Case law

Robertson v. State Liquor Control Bd.

10 P.3d 1079 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 12, 2000

Clearly, Congress did not intend to preempt this field of law. Here, Mr. Robertson ran afoul of RCW 82.24. … In sum, under RCW 82.24.135(5), the person seeking recovery of a conveyance seized pursuant to RCW 82.24.130 bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she qualifies for an exemption from forfeiture

Sylvester v. Pierce County

201 P.3d 381 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Feb 10, 2009

We hold that the lots were not vested by March 1, 2005, and, as a result, Becker and the Collinses cannot qualify for a reasonable use exception. … We may grant relief from a land use decision here if the Sylvesters carry their burden of establishing one of the six standards of relief.

Sylvester v. Pierce County

148 Wash. App. 813 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Feb 10, 2009

We hold that the lots were not vested by March 1, 2005, and, as a result, Becker and the Collinses cannot qualify for a reasonable use exception. … We may grant relief from a land use decision here if the Sylvesters carry their burden of establishing one of the six standards of relief.

Herring v. Department of Social & Health Services

81 Wash. App. 1 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jan 16, 1996

The SSI facilitator position was established in 1987 to assist Washington state residents receiving General Assistance Unemployable benefits (GAU) to successfully apply for SSI benefits. … An *16 appellate court will overturn a jury verdict only if it is "clearly unsupported by substantial evidence.” Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co., 123 Wn.2d 93, 107-08 , 864 P.2d. 937 (1994); Adcox v.

Kramer v. J.I. Case Manufacturing Co.

62 Wash. App. 544 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Aug 26, 1991

For example, in a worker injury case in which the worker is partially negligent, a product manufacturer is liable only for its proportional share of liability, despite the injured worker's employer’s immunity from suit. … that Kramer had not really sought jobs for which he was qualified during the 3 years since the accident and that he apparently misrepresented his postaccident ability to play basketball. 12 We are inclined to agree that

State v. Barron

139 Wash. App. 266 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jun 18, 2007

Clearly, “should” is not “shall.” The consent letter uses both terms and could have used “shall” had the parties intended the notice requirement to be mandatory rather than merely directive. In Tennant v. … RCW 10.93.020(5) states that a reserve officer is a “Specially commissioned Washington peace officer” and “does not qualify under this chapter as a general authority Washington peace officer.”

Herring v. DEPT. OF SOC. AND HEALTH SERV.

914 P.2d 67 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 29, 1996

The SSI facilitator position was established in 1987 to assist Washington state residents receiving General Assistance Unemployable benefits (GAU) to successfully apply for SSI benefits. … An appellate court will only overturn a jury verdict if it is "clearly unsupported by substantial *77 evidence." Burnside v. Simpson, 123 Wash.2d 93, 107-08 , 864 P.2d 937 (1994); Adcox v.

Celeste Ryan, V. Jeff Timmerman

Court of Appeals of Washington · Feb 27, 2024

Nor did the summary explain how Matthew was qualified to testify on the cause of neurological symptoms. … A privileges and immunities clause claim first requires a legislative classification. Int’l Franchise Ass’n v. City of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389, 411 (9th Cir. 2015).

Center For Biological Diversity, App v. Dept. Of Fish And Wildlife, Resps

Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 27, 2020

This statute clearly contemplates a legal agency relationship. … A nonprofit organization is a qualified party under the EAJA.25 RCW 4.84.340(5). 25 “Qualified party” means in part “[A]n organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the federal internal revenue code of 1954 as

American Waterways Operators, Resp v. Pollution Control Hearings Board,et Al, App

435 P.3d 856 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 5, 2019

An “‘[o]rder,’ without further qualification, means a written statement of particular applicability that finally determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of a specific person … But the legislature has clearly limited the Board’s authority to hear appeals to adjudicative proceedings. RCW 43.21B.160. And adjudicative proceedings concern specific rights of specific parties.

Ronald J. Kraus, V. Washington State Patrol

Court of Appeals of Washington · Dec 6, 2022

“‘Exhaustion is required when: (1) a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an agency alone; (2) the agency has clearly established mechanisms for the resolution of complaints by aggrieved parties; and (3) the administrative … A qualified party shall be considered to have prevailed if the qualified party obtained relief on a significant issue that achieves some benefit that the qualified party sought. RCW 4.84.350(1).

State v. White

168 P.3d 459 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 4, 2007

The record clearly shows that Mr. White had an open invitation for which he was neither required nor expected to inform his mother or Mr. … Deputy Artz was clearly investigating.

State v. Walker

129 Wash. App. 258 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Aug 29, 2005

Washington, the United States Supreme Court established a rule barring admission of testimonial hearsay absent witness unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine with regard to the statement. [11] Because it … [as interrogation] under any conceivable *940 definition." [16] And in a subsequent case, the United States Supreme Court found that "police questioning during a Terry stop qualifies as an interrogation," and that "responses

State v. Downing

93 P.3d 900 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jul 20, 2004

But the Court held that Lee's conduct did not qualify. … Nor does this case fall squarely under the permissive joinder cases, where the conduct is clearly not the same. See, e.g., State v.

Hearst Communications, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co.

120 Wash. App. 784 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 22, 2004

Under the established rules for contract interpretation, we are constrained to agree. … The parties’ declaration makes no mention of the marketplace, however, and the agreement clearly permits either party to terminate the agreement and escape a losing enterprise.

Michael Segaline v. Dept. Of Labor & Industries

Court of Appeals of Washington · May 21, 2013

The court ruled in the alternative that Croft was entitled to qualified immunity. L I moved for summaryjudgment on Segaline's remaining claims. … Segaline has established a prima facie case of lack of probable cause by showing that the prosecution terminated in his favor. Rodriguez v. City ofMoses Lake, 158 Wn.

In re the Parenting & Support of S.M.L.

142 Wash. App. 110 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Dec 4, 2007

No additional fees will be allowed without prior authorization of the court. ¶23 Even though the current statutory language clearly allows the trial court to appoint a GAL in its discretion, Dugger relies on an older case … The current Parentage Act was established by Laws of 2002, chapter 302, and became effective on June 13, 2002.

State v. White

141 Wash. App. 128 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 4, 2007

The record clearly shows that Mr. White had an open invitation for which he was neither required nor expected to inform his mother or Mr. … Deputy Artz was clearly investi *143 gating.

American States Insurance v. Symes of Silverdale, Inc.

111 Wash. App. 477 · Court of Appeals of Washington · May 3, 2002

Idaho 2001) (casualty insurance policy itself and its proceeds qualify as property of the estate). … The court clearly stated in Ellwein , “Insureds must prove bad faith as a matter of law.” Ellwein, 142 Wn.2d at 775-76 .

Ray v. King County

120 Wash. App. 564 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 15, 2004

But these subsequent conveyances only establish that Hilchkanum understood that the railway had a right-of-way across his lands. … by stating that a “deed in statutory form grants [an] easement where additional language in the deed expressly and clearly limits or qualifies the interest granted.” 101 *597 Conversely, when the deed contains no language