Case law

In Re Lynch

187 B.R. 536 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Kentucky · Aug 22, 1995

Clearly, the present statute is in the disjunctive. It exempts property covered by the statute from execution or garnishment or attachment or sale to satisfy a judgment or order. … However, the lien does not qualify as a statutory lien under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (53); it does qualify as a judicial lien as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101 (36), which is made fully effective by statute.

Richardson v. Countrywide Home Loans (In Re Gregory)

316 B.R. 82 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Michigan · Oct 7, 2004

Subsections (4) through (8) in turn establish exceptions to the general rule established in subsection(3). 20 *95 The Chapter 7 trustee argues that the exception provided by subsection (5)(d) “clearly provides that in order … The Chapter 7 trustee does not qualify for this limited exception. First, Mich. Comp.

In re Peralta

599 B.R. 759 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. New Jersey · Apr 16, 2019

Further, the document clearly lists Melinda Middlebrooks as the Debtors' attorney. … P. 4004 and 4007 ] are 'jurisdictional' or otherwise immune from tolling based on equitable principles." Id . at 188.

Naranjo v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In Re Naranjo)

261 B.R. 248 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. California · Apr 10, 2001

The 1998 Federal income tax return shows that the Plaintiffs qualified for a Federal tax refund that year in the amount of $1,326. … The 1999 California income tax return shows that the Plaintiffs qualified for a State tax refund that year in the amount of $2,578.

In Re Look

383 B.R. 210 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Maine · Mar 6, 2008

“While there is temptation to look for a federal definition of ‘purchase money security interest,’ prominent use of a term of art so closely identified with the Uniform Commercial Code and established state law counsels reference … “[T]he plain language of the hanging paragraph of section 1325(a) clearly and unambiguously calls for an all-or-nothing rule....” In re Sanders, 377 B.R. at 864.

In re Sharif

564 B.R. 328 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois · Feb 16, 2017

The Trustee has immunity for actions undertaken pursuant to a court or-, der. A bankruptcy Trustee “is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for carrying out the orders of the bankruptcy court.” … Salem, however, cannot wait until a later date in the hopes of establishing standing today.

Don Murphy, Lorraine Dille Williams, Robert Nichols Flint Dille, & Team Angry Filmworks, Inc. v. Bernstein (In re Dille Family Trust)

598 B.R. 179 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · Feb 20, 2019

Clearly this is not what Congress intended when it enacted Article I, § 8, Cl. 4 of the Constitution, which provides that "Congress shall have the power ... to establish ... uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies." … These circumstances clearly reflect an intent to not surrender the right until such time that the proposed settlement was approved and consummated (which was never done).

Oyster Club of Greenwich Ltd. Partnership v. Mianus River Associates (In re Oyster Club of Greenwich Ltd. Partnership)

98 B.R. 654 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Connecticut · Apr 18, 1989

That case is clearly inapposite. By the plaintiff’s logic, it may avoid the consequences of a notice to quit by merely closing its business. That logic is flawed. … If it didn’t, it cannot immunize itself from the service of a notice to quit by hiding behind locked doors.

In Re Roland

224 B.R. 401 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Missouri · Oct 14, 1997

DISCUSSION Section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code defines who may qualify as a debtor eligible for bankruptcy relief. … That court also rejected the reasoning of In re Copman and In re Duncan, finding that “there is no basis in either the text or in the legislative history, for requiring the creditor to establish a causal connection between

Scott v. American Security Insurance Co. (In re Scott)

572 B.R. 492 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York · Jun 14, 2017

ASIC argues that the Debtor has not established and cannot establish the existence of a contract between ASIC and the Debtor, and that this lack of contractual privity bars the Debtor’s breach of contract claim. … See Marathon, 458 U.S. at 69 - 70, 102 S.Ct. 2858 ("Our precedents clearly establish that only controversies [involving public rights] may be removed from Art.

