Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • State v. Peyton

    29 Wash. App. 701 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jun 30, 1981

    In a 55-page majority opinion that discusses the leading studies on the issue of conviction proneness, Hovey concludes that the petitioner failed to establish that California death-qualified juries were so prosecution prone … As for Mathis, his attorney did present two witnesses tending to establish an alibi defense.

    Cited 34 timesPublished
  • Roeder Co. v. K & E Moving & Storage Co.

    4 P.3d 839 · Court of Appeals of Washington · May 30, 2000

    The record establishes that railroads paid significant amounts for both easements and fee simple purchases. [17] Therefore, the negligible consideration alone does not negate the conclusion that, when read in light of Brown … Courts must "conduct a deed-by-deed analysis to ascertain whether the parties clearly and expressly limited or qualified the interest granted, considering the express language, the form of the instrument, and the surrounding

    Cited 19 timesPublished
  • State v. Aaron

    57 Wash. App. 277 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 19, 1990

    Murphy 2 and a number of other *281 Washington cases 3 clearly establish the impropriety of admitting such hearsay evidence. … ER 702 provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience

    Cited 29 timesPublished
  • King Ex Rel. King v. Snohomish County

    21 P.3d 1151 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Apr 25, 2001

    King, stating that he did not believe the County was liable for her son's injury because of immunity statutorily afforded the County. … The Court held, however, that the plaintiffs could not establish the third factor requiring justifiable reliance.

    Reversed by King v. Snohomish County, 146 Wash. 2d 420 (2002)Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Diamond "B" Constructors, Inc. v. Granite Falls School District

    117 Wash. App. 157 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Apr 14, 2003

    By stating only a “preference,” not a requirement, Ennes’ message clearly did not rule out Sound Energy. VII. … There are other qualified installers. VIII. The District’s Arguments: The District makes two additional arguments.

    Cited 22 timesPublished
  • State Of Washington v. Damien Andrew Daniels

    437 P.3d 723 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 25, 2019

    However, under the Drug Court Eligibility Criteria in the manual for the King County Adult Diversion Court (the Manual), felony assault and attempt to elude do not qualify as crimes eligible for DDC. … This provision clearly serves to mitigate against the risk of misinterpreting the statute to require prosecutor consent for treatment outside the therapeutic court context.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Micahn T. Carter v. Mary E. Jones

    Court of Appeals of Washington · Dec 30, 2025

    My duties were never clearly explained to me, so I stepped in wherever I could. … Issue 5: What measure of fault must a defamation plaintiff establish to defeat a qualified privilege? Answer 5: Knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • State v. Rose

    7 Wash. App. 176 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jun 26, 1972

    The record clearly establishes that the defendant, Stanley D. Rose, and companion, Donald F. … Ses., which became effective August 9, 1971. 4 The record clearly establishes that the two officers approached Mr. Rose from two different directions. 5 Some municipal ordinances do define such a crime.

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • Bremerton Public Safety Ass'n v. City of Bremerton

    104 Wash. App. 226 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jan 12, 2001

    But “eligible” means “qualified.” Webster’s II College Dictionary (1999), at 365. … And, as stated above, “otherwise eligible” means “otherwise qualified.”

    Cited 25 timesPublished
  • Olympic Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Department of Revenue

    163 Wash. App. 298 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Aug 29, 2011

    But the burden is on the party asserting the deduction to show that it qualifies for the deduction. … For collateral estoppel to apply, the party seeking application of the doctrine must establish that (1) the issue decided in the earlier proceeding was identical to the issue presented in the later proceeding; (2) the earlier

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • State v. Brown

    100 Wash. App. 104 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 27, 2000

    We hold that the court properly denied Brown's witness immunity request as well as his motion to sever the felony murder count. … In other words, all crimes that did not arise from a single act or omission were clearly separate and distinct.

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • State Of Washington v. Benjamin Batson, Jr

    194 Wash. App. 326 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jun 6, 2016

    Martin de Porres Shelter program is sufficient to establish that Batson lacked a "fixed residence" during the charging period. … But as we explained earlier, the statute clearly specifies that some shelter programs are "fixed residences." Thus, whether Batson was "homeless" is immaterial.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • State v. Wilson

    6 Wash. App. 443 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Feb 18, 1972

    An objection was sustained to an attempt to establish the cost of his investment in his medical office and apartment facility. … Clearly, this factor would be of greater usefulness in some cases than in others.

    Cited 19 timesPublished
  • Ryan v. Department of Social & Health Services

    171 Wash. App. 454 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 25, 2012

    established at the time the department adopted its notice regulation. … At the time it was filed, it was clearly established that State action that imposes a stigma that alters an individual’s eligibility to *472 exercise rights under state law or to work in a chosen field implicates protected

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • Ringhofer v. Ridge

    172 Wash. App. 318 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Dec 10, 2012

    The plain language of RCW 2.36.072(4) clearly indicates that our legislature intended to limit the use of juror disqualification information to preliminarily determining whether persons summoned for jury service meet the … RCW 2.36-.072(4) clearly restricts public access to the juror disqualification information.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Clallam County v. Western Washington Growth Management Hearings Board

    130 Wash. App. 127 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 25, 2005

    While presumably the entire 7,500 acres of designated [agricultural resource land] would qualify, so would potentially thousands of other acres. … As of May 2001, the County had identified 6,995 acres of agricultural resource land and 21,753 acres of chapter 84.34 RCW qualified land.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Tift v. Professional Nursing Services, Inc.

    76 Wash. App. 577 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 1, 1995

    However, it nonetheless found for Tift on the ground that PNS had not established the third element of WAC 296-128-520(4)(b), namely, that her work "directly related to management policies or general business operations”. … Whether an exception applies in a particular case should be reviewed pursuant to the "clearly erroneous” standard.

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • Hodgins v. Oles

    8 Wash. App. 279 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jan 25, 1973

    Clearly the three head jailers, currently employed by the city, were invested with superior authority within the jail and had general authority to exercise their discretion in jail management. … This was necessary to the plaintiff to establish two ultimate facts (1) the degree of care exercised by the city and (2) the degree of mental incompetency of the plaintiff.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • State Of Washington V. American Tobacco Co.

    Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 16, 2023

    Because the State adopted the language from the Model Statute as its Qualifying Statute, section VII(c)(1) necessarily extends to the State’s Qualifying Statute. … Though the PMs’ issue statements could have been more clearly phrased, the State cannot justly argue that it was not aware of the PMs’ arguments. This issue is not waived.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Stevens County v. Futurewise

    192 P.3d 1 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Sep 4, 2008

    It was only after that meeting that the county added a subsection to SCC 13.10.034(3) that qualified the classification of critical habitat: C. … The county also fails to establish identity in the subject matter.

    Cited 16 timesPublished

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