Case law

Lauritzen v. Lauritzen

74 Wash. App. 432 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jun 2, 1994

A driver of a car clearly is not in control of the surrounding streets and highways or the conduct of other persons using those streets or highways. … The Pinkins court established a balance of interests to determine if a special relationship exists.

State v. Thomas

16 Wash. App. 1 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jul 28, 1976

On a prior occasion he traded apparently incriminating information for immunity from prosecution. Finally, on August 2, 1974, he would give no further statement because he had not consulted with his lawyer. … office, although a number of other persons qualified under the statute.

State v. Valladares

31 Wash. App. 63 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jan 15, 1982

Additionally, Campbell was not offered immunity from prosecution. … We note, further, that even where an informal understanding exists that immunity will be granted, such "immunity" is often contingent on supplying truthful information to the authorities.

Howe v. Douglas County

7 P.3d 883 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Sep 12, 2000

RCW 58.17.165 permits a municipality to require a waiver of damages "occasioned to the adjacent land by the established construction, drainage and maintenance of said road. " (Emphasis added.) … Unlike the waiver obligation in Employco, it is not a blanket statute immunizing Douglas County of any liability. The Howes next argue that the waiver runs contrary to the abolition of governmental immunity.

Howe v. Douglas County

102 Wash. App. 559 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Sep 12, 2000

RCW 58.17.165 permits a municipality to require a waiver of damages “occasioned to the adjacent land by the established construction, drainage and maintenance of said road.” (Emphasis added.) … Unlike the waiver obligation in Employco, it is not a blanket statute immunizing Douglas County of any liability. The Howes next argue that the waiver runs contrary to the abolition of governmental immunity.

State v. S.H.

75 Wash. App. 1 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jul 18, 1994

There were no medical reports to establish that K. had been injured or to what extent. … App. at 665 . 4 IV S.H. contends that the 260-week disposition is clearly excessive. We disagree. RCW 13.40.230(2)(b) requires a *13 determination that a disposition is neither clearly excessive nor clearly too lenient.

Star Iron & Steel Co. v. Pierce County

5 Wash. App. 515 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Aug 11, 1971

First, there is the scope of governmental tax immunity and the problem of when such immunity attaches. The next problem is what type of property interests are taxable under the Washington statute. … He has, as to himself, established the exempt status of the *529 personal property. See RCW 84.36.005.

Dot Foods, Inc. v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, STATE

173 P.3d 309 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Nov 27, 2007

Therefore, Dot Foods does not qualify for the exemption, and we affirm. II. … Clearly, the statute is written ambiguously. As stated above, we resolve ambiguities in favor of taxation and against exemption.

Gaspar v. Peshastin Hi-Up Growers

128 P.3d 627 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Feb 14, 2006

Gaspar had failed to establish a clearly mandated public policy for helping law enforcement. As a result, he failed to support a claim of wrongful termination in violation of such a public policy. Mr. … Gaspar established the clarity element of his claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy: the existence of a clearly mandated public policy for assisting a police investigation.

State v. SH

75 Wash. App. 1 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jul 18, 1994

There were no medical reports to establish that K. had been injured or to what extent. … RCW 13.40.230(2)(b) requires a *13 determination that a disposition is neither clearly excessive nor clearly too lenient. E.J.H., 65 Wn. App. at 775.

State of Washington v. Runions

32 Wash. App. 669 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jul 30, 1982

The statutes need not be identical for this presumption to operate; the presumption varies in strength with the similarity of the language, the established character of the decisions in the jurisdiction from which the language … That language is used here because its adequacy is clearly established. There seems to be little or no risk that a statute so phrased will be challenged for any defect in the scope of immunity.

State v. Sutherland

24 Wash. App. 719 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Nov 30, 1979

In exchange for immunity, he gave an extensive statement to the police, implicating the defendant. … In Cohen it was held that the prosecutor's failure to disclose the fact of immunity was not prejudicial error.

Osborn v. Mason County

95 P.3d 1257 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Aug 10, 2004

The plain language of former RCW 4.24.550(6), applicable here, does not grant the County immunity from suit. Where the Legislature intended to grant immunity it is expressed. … The statute clearly indicates that the County may be liable as "otherwise ... provided by law." Former RCW 4.24.550(6).

Azita Shirkhanloo, App. v. Laurie Olsen & Edward Schau, Resp.

Court of Appeals of Washington · Jul 14, 2014

only to qualified immunity in that role.25 In Buckley, the Court applied qualified, not absolute immunity to the prosecutor after he allegedly fabricated evidence and made inflammatory remarks during a press … NO. 70336-6-1/10 although Shirkhanloo claims that Gaines and Schau "lost qualified immunity," she fails to establish that qualified immunity applies here.

Michelbrink v. Washington State Patrol

180 Wash. App. 656 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Apr 23, 2014

Moreover, the parties do not cite, 18 nor are we aware of, any *669 Washington cases limiting such “certain injury” to major injuries. ¶18 On the contrary, RCW 51.24.020 expressly and clearly provides, “If injury results … Unlike Tegard’s declaration, however, we do not interpret WSP’s training materials as establishing certain injury for purposes of defeating summary judgment here.

Richard Turay, Andre Young, V Al Nerio, Mary Reger

Court of Appeals of Washington · Dec 13, 2016

Once a defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Robinson, 119 Wn.2d at 65-66. … Here, we elect to address the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis: whether the constitutional right that Turay alleges the SCC employees violated was clearly established.

Seybold v. Neu

19 P.3d 1068 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 23, 2001

See also McKee wherein the Supreme Court said: "We recently reiterated the rule that to establish the standard of care required of professional practitioners, that standard must be established by the testimony of experts … While the second step of this determination of materiality clearly does not require expert testimony, the first step almost as clearly does.

Seybold v. Neu

105 Wash. App. 666 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Feb 20, 2001

See also McKee wherein the Supreme Court said: “We recently reiterated the rule that to establish the standard of care required of professional practitioners, that standard must be established by the testimony of experts … While the second step of this determination of materiality clearly does not require expert testimony, the first step almost *682 as clearly does.

Peters v. Vinatieri

9 P.3d 909 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Sep 22, 2000

The road on which the agents drove is "clearly a private road and it is maintained entirely by myself." … See Laws of 1998, ch. 152, § 1. [5] Because we conclude that no fourth amendment violation occurred, we need not consider defendant Vinatieri's qualified immunity defense. See Benjamin v.

In Re Roberts

46 Wash. App. 748 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Feb 9, 1987

She points to the requirement in 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (f) that the determination to terminate parental rights be based upon "testimony of qualified expert witnesses". [4] The phrase "qualified expert witness" is meant to apply … The court concluded that these were "qualified expert witnesses" for the purposes of the ICWA. Fisher , at 553. Elaine Fiddler was well qualified within the meaning of the statute.