bar GAF’s complaint, the Defendants are still immune from GAF’s lawsuit under § 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Mid-Continent Electric, Inc. v. Florida (In re Mid-Continent Electric, Inc.)

    278 B.R. 601 · United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida · Apr 11, 2002

    There are sufficient allegations in this Count to establish that there is a case or controversy which involves the interpretation of federal law, a matter which is clearly within the competence and jurisdiction of this Court … It would be clearly inappropriate to have this issue be resolved in a non-bankruptcy forum.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • In Re Murray

    346 B.R. 237 · United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Georgia · Jun 6, 2006

    Debtors have provided no authority in support of an alternate conclusion other than the clearly distinguishable case of In re Horn, 11 which involved a multiple transaction scenario. 12 Nuvell’s claim, therefore, qualifies … , the words should be read term-by-term to refer to any claim that is, first, allowed, and, second, secured. 21 The court in Brown stated that “the relationship between § 506(a) and ‘allowed secured claim’ in § 506(d), [established

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • State of Connecticut v. Glidden (In Re Glidden)

    8 B.R. 128 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Connecticut · Jan 5, 1981

    . § 602 , in order to qualify Connecticut for federal funds for its Aid to Families With Dependent Children Program (AFDC). … See also 11 U.S.C. § 106 (c) which provides that “notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity (1) a provision of this title that contains .. .

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Falck Properties, LLC v. Walnut Capital Real Estate Services, Inc. (In re Brownsville Property Corp.)

    473 B.R. 89 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · Jun 7, 2012

    The Court thus finds that a sufficient nexus exists between the case filed by the Plaintiff and the main bankruptcy case to at least establish related to jurisdiction 3 and the Motion to Remand must therefore be denied. … The sole remaining argument in the Motion to Dismiss is that the Defendants are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from this suit (¶ 10(b)).

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • In Re Damast

    136 B.R. 11 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. New Hampshire · Dec 27, 1991

    retirement plans established by a corporation and which are qualified under IRC § 401 does not apply to this debtor because he is no longer a New York domiciliary. … Any other conclusion would lead to the anomalous result of an ERISA-qualifying pension or similar plan being immune from *16 creditor execution outside of bankruptcy but reachable by the same creditors once the debtor has

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • In Re Brackett

    259 B.R. 768 · United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida · Mar 6, 2001

    The plain language of Fla.Stat. ch. 222.21 clearly provides that it can be used to exempt a plan qualified under §§ 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408 or 409 of the Internal Revenue Code. … Consequently, where a plan does not qualify as a retirement plan under ERISA, it may still be exempt under Fla.Stat. ch. 222.21 as long as it meets the requirements established by the Internal Revenue Code.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Long v. Donahue (In Re Long)

    148 B.R. 904 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Missouri · Dec 21, 1992

    Clearly, the trial court’s intent was to divide the pensions as marital property. … ... shall be modifiable only for the purpose of establishing or maintaining the order as a qualified domestic relations order or to revise or conform its terms so as to effectuate the expressed intent of order.”

    Cited 25 timesPublished
  • Forell v. Kent County Treasurer (In Re Kamstra)

    51 B.R. 826 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Michigan · Jul 30, 1985

    These two clauses of the Constitution establish the parameters of our discussion. … Clearly, then subordination would deprive the city and the county of private property for public use without just compensation.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • In Re Franklino

    329 B.R. 363 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Rhode Island · Aug 15, 2005

    Laws § 9-26-4.1(a)(2005)(em-phasis added). 1 The Trustee contends that the Debtor fails to qualify for the Rhode Island homestead exemption on the ground that he neither occupies, nor has he established the intent as of the … The (unobjected to) and uncorroborated statement attributed to Scott is clearly hearsay, and is so self serving that it is given no weight or deference. 3 .

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • In Re McMahon

    60 B.R. 632 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Kentucky · May 5, 1986

    The Court further notes that the debtors have no equity in the houseboat, as the amount owed to Stockyards Bank and the Bank of Commerce on the houseboat, was clearly in excess of its value. … It is well-established that exemption laws in favor of the debtor are to be liberally construed. In re Bennett, 36 B.R. 893, 894 (Bkrtcy., W.D.Ky.1984).

    Cited 10 timesPublished

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