Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
3,562 results
0.73s
101 Wash. App. 801 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jul 7, 2000
To establish a prima facie case of a failure to accommodate, Fischer-McReynolds must show that (1) she is handicapped, 3 (2) she is qualified to fill a vacant position with her employer, and (3) her employer failed to reasonably … Fischer-McReynolds clearly was alleging violations of civil service statutes and regulations. Thus, she could not seek remedies in superior court until she first pursued available administrative remedies.
Cited 19 timesPublished14 Wash. App. 791 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jan 26, 1976
unable to produce medical evidence of future pain and suffering, the Wisconsin Supreme Court made this pertinent observation: These are the types of injuries as to which the prognostications of one who is not medically qualified … Such injuries are clearly objective in character even though the symptoms may be largely subjective. Olson v. Weitz, supra, is inapposite.
Cited 2 timesPublished77 Wash. App. 775 · Court of Appeals of Washington · May 9, 1995
Further, the question presented is one of law (and neither party contends otherwise) — whether Fettig’s ties to the Seattle address are sufficient to qualify that residence as "a usual place of abode”. Clingan v. … At one end of the scale, the parents’ home is clearly the usual place of abode. At the other end of the scale, the parents’ home is clearly not the usual place of abode. Fettig’s situation is a case in point.
Cited 18 timesPublished10 Wash. App. 205 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Dec 17, 1973
Yakima, 52 Wn.2d 617 , 328 P.2d 873 (1958), and the burden of establishing the invalidity of the ordinance rests upon the party challenging its constitutionality. Letterman v. Tacoma, 53 Wn.2d 294 , 333 P.2d 650 (1958). … Under such a set of reasonable assumptions, the ordinance would vitally affect the safety and welfare of Seattle citizens and thus have a rational basis and be clearly constitutional.
Cited 5 timesPublishedOlympic Pipe Line Co. v. Thoeny
101 P.3d 430 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Nov 23, 2004
A statute is presumed to be constitutional unless its unconstitutionality clearly appears. Moses Lake School Dist. No. 161 v. Big Bend Cmty. … And although the State enjoys a sovereign immunity from payment of interest, unless it places itself in a position of liability by contract or statute, [19] private entities (including Olympic) do not enjoy this immunity.
Cited 17 timesPublishedThomas Reger, V Amazon.com, Services Llc
Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 9, 2026
Reger asserts that his complaint alleges multiple facts supporting the elements of his CPA claim and Amazon’s actions are not immunized by the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230. … But assuming this could qualify as an injury under the CPA, as to Reger, it is not caused by mis-portrayal of a “standard residential-grade outlet (model ‘279-S00’),” which, to that point, Reger had never ordered.
Cited 0 timesUnpublishedGray v. Pierce County Housing Authority
97 P.3d 26 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Aug 31, 2004
PCHA clearly does not fall within the ambit of RCW 59.18.040(1). … The Grays gave up all claims to attorney fees when they settled with PCHA, leaving Gibson as the only class member qualifying under the fee-shifting provisions of RCW 59.18.290(1).
Cited 19 timesPublishedBombardi v. Pochel's Appliance & TV Co.
9 Wash. App. 797 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 16, 1973
We hold there was substantial evidence to support both challenged requirements necessary to establish strict liability. … the body of the instruction, since the jury was clearly instructed that prolonged use could be considered, but that factor alone was not enough to establish that the product was not defective.
Modified by Bombardi v. Pochel's Appliance & TV Co., 10 Wash. App. 243 (1973)Cited 24 timesPublishedWashington Trucking Ass'n v. Employment Security Department
192 Wash. App. 621 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Feb 9, 2016
The tortious interference claim clearly does not meet the third prong because it involves a request for monetary damages and would require extensive member participation to resolve it.5 Resolution of each member’s claim … The plaintiffs claimed that the taxes were discriminatory in violation of the dormant commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution. Id.
Cited 4 timesPublished14 Wash. App. 78 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Aug 4, 1975
The retainer agreement which was offered by the plaintiffs and accepted by the defendants clearly pertains only to representation of the father in his capacity as guardian for the child. … It is not that of the most highly skilled, nor is it that of the average member of the profession or trade, since those who have less than median or average skill may still be competent and qualified.
