Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Getchell v. AUTO BAR SYS. N. INC.

    73 Wash. 2d 831 · Washington Supreme Court · May 9, 1968

    As a defense, defendants asserted truth and absolute or qualified privilege. … We find, upon reviewing the instructions given by the trial court, that the substance of these proffered instructions was amply and clearly covered in instructions dealing with the defenses of truth and qualified privilege

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • In Re Kurtzman's Estate

    65 Wash. 2d 260 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 19, 1964

    The "unless" clause is clearly separated from clause 1, which deals with the computation of the degree of kindred and is clearly subordinate to clause 2, which deals with the rights of inheritance between whole and half bloods … Clearly, this section treats only of kindred of the half blood, for it is their rights alone which are therein defined and limited.

    Cited 23 timesPublished
  • Jordan v. O'BRIEN

    79 Wash. 2d 406 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 24, 1971

    The stipulated facts establish that Judge Kuykendall (having attained the mandatory retirement age of 75) was required to retire December 31, 1949. Const, art. 4, § 3(a) (amendment 25). … Simple calculation indicates that Judge Jordan served 18 years and 361 days (i.e., 4 days short of 1 full year beyond the qualifying 18th year).

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Peoples National Bank v. Schaeffer

    65 Wash. 2d 260 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 19, 1964

    The “unless” clause is clearly separated from clause 1, which deals with the computation of the degree of kindred and is clearly subordinate to clause 2, which deals with the rights of inheritance between whole and half bloods … Clearly, this section treats only of kindred of the half blood, for it is their rights alone which are therein defined and limited.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • McHugh v. Douglass

    165 Wash. 123 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 6, 1931

    Barbara McHugh qualified as executrix and, as required by the statute (Rem. Comp. Stat., § 1477), she caused to be published a notice of her appointment as executrix and a notice to creditors to file their claims. … Whatever her purpose, the executrix by her notice and order clearly allowed the respondent’s claim as a valid claim against the separate property of the decedent. The order appealed from is affirmed. Tolman, C.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Aba Sheikh v. Choe

    156 Wash. 2d 441 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 16, 2006

    We concluded the trial court correctly instructed *462 the jury that the burden of establishing the injury was segregable and that the burden of apportioning the harm fell upon the lone remaining (at-fault) defendant. … Tegman is also harmful because it prevents full and fair compensation to victims that the legislature clearly intended to fully compensate. RCW 4.22.070(l)(b).

    Cited 130 timesPublished
  • State Ex Rel. Taylor v. Lawler

    2 Wash. 2d 488 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 1, 1940

    In his application, the relator alleged that he is a resident of Seattle, King county, Washington, an elector and taxpayer therein, and a skilled and qualified court reporter. … But such a promise is clearly legally unenforceable, and cannot be said to establish a tangible, or even an inchoate, right.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Smith v. Department of Labor & Industries

    8 Wash. 2d 587 · Washington Supreme Court · May 5, 1941

    It is a well-established rule of grammar, which has been recognized and adopted by all the courts, that *592 a qualifying and limiting phrase relates only to the last antecedent; and in the statute before us, the limiting … It would be indeed a technical interpretation and strained construction, a reading into the statute of language other than that employed by the legislature, to express for the legislature an intent it clearly did not entertain

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • Honcoop v. State

    111 Wash. 2d 182 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 15, 1988

    The first and third elements are clearly satisfied. The Director is responsible for the enforcement of the brucel-losis control program. RCW 16.36.020 and .040. … As these decisions involve high level discretionary acts exercised at the executive level, the State is entitled to governmental immunity. See Evangelical United Brethren Church v.

    Cited 132 timesPublished
  • Smith v. Bates Technical College

    139 Wash. 2d 793 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 27, 2000

    Prior judicial decisions may also establish the public policy. Thompson, 102 Wn.2d at 232 . … The court will not intervene and administrative remedies must be exhausted when: (1) a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an agency alone; (2) the agency has clearly established mechanisms for the resolution of

    Cited 76 timesPublished
  • In re the Estate of Fellin

    108 Wash. 626 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 2, 1919

    The trial court, after hearing, denied the petition and confirmed the previous appointment of Merritt, holding that the appellant was a nonresident of the state of Washington, and therefore not qualified for appointment as … Although our statute does not clearly establish the procedure, it must be that notice of the petition be given in order for the court to appoint an administrator and remove another who has theretofore been appointed.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Public Utility District No. 1 v. Inland Power & Light Co.

    64 Wash. 2d 122 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 2, 1964

    Eliminating the REA as a party to the amended petition may be sufficient to protect the petition from pretrial attack, but trial on the merits clearly established the interest of the United States in the property. … is established that in this particular case such payment cannot be made.

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • In re the Recall of Carey

    132 Wash. 2d 525 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 17, 1997

    RCW 35.43, however, governs the establishment of local improvement districts and therefore does not apply to this case. … to provide the services required for the proposed project” based on established criteria.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • State v. Haffer

    94 Wash. 136 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 29, 1916

    The malicious intention of the defendant to injure the family and posterity of deceased must be expressly averred and clearly proved.” In the leading case of The King v. Topham, 4 Durn. & East. … Judge Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations (7th ed.), p. 46, observes: “It is to be observed of this instrument, that being framed for the establishment of a national government, it is a settled rule of construction that

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Hagerman v. City of Seattle

    189 Wash. 694 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 8, 1937

    Many reasons have been assigned by the various courts for the immunity granted to municipal corporations when acting in a governmental capacity. … Despite these attacks, addressed to the foundation *698 and wisdom of the rule, the courts have, almost without exception, adhered to the precedent established by the decisions.

    Cited 38 timesPublished
  • Ravenscroft v. Washington Water Power Co.

    136 Wash. 2d 911 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 24, 1998

    WWP and the County each claimed that it was immune from liability under Washington’s recreational use statute, RCW 4.24.200-.210. … In order for the legislative intent exception to apply, the regulation establishing a duty must intend to identify and protect a particular and circumscribed class of persons, and this intent must be clearly expressed within

    Cited 101 timesPublished
  • DeFunis v. Odegaard

    84 Wash. 2d 617 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 12, 1974

    Thus, the court’s opinion, standing alone, establishes a precedent not only'for'-the operation of the university but inevitably establishes-principles applicable to all governmental agencies and institutions of the state … He was in school not because the law school admitted him as a qualified student but because a court had ordered his admission.

    Cited 35 timesPublished
  • Osborn v. Chapman

    62 Wash. 2d 495 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 11, 1963

    To overcome the immunity of a host, the statute enumerates intentional injury as one basis for establishing liability, and that term, rather than wanton misconduct, should have been defined. … He advised the jury clearly as to the effect of contributory negligence or wanton misconduct upon the part of the deceased passenger. All of the terms were correctly defined.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Reninger v. State Dept. of Corrections

    951 P.2d 782 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 26, 1998

    contrary to the statutory repeal of sovereign immunity. … Houser does not stand for the proposition that an employee is immune from liability if he acts within the scope of his duties.

    Cited 92 timesPublished
  • Sedlacek v. Hillis

    145 Wash. 2d 379 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 20, 2001

    Prior judicial decisions may also establish the relevant public policy. … Under the ADA, the term “discriminate” includes “excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known

    Cited 56 timesPublished

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