In re Miller

511 B.R. 621 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Missouri · May 15, 2014

This Court believes it clearly is. . Kelly, 479 U.S. 36 , 107 S.Ct. 353 (1986). . Kelly, 479 U.S. at 51 , 107 S.Ct. 353 . . Kelly, 479 U.S. at 50 , 107 S.Ct. 353 (emphasis added). . … BAP 2004) (fines levied against debtor were to encourage him to comply with an environmental clean-up order, and therefore were clearly punitive in nature). . E.g., In re Long, 774 F.2d 875, 879 (8th Cir.1985). .

Zamora v. Jacobs (In Re Jacobs)

403 B.R. 565 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois · Apr 9, 2009

Moreover, the subject of the purported embezzlement must qualify as property that can be embezzled. … Once the contributions have made it to the plan account, they are clearly assets of the plan and the ERISA fiduciary trust duties have undoubtedly kicked in.

Office of the United States Trustee v. Miller (In Re Miller)

302 B.R. 495 · United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Dec 10, 2003

Struggling to qualify for a loan, Debtors ultimately obtained a mortgage through a broker on the secondary market at ten percent interest and bought a house for $123,777.00. … That is, they have held that the ability to pay creditors or fund a Chapter 13 plan alone never is sufficient to establish substantial abuse.

Holber v. M & T Bank (In Re Scheffler)

471 B.R. 464 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jun 5, 2012

The evidence is clearly insufficient for me to determine the value of the Home as of that time. … This is clearly insufficient evidence to establish an accurate value for the Home.

In re Arroyo

544 B.R. 751 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico · Nov 9, 2015

The movant “must either clearly establish a manifest error of law or must present newly discovered evidence.” Id. See also; BBVA v. Vazquez (In re Vazquez), 471 B.R. 752, 760 (1st Cir. BAP 2012), citing Aybar v. … The filing fee may be paid in instalments directly by the debtor, particularly in Chapter 7 cases in which there is no plan and the debtor does not qualify for a fee waiver pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1930 (f)(1), or it may be

Homeside Lending, Inc. v. Denny (In Re Denny)

242 B.R. 593 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Maryland · Dec 29, 1999

Giving due weight to each word in the phrase “sold at a foreclosure sale,” this court finds that the preposition “at” clearly indicates the specific event of the foreclosure sale. … Allen, 152 F.3d 283 , 288 n. 6 (4th Cir.1998) (“[It] is [a] fundamental canon of statutory construction that a qualifying phrase refers solely to its immediate antecedent”), it does not make that term ambiguous.

In re Kology

499 B.R. 20 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 24, 2013

Next, the Debtors’ house is unquestionably a “home,” and the evidence clearly establishes that the Debtors have occupied and intended to occupy their house as a principal residence since at least 2010 when the fifth-wheel … The evidence clearly establishes that the Debtors occupy their house, which is located on Lot 4, as a principal residence.

Larimore v. Gulsby (In re Craft Plumbing Service)

53 B.R. 654 · United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida · Sep 27, 1985

transfers were preferential transfers in that they were made by Craft Plumbing while it was insolvent, within one year prior to the filing of the Petition for Relief, and that since the recepients of the transfers were clearly … In addition, the transfer of title to the automobile was, obviously, an attempt by Gulsby to immunize the automobile from any claim of the Trustee of Craft Plumbing by placing the title in the name of his son.

Romo v. Montemayor (In re Montemayor)

547 B.R. 684 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas · Mar 9, 2016

But see [ECF No. 35]. e. that he had been pre-qualified for a home mortgage from Key Mortgage, a firm that Debtor had previously worked with, but the financing was contingent on the discharge being granted. … It can hardly be said that Romo was unaware of the holding in Celotex , which as discussed above clearly provides that a district court may grant summary judgment sua sponte “so long as the losing party was on notice that

Fowler v. Jenkins (In Re Jenkins)

258 B.R. 251 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Alabama · Jan 18, 2001

Rather, the action is one in tort for damages by an exception to the qualified immunity of a co-employee under Ala.Code § 25 — 5—11(a). See Johnson v. Asphalt Hot Mix, 565 So.2d 219 (Ala.1990). … To be successful in establishing that a particular debt qualifies for the exception to a discharge for a debt that accrues as a result of a “willful and malicious injury by the debtor,” under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(6), the creditor