Case law

City of Wenatchee v. Boundary Review Board

39 Wash. App. 249 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Dec 20, 1984

Second, a statute is presumed constitutional unless its invalidity clearly appears or is made to appear beyond a reasonable doubt. Port of Tacoma v. Parosa, supra at 184. … The court held the benefits of the act encompassed any area of the state which may elect to qualify under it, and therefore the act was a general, not special, law. See also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.

Miller v. City of Bainbridge Island

111 Wash. App. 152 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Apr 12, 2002

The Strawberry Plant clearly did not qualify as residential; therefore, in 1969, the Strawberry Plant’s then-current uses became legal nonconforming uses. … Substantial evidence in the record clearly supports the hearing examiner’s determination that Miller failed to sustain his burden on this issue, and it is affirmed.

Scarsella Bros., Inc. v. Department of Licensing

53 Wash. App. 882 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Apr 24, 1989

The amendment does not "give back" any collected tax, it only changes the procedure for qualifying for an exemption. … [is] consumed in the propulsion of motor vehicles on the highways of this state, unless the contrary is established by satisfactory evidence.'' (Italics ours.)

State v. Bello

176 P.3d 554 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Feb 4, 2008

. ¶ 11 It is well established that article 1, section 7 provides greater protection of the privacy interest in a vehicle and its contents than does the Fourth Amendment. Parker, 139 Wash.2d at 493-95 , 987 P.2d 73 . … therefore, not subject to the vehicle exigency exception to the warrant requirement. ¶ 20 Lopez's contention—that because a vehicle subject to a traffic stop may be presumed to be the property of the driver, the vehicle is immune

JL Storedahl & Sons, Inc. v. Clark County

180 P.3d 848 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Apr 8, 2008

In 1973, the County amended the F-X zone to limit permitted uses, but provided: All uses in existence and occurring on a specific parcel of land which legally qualified as "permitted uses" under provisions of the former F-X … CP at 121-22. ¶ 33 Clearly, the Board disagreed with the Examiner's determination of what the applicable base level would be if the Examiner denied the rezone application.

State v. Ieremia

78 Wash. App. 746 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jul 31, 1995

The court denied the request on the ground that the evidence established either second degree rape or no rape at all. The jury found Singh guilty as charged. … However, none of these cases establishes that third degree rape is a lesser included offense of second degree rape.

State v. Russell

141 Wash. App. 733 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Nov 14, 2007

At sentencing, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Russell had two prior convictions “of the most serious offense[ ],” thereby qualifying him as a persistent offender under the POAA enumerated in … GR 16(c)(l)-(3). ¶18 Here, the record clearly shows that the trial court complied with the GR 16 requirements.

McMILIAN v. King County

255 P.3d 739 · Court of Appeals of Washington · May 2, 2011

"The use of property must actually be established prior to the adoption of the zoning ordinance to qualify as a nonconforming use thereafter." Anderson v. … In contrast, in the present case the nonconforming commercial use clearly vested in 1972."

State v. Garcia

193 P.3d 181 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Sep 23, 2008

And that is clearly a requirement of the statute under which he was prosecuted. RCW 9A.36.031(1)(a) ("A person is guilty of assault in the third degree if he ... … It is an immunity statute for civil actions against mercantile establishments. And this is a criminal prosecution. ¶ 26 Mr. Garcia also argues that the State did not prove all elements of the federal assault statute.

Miller v. City of Bainbridge Island

43 P.3d 1250 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Apr 12, 2002

The Strawberry Plant clearly did not qualify as residential; therefore, in 1969, the Strawberry Plant's then-current uses became legal nonconforming uses. … Substantial evidence in the record clearly supports the hearing examiner's determination that Miller failed to sustain his burden on this issue, and it is affirmed.

Edelman v. State

160 Wash. App. 294 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Feb 23, 2011

Indeed, it clearly does not require processing of incomplete forms, but instead requires that the applicant be given the opportunity to complete the form in a timely manner. 42 U.S.C. § 15483 (b)(4)(B). … A qualified party shall be considered to have prevailed if the qualified party obtained relief on a significant issue that achieves some benefit that the qualified party sought. RCW 4.84.350(1) (emphasis added).

Brelvis Consulting, Llc v. State Of Washington

430 P.3d 685 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Nov 20, 2018

Second, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of our state constitution treats citizens and corporations as separate categories. … More importantly, the BBB page clearly relates to Brelvis and describes a “pattern of complaints” regarding Brelvis’ failure to consolidate loans and respond to customer requests for refunds. CP at 164.

Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance v. Jerome

66 Wash. App. 756 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Aug 3, 1992

As a passenger in the Ederers' car, Jerome qualified as an insured under the liability provision of the Ederers' automobile insurance policy. … Ederer's bums clearly arose from his operation of the vehicle at the time of the accident and from his attempt to save the vehicle from destruction.

D.W. Close Co. v. Department of Labor & Industries

143 Wash. App. 118 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Feb 11, 2008

“An agency acting within the ambit of its administrative functions normally is best qualified to interpret its own rules, and its interpretation is entitled to considerable deference by the courts.” Pac. … It clearly reflects one view of industry practice and was not “willful and unreasoning and taken without regard to the attending facts or circumstances.” Wash. Indep., 148 Wn.2d at 905 .

Matter of Estate of Price

73 Wash. App. 745 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Apr 18, 1994

They claimed that Leland’s will was ambiguous, and argued that extrinsic evidence established his intent as regards the house. … Finally, she was of sound mind and qualified at law to be a witness. On these facts, Leann’s signature as a notary could properly be treated instead as the signature of an attesting witness.

In Re The Marriage Of: Gabriel Y. Lee v. Carol Ann Kennard

Court of Appeals of Washington · Sep 16, 2013

Qualified Domestic Relations Order Kennard argues that the trial court erred by refusing to enter the QDRO as presented by her attorney. … The language of RCW 26.09.140 clearly makes an award of fees and costs discretionary.

State v. Lessley

59 Wash. App. 461 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Nov 2, 1990

as the "same criminal conduct". 4 Clearly, the Legislature intends a narrow construction. … This result accords with the well-established rules that the more specific statute controls over a conflicting, more general statute, 8 and that the Legislature is presumed to be familiar with its prior legislation. 9 In

State v. Balzer

91 Wash. App. 44 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Apr 17, 1998

The court rejected the proposal and summarily refused to accommodate or immunize the Ethiopian Coptic Church’s use of marijuana in religious practices. Id. at 1462-63 . … The regulation of marijuana is clearly designed *66 to protect society as a whole.

McMilian v. King County

161 Wash. App. 581 · Court of Appeals of Washington · May 2, 2011

“The use of property must actually be established prior to the adoption of the zoning ordinance to qualify as a nonconforming use thereafter.” Anderson v. … In contrast, in the present case the nonconforming commercial use clearly vested in 1972.” Van Sant, 69 Wn. App. at 652 (citation omitted).

City Of Seattle, V. Delaura & Fred B. Norg

491 P.3d 237 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jul 19, 2021

Source of Duty In 1961, the legislature repealed the State’s sovereign immunity for governmental functions. LAWS OF 1961, ch. 136 § 1 (codified as RCW 4.92.090). … In Beltran-Serrano, our Supreme Court clearly held that “[a]t common law, every individual owes a duty of reasonable care to refrain from 3 See Medic One, SEATTLE.GOV, http://www.seattle.gov/fire/about-us/about-the- department