Case law

In Re Wampler

302 B.R. 601 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Indiana · Aug 25, 2003

Accordingly, the party challenging conversion bears the burden of establishing bad faith by a preponderance of evidence. … Clearly, the Debtor’s creditors will be adversely impacted by conversion.

Rodriguez v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In Re Rodriguez)

396 B.R. 436 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas · Sep 18, 2008

Upon receiving a discharge, the debtor is immune from personal liability on any discharged debt. … The homes are Plaintiffs’ homesteads that qualified as exempt property. Exempt property is not property of the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Jacksonville Riverfront Development, Ltd.

215 B.R. 239 · United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida · Nov 10, 1997

a plan with a reasonable possibility of confirmation, or commences payments to creditors whose claims are secured by the subject real estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (d)(3) (emphasis added). 5 This Court finds that Congress has clearly … The Court is conscious of the fact that the instant case does not qualify as a “single asset real estate" case as defined under the Bankruptcy Code because the debtor's secured debts exceed $4,000,000.

Hunter v. Sowers (In Re Sowers)

229 B.R. 151 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Oct 27, 1998

Clearly not disclosing information at a § 341 meeting constitutes a concealment occurring after the filing of the bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 341 (a). … First, there is no question that testimony given at a § 341 meeting, and statements or omissions contained in a debt- or’s Bankruptcy Schedules qualify as occurring under oath for purposes of § 727(a)(4)(A).

Bossert v. United States (In Re Bossert)

201 B.R. 553 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Washington · Oct 16, 1996

Section 507 establishes a priority scheme for paying claims. … Because they were punitive, rather than compensatory, these pre-filing penalties did not qualify for priority treatment under the terms of § 507(a)(7)(G). Ibid.

In Re Ehrich

110 B.R. 424 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Minnesota · Feb 14, 1990

Johnson I, the broad language of the statutes clearly allows Debtor to invoke them to try to support that claim. There is no reported case on point, where a court applies MINN. … First, the statute itself clearly distinguishes between a “sale” and a “conveyance.” MINN.

Lynn v. Grigsby (In Re White Motor Corp.)

99 B.R. 783 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · May 19, 1989

The plan was established to qualify under ERISA and Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code. (Joint Exh. B). … Clearly, the Committee had no established review procedure and their counsel was unreasonably dilatory in informing Plaintiff the manner in which his claim would be reviewed.

In Re Newport Creamery, Inc.

265 B.R. 614 · United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida · Aug 14, 2001

It is not qualified to do business in the state of Florida. The petition filed in this case lists the street address of the Debtor as: 208 W. Main Road, Middleton, Rhode Island. … Clearly the assets used in the Debtor’s restaurant operations are its “principal” assets, rather than its 55 percent interest in a recently acquired real estate project.

In Re Pollard

296 B.R. 531 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Oklahoma · Jun 23, 2003

This Court has noted that the presumption represents a “policy goal established by Congress that allows the court to use its discretion in applying section 707(b).” … Clearly, the burden of proof and burden of production in a motion to dismiss for substantial abuse rest with the moving party.

In Re Chateaugay Corp.

116 B.R. 887 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York · Jul 11, 1990

A review of the legal *907 precedents clearly establishes that the bond replacements qualify as both a substituted contract and novation. … The documentation between the parties clearly establishes that the Aetna bond No. 018 S 71955 was substituted for the three pre-existing bonds.

In re Pereau

40 B.R. 500 · United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida · Jul 13, 1984

There can be no doubt of when Amoco first learned of the debtor’s having filed bankruptcy nor can Amoco argue that the debtor’s conduct was in any way qualified or ambiguous. … The question of whether the debtor failed to give Amoco timely payments of amounts due does not appear to contain a notice problem but clearly raises issues of whether a material default existed and, assuming that it did,

Barrett v. Sallie Mae Servicing (In Re Barrett)

339 B.R. 435 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Dec 14, 2004

In fact to the contrary, it was clearly shown that the Debtor’s mental *442 difficulties do not rise to the level to enable the Debtor to qualify for Social Security Disability benefits. … This Court finds that compliance with the ICRP is not necessary to establish good faith.

Speciner v. Gettinger Associates (In Re Brooklyn Overall Co.)

57 B.R. 999 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. New York · Mar 4, 1986

The trustee accepted the position and qualified on November 9, 1984. … The record clearly establishes that the debtor, on September 11, 1984, during the so-called gap period, transferred to the defendants “property of the estate” as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(1). 2.

In Re Coastal Equities, Inc.

33 B.R. 898 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. California · Sep 28, 1983

The Plan clearly directs that investors be put to an election. … This would clearly be an unfair result since it would serve to put Class 6 and 7 claimants in a no-lose situation.

Neuner v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield (In re Lymecare, Inc.)

301 B.R. 662 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. New Jersey · Nov 5, 2003

FEHBP is clearly a “governmental plan” excluded from ERISA requirements. B. Preemption. … The cited regulation clearly prohibits suit against the carriers or the carriers’ subcontractors in lieu of the OPM.

In re World Imports, Ltd.

511 B.R. 738 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jun 18, 2014

Those dates were within 20 days prior to bankruptcy, and the claims, they argue, would therefore qualify for administrative priority. … That is indeed the case, so long as the state law does contravene an established federal interest. O’Melveny & Myers v.

In Re Ridgley

81 B.R. 65 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Oregon · Dec 4, 1987

This is clearly not correct because, as has been pointed out, the definition of “transfer” is broad enough to include the fixing of a lien. … Although interest is not specifically included in the language of § 507(a)(7) which delineates those taxes which qualify for priority treatment, that section does refer to “allowed unsecured claims”.

Mendelson v. Hargrove (In Re Mirkin)

100 B.R. 221 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · May 25, 1989

The Defendants, meanwhile, clearly recorded their “second mortgage” before the mortgage now held by the Plaintiff. We find that the statutory law clearly supports the Defendants’ position. … Decisions of that Court, consistent with these statutes, have established that: (1) The priority of mortgages is generally established by which mortgage is left for recording first, with the first in time having priority.

In Re Ohio Corrugating Co.

115 B.R. 572 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Apr 12, 1990

The Sixth Circuit held that Section 1113 encompasses retiree benefits, and, therefore, it was not necessary for the premiums to qualify as an administrative expense because they were payable under § 1113. … by the Bankruptcy Code, especially with the priority scheme established by § 507 and § 1129(9)(B).

Matter of Milleson

83 B.R. 696 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Nebraska · Mar 8, 1988

“Such a substitute must clearly both compensate for present value and insure the safety of the principal.” … This statement, however, must be qualified by the fifth amendment and by the explicit language of 11 U.S.C. §§ 363 (() and 363(e). Under § 363(0, the debtor may use, sell or lease property under the Chapter 12 plan.