Case law

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  • Avellaneda v. State

    167 Wash. App. 474 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 27, 2012

    The court held, “If these preliminary questions can be clearly and unequivocally answered in the affirmative, then the challenged act, omission, or decision can, with a reasonable degree of assurance, be classified as *481 … In order for a decision to qualify as discretionary, the State must show that the decision was the outcome of a conscious balancing of risks and advantages. Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 214-15 .

    Cited 46 timesPublished
  • McCluskey v. Handorff-Sherman

    68 Wash. App. 96 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Dec 21, 1992

    The dicta in Forks suggests a farther effort to qualify a government's duty to protect its inhabitants from third party conduct. There are unique policy reasons for limiting liability in these circumstances. … Any error in the giving of this instruction would be harmless because the jury clearly rejected the emergency theory when it found Handorff-Sherman 50 percent negligent. See Thomas v.

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Dan Young, V. Todd S. Rayan

    533 P.3d 123 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jul 24, 2023

    As applied to witnesses, the privilege is sometimes referred to as witness immunity, and under it, “[a]s a general rule, witnesses in judicial proceedings are absolutely immune from suit based on their testimony.” … Bender, however, discussed the difference between doctrines of absolute and qualified (and discretionary) immunity in the abstract, not as applied to any particular set of facts. 99 Wn.2d at 600.

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • Washington Public Employees Ass'n v. Personnel Resources Board

    127 Wash. App. 254 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Apr 26, 2005

    The Civil Service Law established a new State Personnel Board and brought most general government employees under the Board’s control. … Moreover, if we are to compare members of the designated class with persons outside the class, it should not matter whether all members of the designated class are treated alike because a class of one qualifies for equal

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Collins v. King County

    49 Wash. App. 264 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Sep 8, 1987

    The Anderson court upheld the district attorney's claim of immunity, stating as follows: While it is true that a prosecuting attorney acting in a matter which is clearly outside of the duties of his office is personally liable … Thus, responsibilities for the establishment and implementation of the VAU have been placed with the prosecuting attorney. Therefore, Kahaumia was carrying out a mandated function of the prosecuting attorney.

    Overruled in part, on other grounds by Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County, 119 Wash. 2d 91 (1992)Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Clipse v. Gillis

    20 Wash. App. 691 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jul 17, 1978

    Counsel has not called to our attention, nor do we find from our own examination of the record, any facts which would tend to establish the illegality of the warrants, or their illegal execution. … If these preliminary questions can be clearly and unequivocally answered in the affirmative, then the challenged act, omission, or decision can, with a reasonable degree of assurance, be classified as a discretionary governmental

    Overruled by Bender v. City of Seattle, 99 Wash. 2d 582 (1983)Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Manor v. Nestle Food Co.

    78 Wash. App. 5 · Court of Appeals of Washington · May 30, 1995

    Manor’s employer as a matter of law and, thus, immune from suit. The Manors contend the question is one of fact, not of law. … In the workers’ compensation claim, Nestle’s position was not adversarial while it is clearly an adversary in the present claim.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Donna Zink, et ux v. City of Mesa

    Court of Appeals of Washington · Apr 30, 2024

    However, we conclude that the right to video record a public meeting was not clearly established in 2003 and therefore Mayor Ross is entitled to qualified immunity. … it was clearly established in 2003.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Avellaneda v. State

    273 P.3d 477 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 27, 2012

    The court held, "If these preliminary questions can be clearly and unequivocally answered in the affirmative, then the challenged act, omission, or decision can, with a reasonable degree of assurance, be classified as a discretionary … In order for a decision to qualify as discretionary, the State must show that the decision was the outcome of a conscious balancing of risks and advantages. Taggart, 118 Wash.2d at 214-15 , 822 P.2d 243 .

    Cited 45 timesPublished
  • State v. Toomey

    38 Wash. App. 831 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Nov 5, 1984

    Immunity would have jeopardized his conviction, for if he were successful in obtaining a reversal, he could not be tried again. State v. Runions, 100 Wn.2d 52 , 665 P.2d 1358 (1983). … It is debatable whether Toomey's claim qualifies, but we nevertheless elect to consider it. 6 In Michael M. v.

