Case law

Davis v. State

30 P.3d 460 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 6, 2001

recreational use immunity statutes. … use immunity statutes.

Kilbourn v. City of Seattle

43 Wash. 2d 373 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 1, 1953

The hardships and injustices arising from the defense of governmental immunity — of which this case is typical— are unquestionably the reason some courts have from time to time permitted the transmutation of what are clearly … public policy should be by legislative enactment and not by the expedient of placing a “nuisance” label on what are clearly negligence actions.

Kelso v. City of Tacoma

63 Wash. 2d 913 · Washington Supreme Court · Mar 5, 1964

This court has consistently held that the doctrine of governmental immunity is a matter of state policy which can be changed only by the legislature. This established pronouncement was recently stated in Kilbourn v. … The legislature has clearly indicated its intention to change the public policy of the state. The doctrine of gov *919 ernmental immunity was not preserved to the municipal branches of government.

State v. Tracy

147 P.3d 559 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 22, 2006

We conclude that she did not establish she was a "qualifying patient" entitled to present a compassionate use defense under RCW 69.51A.010(3). … As noted above, the ballot title of I-692 clearly covers Ms. Tracy and others like her.

Emsley v. Army National Guard

106 Wash. 2d 474 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 31, 1986

The National Guard may be ordered into active federal service pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 3500 , which establishes the grounds and procedures for such an order. … In order that a decision of a governmental official or agency qualify for immunity under the Evangelical exception, four questions must be affirmatively answered: (1) Does the challenged act . . . necessarily involve a basic

Wynn v. Earin

163 Wash. 2d 361 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 3, 2008

This kind of testimony is clearly encompassed by the witness immunity rule. … Wynn maintains that because he successfully established some violations of the Act, i.e., Ms.

Automotive United Trades Organization v. State

175 Wash. 2d 214 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 30, 2012

A substantial interest that “arises from terms in bargained contracts” may qualify. Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. … Accordingly, a determination that a party was “necessary” often led to a rubber-stamping of the party as “indispensable.” ¶33 To counter this trend, federal joinder rules were amended in 1966 to clearly “condition [ ] a finding

Costanich v. Department of Social & Health Services

164 Wash. 2d 925 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 30, 2008

. ¶1 This case asks us to determine whether RCW 4.84.350, which provides a statutory cap on attorney fees, establishes a limit for each level of judicial review of an agency action or on all levels of review combined. … We agree that the EAJA, similar to its federal counterpart, provides a partial waiver of sovereign immunity in allowing litigants to recover fees and costs from the State.

State Ex Rel. Sater v. State Board of Pilotage Commissioners

198 Wash. 695 · Washington Supreme Court · May 2, 1939

We are clearly of the opinion that appellants Landstrom and Jensen should have been permitted to take the examination on June 11, 1935, and that for the benefit of these two appellants, at least, the board should be compelled … I, of our state constitution, we find the same guaranty, in substance, as follows: “No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation, other than municipal, privileges or immunities which,

Segaline v. State, Dept. of Labor & Indus.

238 P.3d 1107 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 19, 2010

. ¶ 1 We are asked to decide whether a government agency qualifies as a "person" under RCW 4.24.510. … Does a government agency qualify as a "person" under RCW 4.24.510?

Segaline v. STATE, DEPT. OF LABOR & INDUS.

238 P.3d 1107 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 19, 2010

. ¶ 1 We are asked to decide whether a government agency qualifies as a "person" under RCW 4.24.510. … Does a government agency qualify as a "person" under RCW 4.24.510?

Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane

134 Wash. 2d 947 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 23, 1998

As in Bateson claims of absolute immunity should be denied and defendants’ liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 established. … Municipalities enjoy no qualified immunity from suit. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 , 100 S. Ct. 1398 , 63 L. Ed. 2d 673 (1980); Robinson v.

Entila v. Cook

Washington Supreme Court · Jan 12, 2017

RCW 51.08.013 then establishes employer immunity and defines "acting in the course of employment." … Although RCW 51.08.013 establishes benefit eligibility and employer immunity, it does not control third party immunity, which is the issue this case presents.

Madison v. State

163 P.3d 757 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 26, 2007

Respondents have failed to establish that felons' right to vote qualifies as an important right under federal case law. … ¶ 65 Despite prior case law establishing a sound, historical, and relatively simple approach to application of our constitution's privileges and immunities clause, the majority errs in its analysis.

State v. Reis

183 Wash. 2d 197 · Washington Supreme Court · May 7, 2015

In this context, the amended MUCA clearly establishes a tiered system of protections for compliant, qualifying users of medical marijuana: RCW 69.51A-.040 and a series of affirmative defenses for qualifying patients failing … Instead, qualifying patients and designated providers are provided with an affirmative defense and RCW 69.51A-.040 establishes the elements for raising that defense.

Andersen v. King County

158 Wash. 2d 1 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 26, 2006

" and *994 whether respondents' claim qualifies. … But it is clearly not the same as equal protection.

Smoke v. City of Seattle

132 Wash. 2d 214 · Washington Supreme Court · May 22, 1997

On March 6, 1990, Plaintiffs sent a letter to the City disputing the Metro letter’s conclusions and claiming the rectifier did not qualify as a principal structure. … Although the City protests RCW 64.40 lacks an express waiver of sovereign immunity from postjudgment interest, by consenting to suit for damages from land use decisions the City impliedly waived immunity from the liabilities

Wynn v. Earin

181 P.3d 806 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 3, 2008

This kind of testimony is clearly encompassed by the witness immunity rule. … Wynn maintains that because he successfully established some violations of the act, i.e., Ms.

Jenkins v. State

85 Wash. 2d 883 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 2, 1975

Third, RCW 4.96 and RCW 36.45.030 are not clearly inconsistent and repugnant to each other. … In reality, sovereign immunity has nothing to do with the ultimate classifications which conditions establish.

Smoke v. City of Seattle

937 P.2d 186 · Washington Supreme Court · May 22, 1997

On March 6, 1990, Plaintiffs sent a letter to the City disputing the Metro letter's conclusions and claiming the rectifier did not qualify as a principal structure. … Although the City protests RCW 64.40 lacks an express waiver of sovereign immunity from postjudgment interest, by consenting to suit for damages from land use decisions the City impliedly waived immunity from the liabilities