Case law

Drobny v. Boeing Co.

80 Wash. App. 97 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 30, 1995

The unchallenged evidence on summary judgment shows that Boeing retained the discretion to decide what would and would not qualify as serious misconduct. 4 Drobny also acknowledged that he misused accessible information to … Thus, his actions were clearly intentional. AP 580 states that intentional misconduct is particularly likely to result in dismissal without progressive discipline.

State v. Statler

248 P.3d 165 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 15, 2011

excessive or clearly too lenient." … Statler cannot establish prejudice." Opinion at 172.

Hoquiam v. EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMM'N

29 Wash. App. 319 · Court of Appeals of Washington · May 13, 1981

The "clearly erroneous" test cannot be applied adequately where the fact-finding process has been tainted. … To go this far does a serious disservice to the public and to Government agencies anxious to attract qualified personnel.

Johnson v. Ryan

186 Wash. App. 562 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 19, 2015

But the clearly predominant label that federal courts and our own have applied in identifying that speech whose character warrants special protection under the First Amendment is speech on issues or matters of “public concern … Associated Newspapers, 35 Cal. 2d 121, 124-25 , 216 P.2d 825 (1950) (construing the abuse language as merely making clear that the right of free speech does not guarantee immunity from liability). *598 ¶72 Of course, we avoid

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Farr

70 Wash. App. 759 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Aug 2, 1993

In this sense, it is implicit an individual suffer a potential adverse economic impact before he may qualify for time loss benefits. Mr. … The Holbrook court clearly held that the Loudon v.

American States v. Symes of Silverdale

45 P.3d 610 · Court of Appeals of Washington · May 3, 2002

Therefore, Trustee Ellis is correct that federal law clearly controls the creation of a bankruptcy estate and a debtor-in-possession's duties and capacity. … The court clearly stated in Ellwein , "Insureds must prove bad faith as a matter of law." Ellwein, 142 Wash.2d at 775-76 , 15 P.3d 640 .

Kenney v. Walla Walla County

45 Wash. App. 861 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Nov 18, 1986

By applying the above mentioned four criteria, we conclude the decision to open the range and the subsequent decision to close will not qualify as judicial action for purposes of RCW 7.16.040. … The State Legislature, in RCW 16.24.020, requires the board of county commissioners to hold a hearing "to hear all persons interested in the establishment of range areas or stock restricted areas ..."

Jason Dillon, App. v. Seattle Deposition Reporters, Et Ano., Resps.

Court of Appeals of Washington · Jan 21, 2014

SDR never attempted to establish, nor did the trial court find, good cause to lift the stay on all pending motions. … The plurality opinion relied on Const, art. 1, § 4, the right of petition, and Const, art. 1, § 12, privileges and immunities.

In Re Detention of Berry

248 P.3d 592 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 7, 2011

which encompasses both less commonly encountered paraphilias and those not yet sufficiently described to merit formal inclusion in the DSM-III-R." [21] The DSM-IV-TR provides a number of examples of paraphilia NOS, but clearly … McVey, 196 Ariz. 470 , 1 P.3d 113, 123 (2000) (" Frye is inapplicable when a qualified witness offers relevant testimony or conclusions based on experience and observation about human behavior for the purpose of explaining

Swinford v. RUSS DUNMIRE OLDSMOBILE, INCORP.

82 Wash. App. 401 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jun 28, 1996

Additionally, we affirm the directed verdict in *405 favor of Russ Dunmire on Swinford’s handicap discrimination claim because Swinford failed to establish he was handicapped. … Swinford introduced no medical evidence of a handicap, and he failed to establish a handicapping condition.

In Re Farina

972 P.2d 531 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Apr 13, 1999

Therefore, the controlled substance registration and penalty provisions of RCW 69.50 clearly do not apply. … Fortunately, RCW 18.64.011 qualifies its definitions with the saving language, "[u]nless the context clearly requires otherwise...." Here, the context clearly does require otherwise to avoid absurdity. State v.

State v. Rudolph

168 P.3d 430 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 2, 2007

proved these convictions, and (2) they were clearly comparable to at least one Washington "strike" offense for POAA purposes. … Blakely and Apprendi are grounded in the United States Constitution's Sixth Amendment and establish a defendant's minimum jury trial right.

State of Washington v. Anthony Laurence Wright

493 P.3d 1220 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Aug 24, 2021

Rehabilitation does not qualify as a mitigating factor under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW (SRA) Fixing appropriate penalties for crime is a legislative function.4 The legislature’s … Wright “First, a trial court may not base an exceptional sentence on factors necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sentence range.

State v. Mason

127 Wash. App. 554 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Apr 18, 2005

the statement fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. 4 The excited utterance exception is a firmly rooted hearsay exception, 5 and thus out-of-court statements made by unavailable witnesses were admissible if they qualified … The court clearly limited the admissibility of this testimony, and in this context, Santoso’s statement was not introduced to implicate Mason. Crawford is inapplicable. 5.

Hofstee v. Dow

109 Wash. App. 537 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Dec 20, 2001

Hofstee’s cows was determined to be a brucellosis reactor did not qualify as a sudden and dangerous event. … The risk that a cow would turn out to be a reactor was somewhat significant, but it was clearly foreseeable by parties that bargained at arm’s length.

State v. Law

146 Wash. App. 28 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jun 2, 2008

The examiners who wrote the summaries were not identified. ¶15 The trial court ruled that the contents of the letter were “clearly hearsay” and would not be admissible as substantive evidence. … But the court ruled that “to ask him about statements in the letter and asking him to explain it, deny it or admit it, [calls for] clearly inadmissible hearsay.” ¶16 The trial court’s ruling was correct.

Haselwood v. Bremerton Ice Arena, Inc.

137 Wash. App. 872 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Apr 10, 2007

Contractors are sufficiently pro *885 tected without carving out an exception to the rule that public property is immune to liens. f 35 Accordingly, the extent of RV Associates’ possible lien is limited to the improvements … Furthermore, when we read the mechanics’lien statute as a whole, it clearly establishes a single lien that attaches to the realty through the improvement. 5 *886 ¶39 RCW 60.04.011(5) defines improvements as: (a) Constructing

Donald And Kathleen Miller v. City Of Sammamish

447 P.3d 593 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Aug 19, 2019

In Exendine, this court explained: The Sammamish Municipal Code establishes the office of a hearing examiner. … SMC 23.100.010 establishes a fee assessment schedule for violations of the Sammamish City code.

Hearst Communications, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co.

86 P.3d 1194 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 22, 2004

Under the established rules for contract interpretation, we are constrained to agree. … The parties' declaration makes no mention of the marketplace, however, and the agreement clearly permits either party to terminate the agreement and escape a losing enterprise.

State v. Kepiro

61 Wash. App. 116 · Court of Appeals of Washington · May 6, 1991

Communications which qualify as threats are outside the realm of protected speech, State v. Brown, 50 Wn. App. 405, 411 , 748 P.2d 276 (1988), and one cannot innocently threaten to harm another person. … All that is required is that the defendant intentionally communicate the words which a *126 reasonable person would construe as a threat, and this requirement was clearly met here.