    Cited 41 timesPublished
  • Ranger Insurance v. Pierce County

    138 Wash. App. 757 · Court of Appeals of Washington · May 22, 2007

    These bond companies are justified by the Superior Court through an established process designed to show that the company is qualified to conduct business in this field. … McAllister implies that Signature had authority because “[t]hese bond companies are justified by the Superior Court through an established process designed to show that the company is qualified to conduct business in this

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Adult Student Housing, Inc. v. Department of Revenue

    41 Wash. App. 583 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Aug 23, 1985

    This is consistent with the well established rule of narrowly construing exemption statutes. … RCW 84.36.030 requires more to qualify for an exemption.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Smith v. State

    135 Wash. App. 259 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Sep 18, 2006

    immunity. ¶15 The trial court dismissed all of the Smiths’ claims. … Doe 22 expressly held that the initial inquiry in determining whether a cause of action exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is whether the statutory language clearly and unambiguously creates a right.

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • Smith v. State

    144 P.3d 331 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Sep 18, 2006

    , the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act does not create a constitutional right, the Act provides a remedy in the form of an administrative appeal, and the named defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. ¶ 15 … Doe [23] expressly held that the initial inquiry in determining whether a cause of action exists under § 1983 is whether the statutory language clearly and unambiguously creates a right.

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • City of Wenatchee v. Chelan County Public Utility District No. 1

    181 Wash. App. 326 · Court of Appeals of Washington · May 20, 2014

    It argues that the court more clearly expressed the principle of law necessary to its disposition when it said: [Algona] argues that governmental immunity should not apply because the [King] County operation of a solid waste … Seattle Popular Monorail Authority, 156 Wn.2d 752, 758 , 131 P.3d 892 (2006), our Supreme Court stated that the provision “clearly establishes that the state legislature may delegate to the corporate authorities of municipalities

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Greensun Group Llc v. City Of Bellevue

    436 P.3d 397 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 4, 2019

    Because 19 qualified applicants sought to open shops in Bellevue, the LCB held a lottery on May 2, 2014. Greensun ranked fifth. … Discretionary Immunity Second, the City argues its actions were privileged based on discretionary immunity. When the legislature passed RCW 4.92.090, it abolished sovereign immunity.

    Cited 34 timesPublished
  • Snedigar v. Hodderson

    53 Wash. App. 476 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Feb 21, 1989

    The record does not clearly establish when Snedi-gar discovered that this alleged conversion occurred. … The privilege is qualified, not absolute; therefore, it cannot be used as a blanket bar to discovery.

    Reversed in part by Snedigar v. Hoddersen, 114 Wash. 2d 153 (1990)Cited 41 timesPublished
  • Anica v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

    84 P.3d 1231 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Feb 24, 2004

    Next, Anica claims that despite the Washington Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), Wal-Mart does not enjoy immunity from her lawsuit. … individuals on the basis of national origin or citizenship status. [47] Congress therefore incorporated in IRCA protections for "protected individuals." [48] Anica would derive no benefit even if we were to recognize a clearly

    Cited 28 timesPublished
  • Moore v. Wayman

    85 Wash. App. 710 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Apr 11, 1997

    This state abolished sovereign immunity in 1967. RCW 4.96.010. 2 The public duty doctrine is not another form of sovereign *717 immunity. J & B Dev. Co. v. King County, 100 Wn.2d 299, 303-306 , 699 P.2d 468 (1983). … The buyers rebut the inspectors’ assertions with the testimony of experts that any qualified inspector should have known that these defects had not been corrected.

    Cited 25 timesPublished
  • Hildahl v. Bringolf

    5 P.3d 38 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jul 28, 2000

    The Act established "a system of compulsory state industrial insurance," under which "all awards are paid from the accident fund." Greenleaf v. … into the state industrial insurance fund. [17] Nor was Bringolf a qualified self-insurer. [18] U.S.

    Abrogated on other grounds by State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621 (2018)Cited 12 timesPublished

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