Cited 53 timesPublished39 Wash. App. 273 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Dec 24, 1984
Thus, the statements were too remote in time from the alleged events to qualify as excited utterances. Only Shawna's first statement was properly admitted at trial. 2. … The prosecution bears the burden of establishing this predicate. Roberts , at 74-75.
Reversed on other grounds by State v. Hieb, 107 Wash. 2d 97 (1986)Cited 16 timesPublishedOlympic Pipe Line Co. v. Thoeny
124 Wash. App. 381 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Nov 23, 2004
The statute reflects the established constitutional law of this state favoring damages over injunction as a remedy once property has been taken for public use. … And although the State enjoys a sovereign immunity from payment of interest, unless it places itself in a position of liability by contract or statute, 19 private entities (including Olympic) do not enjoy this immunity. ¶
Cited 17 timesPublished110 P.3d 791 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Apr 18, 2005
the value of additional procedural safeguards, and (3) the governmental interest, including costs and administrative burdens of additional procedures. [11] Here, the private interest affectedfreedom from confinementis clearly … 71.09.090(2), but any changes in the statute's language do not affect its holding. [20] RCW 71.09.070 provides in part: "The committed person may retain, or if he or she is indigent and so requests, the court may appoint a qualified
Cited 12 timesPublishedMichael J. York v. CSL Plasma, Inc. fka ZBA Plasma
Court of Appeals of Washington · Jul 23, 2015
The eventual February 7, 2014 hearing date therefore clearly complies with CR 56(a). Mr. … York had enough information to connect CSL Plasma to the injury to establish the essential elements of a personal injury claim.
Cited 0 timesUnpublishedNichols v. Seattle Housing Authority
171 Wash. App. 897 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Nov 13, 2012
. ¶8 Nichols requested an informal hearing to challenge the decision that her existing repayment agreement made her ineligible to qualify for a new one. Independent Hearing Officer M. … The court may also reverse the agency decision when it is “ ‘clearly erroneous.’ ” Mansour, 131 Wn. App. at 263 , quoting Polygon Corp. v.
Cited 8 timesPublished166 P.3d 786 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Aug 28, 2007
It then ruled that the information on the documents, in conjunction with Wilkins' testimony, established that the previous convictions were Lewis's. … Expert testimony is admissible under ER 702 if (1) the witness qualifies as an expert and (2) the expert's testimony would be helpful to the trier of fact. State v.
Cited 40 timesPublished58 Wash. App. 740 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Aug 13, 1990
Under these circumstances, "the information is immune from attack unless so obviously defective as not to charge the offense by any reasonable construction." Smith, 49 Wn. App. at 598 . … Nordby, 106 Wn.2d at 517-18 . *748 These reasons will be upheld if they are not clearly erroneous. Nordby, 106 Wn.2d at 518 .
Disapproved on other grounds by State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wash. 2d 93 (1991)Cited 17 timesPublishedEstate of Michael Dempsey v. Spokane Washington Hospital Co., LLC
Court of Appeals of Washington · Dec 14, 2017
The work product privilege provides a qualified immunity from this general discovery rule. Harris v. Drake, 152 Wn.2d 480, 486, 99 P.3d 872 (2004). CR 26(b) memorializes this immunity. … to establish a substantial need and 7 No. 34573-4-III In re Estate ofDempsey (dissent) undue hardship before reviewing the communication.
Cited 0 timesPublished12 Wash. App. 91 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Nov 18, 1974
The revenues received from City Light’s customers exclusively for the cost of conversion from an overhead to an underground electric power system were revenues necessary to construct or establish a distribution system. … Moreover, the revenue at issue before the court in Ken-newick is clearly distinguishable from the revenue received by the King County Water District and by Seattle City Light.
Cited 2 timesPublished248 P.3d 581 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Feb 23, 2011
Indeed, it clearly does not require processing of incomplete forms, but instead requires that the applicant be given the opportunity to complete the form in a timely manner. 42 U.S.C. § 15483 (b)(4)(B). … A qualified party shall be considered to have prevailed if the qualified party obtained relief on a significant issue that achieves some benefit that the qualified party sought. RCW 4.84.350(1) (emphasis added).
Cited 1 timesPublished
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