Case law

In Re Amalgamated Foods, Inc.

41 B.R. 616 · United States Bankruptcy Court, C.D. California · Jul 23, 1984

I do think the section clearly voices a policy of speedy disposition. This clear statement of legislative policy seems to me to control. … I do think that a bankruptcy judge is institutionally qualified to hear and decide issues of just this sort. Indeed, on issues of this sort, he may be rather better qualified than many others.

In Re Oakley Custom Homes, Inc.

168 B.R. 232 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Colorado · Mar 31, 1994

An entity known as Creekside Partnership was established by IFM, a business partly or wholly owned by Mr. Kelley, and the Alleged Debtor. … Chandler was not a qualified petitioning creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 303 (b). Thus, there were no qualified petitioning creditors in the case. VI. DISMISSAL OF INVOLUNTARY PETITION 48.

In Re Pameco Corp.

356 B.R. 327 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York · Nov 22, 2006

The Payment Constitutes a Transfer of the Debtor's Property A prepetition transfer may not be avoided as a preference under the Bankruptcy *334 Code unless it qualifies as a "transfer of an interest of the debtor in property … This is not enough, and Defendant has not established a defense under § 547(c)(1). B.

In Re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp.

370 B.R. 90 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York · Jun 13, 2007

Therefore, the Court finds that Standard has failed to establish that the balancing of the equities favors the relief sought. Therefore, the second prong of the two-prong test has not been established. … Claim 13075 does not qualify as an informal proof of claim.

Travelers Express Co. v. Washington (In Re Washington)

105 B.R. 947 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. California · Oct 5, 1989

There is no dispute over whether INSTA CHECK or its principals qualify under this Division. 6 . See note 7, infra. 7 . … Clearly, statutory construction of bankruptcy laws must begin with the language of the statute itself (United States v.

In re Michigan Biodiesel, LLC

466 B.R. 413 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Michigan · Oct 31, 2011

According to the Debtor, the chemical and physical properties of glycerin make it qualify as a “green” or alternative source of energy. … they create the false impression that the Debtor received and shipped product to and from Bangor, when the testimony clearly establishes that no such shipments took place.

Burner v. Security State Bank (In Re Burner)

109 B.R. 216 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Texas · Dec 26, 1989

Clearly, the security interest in the stock was perfected by pledge when the Bank took possession of the stock certificates and accompanying documents. Tex. … In conclusion, the proof offered by the Debtor fails to establish inequitable conduct which satisfies the test stated in Mobile.

Reitmeyer v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Revenue (In Re Pompeo)

195 B.R. 43 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · Apr 24, 1996

However, because this interest is clearly a lien, it would be subordinated to any priority claims under 11 U.S.C. § 724 (b)(2). … Such interest, if it is to receive any protection under the Bankruptcy Code, must qualify as a lien. 17 III. Whether the Commonwealth’s interest established pursuant to 47 Pa.SA. § 4-477(d)(3) qualifies as a lien?

In Re Betts

165 B.R. 233 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois · Jan 18, 1994

A judge is presumed qualified to hear a proceeding and the movant has the burden of proving otherwise. Idaho v. Freeman, 478 F.Supp. 33 (D.Idaho 1979). … Clearly the actions of Judge White in entering the order were acts performed in his judicial capacity. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-227 , 108 S.Ct. 538, 543-544 , 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988).

Adams v. Volpitto (In Re Volpitto)

455 B.R. 273 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia · Mar 22, 2011

APM timely obtained an extension until October 15, 2007 to establish and make any additional 2006 contributions, and the deadline to establish and tender any contributions for 2007 was not until April 15, 2008. … The Plan and the plan summary clearly state that contributions are discretionary.

Novak v. Univ. of Miami (In re Demitrus)

586 B.R. 88 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Connecticut · Feb 27, 2018

The Direct PLUS Loan program was established by Congress for the purpose of allowing eligible parents to enable their dependent children to pursue their courses of *92 study in college. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087a(a). … As long as "two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective." See FCC v. NextWave Pers.

Jones v. Burgess (In Re Burgess)

1 B.R. 421 · United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Tennessee · Dec 5, 1979

Since it establishes a definite time after which a bankrupt can no longer successfully claim property as exempt this approach obviously promotes an orderly administration on bankruptcy cases. … Thus, if the status of title is determinative, either the filing of the petition or the trustee’s acceptance could qualify as the deadline for the filing of amendments.

In Re Tinti Const. Co., Inc.

29 B.R. 971 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Wisconsin · May 27, 1983

In his efforts to save his business, he then established Brooke Construction, Inc. (Brooke) on or about February, 1983. … The courts, however, have consistently held that collective bargaining agreements are not immune from rejection under s. 365.

In Re Bova

211 B.R. 803 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Aug 14, 1997

Gowen noted that, at that time, spousal immunity barred a claim of the Debtor against his wife’s coverage. … Gowen’s testimony was quite convincing in establishing that these hopes were unrealistic.

In Re Sea Air Shuttle Corp.

168 B.R. 501 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico · Jun 14, 1994

November 2, 1992, was established as the bar date for filing claims in the Chapter 7 case. … These amendments are especially relevant here because they clearly demonstrate that only claimholders who in fact filed proofs of claim in the Chapter 11 case may have their claims treated as filed in the Chapter 7 case.

In Re Young

276 B.R. 683 · United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida · Feb 19, 2002

September 2000: 15 days Or in all, a total of 43 days out of a minimum of 91 days required to qualify for Florida exemptions or a total of 77 days from the date of the purchase of the Condo. … to established a permanent residence in Florida, clearly whatever happened after the purchase warrants but one conclusion, that at the time they filed the Petition, they did not reside and no longer had any intention to

In Re Watkins

216 B.R. 394 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Texas · Aug 6, 1997

In addition, they will qualify for Medicare and all of the other government programs for which we all pay high taxes. … Clearly they knew they were going to file bankruptcy when that debt was incurred.

Callahan v. Petro Stopping Center 72 (In re Lambert Oil Co.)

347 B.R. 173 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Virginia · Aug 3, 2006

Thus, the bankruptcy court concluded that the transactions did not qualify for the contemporaneous transfer for new value defense. … Accordingly, Petro does not qualify for the ordinary course of business defense. IV. CONCLUSION.

Barciz v. Farmers Citizens Bank (In Re Barciz)

123 B.R. 771 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Jun 29, 1990

A later case citing Brown further establishes this point. … The Debtor’s argument is clearly not on point for the purposes of this decision.

Hoarty v. Midwest Carriers Corp. (In Re Best Refrigerated Express, Inc.)

168 B.R. 978 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Nebraska · Apr 22, 1994

Consideration of a summary judgment motion at this juncture is appropriate because there is no issue as to whether Midwest qualifies as a small business. … The trustee’s argument that the “no longer transporting property” requirement of Section 2(a)(f)(l)(A) applies to Section 2(a)(f)(9) is incorrect because the statute clearly limits the “no longer transporting property” clause